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ABSTRACT 
Rising oil prices have been a concern for both developed and developing countries, especially in 
more recent years as it tends to have a crippling effect on production and transportation. Many 
countries have moved towards the development of fossil fuel alternatives as a means of 
achieving energy independence and achieving environmental targets (for example the Kyoto 
Protocol). Developments in both these types of energy markets (fossil fuel and renewable fuels) 
may impact Canadian Prairie agriculture. 
 
Most of Canadian prairie crops are exported. The Canadian prairies are land locked to some 
extent. The closest ocean access to the eastern portion of the prairies is the port of Churchill, but 
is closed during the winter season. Crops are therefore transported west through the Rocky 
Mountains or east through the Great Lakes to get to a port. This requires hundreds of kilometres 
of truck and rail transportation, which is fuel dependent. To a lesser extent, at the micro-level 
farmers depend on fossil fuels to operate machinery to facilitate efficient crop production. If oil 
prices continue on an upward trajectory, will farmers cropping behaviour change? 
 
Furthermore, the development of the bioethanol industry on the Canadian prairies has given 
wheat farmers another crop option. As oil prices increase, the price of ethanol increases as well. 
Also, demand is bolstered by renewable fuel standards and government tax exemptions or 
subsidies. 
  
This study seeks to put forward the notion that as oil prices increase, crop production and 
transportation costs also increase thereby reducing farmers’ gross margins. Also, ceteris paribus, 
as oil prices increase there will be an increased demand for, and an increase in the price of 
biofuels thereby increasing the price of biofuel feedstock. Higher feedstock prices are expected 
to increase the gross margins of farmers. Therefore higher oil prices drive increased crop 
competition between traditional cropping (cropping for food exports) and energy cropping. 
 
This thesis seeks to ascertain at what level of oil prices would farmers, in general, be willing to 
switch from producing wheat for traditional (hard/food wheat) purposes to bioenergy (soft/ 
biofuel wheat) cropping alternatives. Also under varying scenarios of oil price growth and 
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government support to the biofuel industry, this thesis seeks to ascertain the impact of biofuel 
industry expansion on grain elevator pricing behaviour and the structure of the elevator industry, 
assuming elevators spatially compete with each other for farmers’ crops. 
 
An agent based model (ABM) is employed for this study. The model is selected over other types 
as the researcher wants to capture the increased complexity stemming from the competition 
between crops that belong to at least one distribution chain. Agent based networks allow for 
emergent behaviour that is obtained from the spatial competition of elevators. Finally, the agent 
based model allows for spatial heterogeneity in location of farmers in terms of soil quality and 
their proximity to an elevator, which affects crop productivity and transportation costs, 
respectively. 
 
The ABM (also called the FARMCHAIN model) is comprised of over 35000 farmer agents, 176 
elevator agents, 6 canola crushing plant agents, 5 ethanol plant agents and 1 biodiesel plant agent 
located on the 20 census agricultural regions (CARs) of Saskatchewan. Farmers allocate land 
based on their expected gross margins. Farmers produce and truck crops to the designated 
distribution chain. Crops move through the chain and at every stage the associated costs are 
computed and apportioned to the farmer. At the end of the period, gross margins are computed 
and these gross margins are used in computing the expected gross margins for the subsequent 
period. 
 
It is found that real annual crude prices would have to be greater than $133 before farmers begin 
to switch to producing biofuel wheat (soft wheat) from food wheat (hard wheat). This would 
have to be approximately 30% higher than that of 2008 in which crude prices were at record 
levels. Also, if biofuel support is declining then it would take a considerably higher price to 
entice farmers, in aggregate, to switch.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE IMPACT OF ENERGY MARKETS ON THE 
CANADIAN FOOD WHEAT SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
1.1 Background and Introduction 
While energy markets have held the world stage for a number of years through restricted supply 
and price spikes (Johnson, 1981; Norton, 1988; Hamilton, 1996; Le Blanc and Chinn, 2004; 
Vielle and Viguier, 2007), more recent concerns about food adequacy and sovereignty have 
arisen from the fact that high oil prices have driven the development of renewable fuel 
technology which has led to a significant reallocation of food supplies to energy production 
(Brown and Funk, 2008). In addition, more recent concerns of global warming and political 
turmoil in the Middle East and Africa (Barsky and Kilian, 2004) have prompted the development 
of renewable energy and have indirectly exacerbated food adequacy and sovereignty concerns.  
 
These developments in the energy markets may have important implications for Saskatchewan 
agriculture from two perspectives. Firstly, as energy prices increase, so does the return to 
growing energy crops, and therefore, farmers are faced with the decision to allocate land to 
traditional crops (such as wheat for food, canola, barley, field peas etc.) as opposed to energy 
crops. Secondly, higher energy prices increase production and transportation costs of export 
crops, which dominate Saskatchewan cropping agriculture. This in turn reduces the returns to 
crop farming and more specifically, traditional crop farming. 
 
Although energy prices may have a direct impact on crop production through the use of fuel to 
operate farm machinery, energy prices may impact Canadian prairie agriculture indirectly as 
well. Prairie export crops are at the start of a long supply chain that begins with bulk agricultural 
commodities that are transported over road, rail, lakes and oceans to diverse demand points. 
Therefore, energy prices are not only an important input to crop production, but can be of equal 
importance to other components in the distribution chain. Thus it is not only important to assess 
the vulnerability of crop production to changes in energy prices but to assess the impact on the 
supply chain as a whole. 
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In a context of volatile energy prices and governments’ increasing concern about clean and 
sustainable energy, there has been a significant increase in demand for fossil fuel alternatives 
within the past decade. This has been made manifest in the implementation of increased biofuel 
mandates by many countries (Gorter and Just, 2009), which has in turn fostered growth and 
developments in both bioethanol and biodiesel production. However, many of the biofuel 
alternatives may compete directly or indirectly with food. Therefore, the impact of world energy 
prices and domestic bioenergy markets on Canadian crop production may introduce potential 
temporal feedbacks between food crop and biofuel crop production. This thesis focuses on the 
effect these changes will have on Saskatchewan’s crop production and on the grain elevator 
industry. 
 
In Saskatchewan, the cropping decisions of farmers have evolved from the wheat-barley-canola 
dominance in the 1980’s to canola-wheat-dry pea dominance in 2010 (Saskatchewan Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2012). Within the past 10 years there has been a significant increase in the 
percentage of land seeded to canola with corresponding declines in the percentages for wheat and 
barley. The increase in canola acres occurred in a context in which farmers were reducing acres 
of summerfallow land to seed more canola (Gusta, Smyth and Belcher, (2011). Relatively higher 
canola prices and benefits stemming from innovations made in the adoption of herbicide tolerant 
varieties have prompted the push toward a greater seeded area (CCC, 2012a; Gusta et al., 2011). 
Thus any analysis of wheat production must also take into account other potential competing 
crops such as canola. Canola, like wheat, has multiple end-uses which not only includes the 
export of the oil, seed and meal but also domestic biodiesel production. Thus an increased 
demand for biofuels may also have implications for canola cropping decisions as producers in 
the sector may divert from canola for food towards canola for biofuel (not specifically explored 
in thesis). Similarly, increased ethanol demand may also shift wheat production from food to 
biofuel purposes, generating downstream implications for the other participants of the food 
wheat supply chain. 
  
1.2 Problem Statement 
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The two competing end-uses for farmland raise questions surrounding the feedback link between 
land allocation decisions and world oil prices. Higher oil prices increase the demand for biofuels 
(renewable energy) and the associated derived demand for the feedstock crop which can be 
produced instead of traditional crops. This thesis seeks to provide an answer to the following 
questions: 1) what are the linkages between the world crude oil price and the cost of production 
and transportation of wheat grain and how important are these linkages?; 2) at what level of 
world crude oil prices will farmers’ cropping behaviour change? More specifically, at what level 
of world crude oil prices would farmers adjust their crop rotations away from food wheat 
production into the production of industrial wheat for energy purposes?; 3) will changes in 
cropping decisions influence the level of competition between grain elevators?; 4) in a context of 
high world crude oil prices, would changes in government support to the biofuel sector influence 
farmers’ production of industrial wheat for energy instead of wheat for food? and 5) if grain 
elevators are spatially competitive, what are the likely resulting impacts on the competitive 
structure of grain handling industry of increased oil prices and sustained government support to 
the biofuel industry?  
 
1.3 Study Objectives 
This study has three main objectives: 
1. Identify the significant linkages between fuel prices, land use and wheat production for 
Saskatchewan crop farms. 
  
2. Determine the price that world crude oil prices must exceed before farmers are enticed to 
allocate most of their land to energy crops.  
 
3. Assess the scenario-based impacts of government biofuel policy and increased oil prices 
on crop land allocation decisions of farmers and food wheat grain-handling industry 
structure and competition. 
 
1.4 Scope of the Study 
This thesis focuses on crop supply chain modelling. This falls within the larger area of energy-
related agent based modelling. This is an area that has been receiving attention in recent times 
and is likely to be important in understanding the recent shifts in crop production and the food 
supply chain. According to Scheffran (2009), growing demand for biofuel has implications for 
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land allocation. Based on this, this thesis explores the specific area of land use allocation and its 
impact on the food supply chain in Saskatchewan and where possible, makes projections for 
possible land allocation in Saskatchewan and its effects on elevator pricing behaviour. Other 
potential causes of structural change based on changes in technology such as those studied by 
Freeman (2005) and Stolnuik (2008) fall outside of the immediate scope of this work and while 
they may be mentioned, they will not be developed in this work. 
 
1.5 Methodology  
This thesis utilizes an agent based simulation model approach to dynamically simulate individual 
farmer land use decisions in Saskatchewan in response to varying energy prices and government 
program polices. Farmers utilize a four-crop rotation consisting of wheat, canola, barley and field 
peas with allocations representative of their corresponding Census Agricultural Region (CAR). 
Two of the crops are potential bioenergy crops: wheat and canola. Although a hard wheat crop 
that fails to meet the premium quality grade is often redirected to biofuel purposes or animal feed 
purposes, it is assumed in this thesis that wheat farmers decide whether to seed hard wheat 
(wheat for food) or soft wheat (assumed to be used for biofuel production) ex ante and there is 
assumed to be no ex post redirection of the hard wheat varieties. Each Saskatchewan farm is 
treated as an individual agent and is located on a simplified landscape with associated cost and 
production coefficients, according to one of the 20 CAR land use profiles. 
 
A time series of crop prices is dynamically generated using historical distributions. Various 
scenarios of crop prices, energy prices and government programmes are generated and the 
aggregate production response of farmer agents and the resulting competitive response of 
elevator agents are observed.  Farmer agents respond to changing prices as increasing fuel prices 
directly decrease gross margins through their impact on input costs and in farmgate prices 
through increased transportation costs. Simultaneously, increasing fuel prices increase returns to 
biofuel production thereby increasing the returns to cropping the biofuel feedstock. Since land 
use decisions are assumed to be based on expected gross margins driven by farmgate returns of 
the previous period and the following year’s price, a change in gross margins may generate 
changes in land use patterns. Because of the unfolding nature of the individual reactions and 
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behaviour, the simulations are based on 15 periods, with the first four periods being used as 
initialization periods. In addition, because of the stochasticity of prices, each scenario is 
replicated 50 times. The agent based model is coded in Netlogo ©, a Java based software. 
 
1.6 Organization of the Study 
This thesis commences in the next chapter with a review of the literature, which is comprised of 
discussions on recent trends in fossil fuel markets, the current structure of the Canadian crop 
supply chains, inter-linkages between fossil fuel and agricultural markets, vertical markets and 
competing supply chains, and literature concerned with the modelling of farmers’ decision 
behaviour. Chapter 3 focuses on describing the agent based framework utilized in this study by 
identifying the roles of, and the relationships between, agents and the inter-temporal transitions 
of the agent based simulation model, called the FARMCHAIN model. Chapter 4 discusses the 
data used to initialize and parameterize the FARMCHAIN model. In Chapter 5 the verification 
and validation of the FARMCHAIN model is presented. Also, the results of the model are 
discussed in Chapter 5 while Chapter 6 summarizes and concludes. 
  
6 
 
CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 Trends in Fossil Fuel Demand, Supply and Prices 
The topic of sustainable energy has received considerable attention in both the media and 
academic literature (Chase-Dunn, 2002; Goldemberg, 2007; Lund, 2007) over the past four 
decades. This literature arises out of a context of significant fluctuations in fossil fuel prices 
(Short, English, and Heady, 1984; Saghaian, 2010), which are due in part to the underlying 
movements in the related economic variables of demand and supply. Over the past decade, 
developing and emerging countries have increased their consumption of fossil fuels but the 
growth in supply has been relatively constrained due in part to nature of the industry. Industry 
supply is characterized by cartel behaviour (Kranser, 1974; Mead, 1979) which means that 
suppliers can influence world price by restricting supply. Furthermore, significant time lags 
involved in exploration, litigation, capital sourcing and drilling can also account for longer than 
usual cycles in price fluctuations (International Monetary Fund, 2011). 
 
The decade commencing in the year 2000 was fraught with significant volatilities in fossil fuel 
prices. Average North American crude oil prices peaked in July of 2008 at approximately $846 
per cubic meter or $134 per barrel (NRCAN, 2011a). As a consequence, the year-on-year 
increase in the average North American crude oil prices was 41.5%. This marked the second 
time within a decade in which the year-on-year increase in the average crude price exceeded 
40%. The year-on-year increase in 2000 was at 55.4% (Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1: North American Average Crude Oil Prices, 1986-2011. 
Source: Natural Resource Canada, 2011 
 
The significant increase in crude oil prices over the past decade occurred in a context of strong 
growth of emerging economies (Hicks and Kilian, 2009). China’s annual average Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate per capita was 9.6% over the period 2000-2010. Over the 
same period, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia all had growth rates in excess of 2% while the 
lacklustre growth rate of the United States was 0.94% (The World Bank, 2011). As these 
emerging economies grew, their demand for fossil fuels increased. China was the fourth largest 
importer of oil in 2008, importing roughly 4.4 million barrels per day (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2009). China’s demand for fossil fuels grew at an annual average rate of 5.6% over the 
period 2007-2010 whereas the United States’ demand declined at an annual average 1.9% 
(Figure 2.2) over the corresponding period (Energy Information Administration, 2011).  
 
  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Comparison of Growth in Oil Demand of China and the United States  
Source: Constructed by author with data from Energy Information Administration, 2011 
 
 
Annual growth in the world supply of oil fluctuated around a mean of 0.4% over the period 
2007-2010. Expansion in the number of drill sites in the United States has been delayed due to 
the increased political pressure from environmental concerns arising from spills from offshore 
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drilling sites and air pollution (Holing, 1990; Environmental Protection Agency, 2011). In the 
1990’s most of the regulatory guidelines pertaining to offshore exploration and drilling were 
either introduced or revised (United Nations Environment Programme, 2001). These guidelines 
in turn could have led to unexpected increased costs and could have contributed to the sluggish 
or delayed reaction in supply to increased demand for oil, resulting in longer than usual cycles 
and significant price increases.  With increasing world demand for fossil fuel and lagging supply, 
there is considerable pressure for increased prices which has impacted agriculture.  
 
2.2 The Impact of World Crude Oil Markets on Agriculture  
The literature on the economic impact of energy markets on agricultural markets has been 
extensively researched over an extended time period. Many have studied the impact of the nature 
of the industry on prices, macroeconomic stability and the impact on agriculture (Short et al., 
1984; Moosa, 1993; Ball, 2006; Fabiosa, 2009; Saghaian, 2010). The analyses have ranged from 
the discussion of the Dutch Disease - the indirect impact of increased oil prices on exchange 
rates that caused a loss in competitiveness in the agriculture sector in the Netherlands 
(Feltenstein, 1992) to econometric estimations of relationships between crude oil prices and 
agriculture commodity prices (Fabiosa, 2009; Saghaian, 2010). This section gives a brief 
overview of some of this literature. 
 
There have been three notable spikes in oil prices in the post-World War II era: the first in the 
1950’s; the second occurred in the period of 1973-74; and the third began in 2004 (Radetzki, 
2006) and ended in 2008 (Hicks and Kilian, 2009).  Radetzki also highlighted the relationship 
between these price booms and the growth rate of developed countries. More specifically, he 
noted that periods of price spikes are preceded by periods of significant increases in economic 
growth and that the end of every price boom is accompanied by significant declines in the GDP 
growth rate of countries (Radetzki, 2006).  He also highlights the fact that the third price boom 
was more prolonged than the first two price booms and notes that all three price booms are a 
result of changes in demand-side variables. The recent vicissitudes in oil prices have been driven 
primarily by increased scarcity and developing country growth (IMF, 2011). Fabiosa (2009) 
noted that the most recent price boom has been characterized by an increased drive for fuel 
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alternatives in the form of biofuels and has in turn led to increased integration between energy 
and agricultural markets. Furthermore, Baffes and Haniotis (2010) noted that the significant link 
between energy and non-energy markets will continue to be the leading factor that influences 
commodity prices and more specifically food prices.  
 
Fabiosa (2009) utilized a correlation assessment of oil prices on the livestock sector to bifurcate 
the study sample into two specific time periods: a ‘pre-ethanol boom’ and an ‘oil-linked, post-
ethanol boom’ demarcated by the periods 1992-2004 and 2005-2008, respectively. He found that 
there is a significant increase in the correlation between oil prices and grain markets in the post-
ethanol boom period versus the pre-ethanol boom period from 0.02 to 0.89. It is therefore 
concluded that biofuels have created the link between energy markets and agricultural 
commodity prices.  
2.3 Canadian Prairie Crop Production, Competition and Distribution 
While crop land use has evolved over time, it has more recently changed as a result of 
considerable increases in some crop prices, in production technologies and in energy costs.  At 
the farm level, optimal cropping patterns are a function of relative prices and gross margins 
(Gardener, 1975). However, because the efficiency of the logistical chain impacts the 
transmission of information such as prices, competiveness can be regarded as a competition 
between the distribution chains of alternative crops. The following sections discuss the nature of 
changes in cropland allocation as well as the evolution of world prices. Thereafter the structure 
of the food wheat, barley, canola and field pea distribution chains are discussed followed by 
briefly highlighting the impact fuel price has on crop production and crop distribution and 
finally, competition and coordination of vertical markets is examined. 
 
2.3.1 Land Allocation, Production and Export of Crops 
In 2006, the four most seeded crops in the Saskatchewan were spring wheat, canola, barley  and 
durum with seeded acres of 9.6 million, 6.0 million, 3.5 million and 3.2 million, respectively 
(Figure 2.3). In the following  five years, farm cropping decisions have changed significantly in 
that farmers significantly increased their acreage allocated to canola and lentils and 
simultaneously reduced the acreage alloted to spring wheat, barley and durum. Farmers only 
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marginally increased the amount of land alloted to dry peas. At end the end of 2010, the four 
most seeded crops are canola, spring wheat, lentils and dry peas with 7.8 million acres, 7.4 
million acres, 3.3 million acres and 2.8 million acres, respectively. 
 
Figure 2.3: Total Seeded acres in Saskatchewan of the six most seeded crops, 2006-2010.  
Source: Government of Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture (2012) 
 
Figure 2.4 shows the spatial extent to which the six most seeded crops in Saskatchewan are 
planted in each of the 20 Census Agricultural Regions (CARs) in 2010. The seeding of spring 
wheat is significant in all CARs. Canola is most prevalent in the northern and central parts of the 
CARs (CARs 5- 9). Durum is seeded mostly in the south-west portion of the province. Barley, 
although seeded in relatively small proportions is represented most in the central and northern 
CARs. Land allotted to dry peas is also comparatively small and there is no discernible seeding 
pattern in the geographical extent (Figure 2.4). 
 -
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Figure 2.4: Seeded acres of the six most seeded crops in Saskatchewan in 2010 by CARs.  
Source: Government of Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture (2012) 
 
Although durum is a crop that is extensively seeded in the province, the spatial distribution is 
skewed towards the southern part of the province. For privacy concerns, statistical CAR data are 
suppressed for CARs 2a, 4a, 7a, 8a, 9a and 9b, indicating few respondents. Since CAR-specific 
information is needed for this study, durum is excluded from the analysis. Despite the strong 
growth in the number of acres allotted to lentils over the period 2006-2010, CAR specific 
information for CARs 1b (all 4 years), 5b (in 2006 and 2007), 9a (in 2007), 9b (all 4 years) is 
restricted due to the lack of spatial prevalence in the seeded crop across the province in the 4 
years prior to 2010. Therefore the lentil crop will be excluded from the analysis. As a result, 
approximately 66.0% of total seeded crop acreage in the province is accounted for by these four 
crops. 
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Figure 2.5: Average seeded acres over 10 years, 5 years, 3 years and in 2010 in Saskatchewan of spring wheat, 
canola, barley, dry peas.  
Source: Government of Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture (2012) 
 
It is evident from Figure 2.5 that there exists a pattern in Saskatchewan farmers’ cropping  
decisions for the four crops chosen for the analysis. The land allocated to spring wheat and 
canola is consistently greater than that of barley and field peas. While wheat and barley 
allocations progressively decline, canola increases over time. The actual land  allocation ouctome 
in the form of production levels are, however, not as distinct as yields varying from year to year 
and acts of nature or other uncontrolable factors may influence crop production.. 
 
To illustrate the varying production yield, It is shown in Figure 2.6 that production in 2010 was 
lower than the 10-year, 5-year and 3-year historical averages in spring wheat, barley and dry 
peas. In contrast, Saskatchewan’s 2010 canola production was higher than its 10-year and 5-year 
historical average but lower than its 3-year historcal average. Its is also evident that over the 10-
year period  barley was most stable (Figures 2. 6). Compaaring figures Figures 2.5 and 2.6, it can 
be seen that barley and pea production were most consistent with cropland allocations. 
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Figure 2.6: Average production over 10 years, 5 years, 3 years and in 2010 in Saskatchewan of spring wheat, canola, 
barley, dry peas.  
Source:Government of Saskatchewan  Ministry of Agriculture (2012) 
 
 
On the international scale, Canada is on average, the sixth-largest producer of wheat in the 
world; producing an average of 24.7 million metric tonnes per year over the past four crop years 
commencing 2007/08 (Table 2.1). Canada’s production over this time period represented 
approximately 18.1% of the average production of the 27-member European Union - the largest 
producer.  However, Canada is the third largest exporter of wheat (Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1: The World Top 10 Wheat Producing and Exporting Countries 
 
Source: Constructed by author with data from FAO-STAT, 2012 and Production Supply and Disposition (PS&D), 
2012 
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Over the period 2005-2009, Canada exported approximately 17.0 million tonnes of wheat per 
year or 12.9% of the world export market. Furthermore, Canadian wheat exports exhibited a 
trend increase over the four crop years commencing in 2007/08. Exports were 12.2 million 
tonnes in the 2010/11 crop year, a year-on-year increase of 1.6 million tonnes. Furthermore, the 
10-year moving average ending in the years declined over time (Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2: Canadian Wheat Exports 2005/06-2010/11 
 
Source: Canadian Grain Commission Canada Grain Exports Crop Years (2005/06-2011/12)  
 
Canada was the second largest producer of canola in 2010, producing 11.8 million tonnes, 
behind China which produced 13.1 million tonnes but ahead of India which produced 6.4 million 
tonnes. Canada was the number one producer of dry peas in the world in 2010. Canada was the 
sixth largest producer of barley in 2010. Barley production is dominated by European countries 
(Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3: The World Top 10 Canola, Dry Peas and Barley Producing Countries in 2010 
 
Source: Constructed by author with data from FAO-STAT (2012) 
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For the calendar year 2011 Canadian rapeseed seed exports were 7.9 million tonnes, an increase 
from 2.2 million tonnes in calendar year 2002 (CCC, 2011b). 1 Canadian exports of dried peas 
increased by 55.3% to 2.5 million tonnes for the August 2010- July 2011 crop year relative to the 
previous crop year (CGC, 2011). On the other hand, Canadian barley exports declined 
marginally by 42,000 tonnes to 1.3 million tonnes in the crop year 2010/11 relative to the 
previous crop year. 
 
The analysis of farmer land allocation, production and exports indicated that farmers were 
incrementally adjusting crops acreages that Canada is deemed to have a significant market share. 
Canada is a significant exporter in the rapeseed market and producer in the field pea market; this 
may be as a result of the relatively favourable agronomic conditions for these crops that exist on 
the Prairies and the relatively high market prices. 
 
2.3.2 Saskatchewan Crop Prices 2001-2010 
The changes manifested in farmer land allocation over the past decade occurred in a context of 
relatively higher canola and field pea prices (Figure 2.7). Over the period 2001-2009, the average 
annual prices of canola and field peas were approximately 1.8 times and 1.5 times, respectively, 
higher than that of wheat while the average annual price of barley was approximately 94% of 
average annual price wheat (UN Comtrade, 2012; FAO-STAT, 2012). Price changes can alter 
farmers’ cropping decisions (Walsh, de la Torre Ugarte, Shapouri, and Slinsky, 2003). However, 
farmers’ cropping decisions may also be influenced by the structure of the crop distribution 
chain.  
                                                 
1 The FAO-STAT database reports comparable trade data within a calendar year and makes the necessary adjustments for discrepancies such as 
time lags and place of origin/destination inconsistencies. 
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Figure 2.7: Nominal World Crop Prices (1991-2010).  
Source: UN Comtrade, 2012 and FAO STAT, 2012 *Canola Source: FAO STAT Constant 1991-2001 Prices. 
 
2.3.3 Saskatchewan Crop Supply Chain 
This section briefly discusses the structure of the supply chains for wheat, barley, canola and 
field peas in western Canada. For each chain the participants are highlighted and the distribution 
channel discussed. Wheat and barley supply chains are discussed together while canola and dry 
peas supply chains are discussed thereafter. 
2.3.3.1 The Canadian Wheat and Barley Supply Chain 
The Canadian food wheat and barley supply chain is comprised of famers, grain elevators, 
trucking, railway and shipping companies.2 Producers are a vital component of the wheat supply 
chain. In 2011 15,634 farms reported seeding wheat in Saskatchewan, down from 21,455 in 2006 
(Statistics Canada, 2012). Also, in 2011, 5648 fewer farmers reported seeding barley relative to 
2006. In 2011, the number of farmers who reported seeding barley is 8,380. The greatest decline 
                                                 
2Historically, the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) was the only buyer of Canadian wheat, durum, non-feed barley and feed wheat for export 
(Schmitz and Furtan, 2000). The CWB was responsible for moving the grain from grain elevators through ports and to customers abroad. The 
claim of the CWB was that it could extract premiums in excess of the world price from the world market (Informa Economics, 2008). The CWB 
monopsony power was deemed too restrictive and the Government passed Bill C-18 dubbed “Freedom of the Grain Farmers Act” which rendered 
sales by farmers to the Canadian Wheat Board as voluntary as of August 1, 2012 (Bill C-18, 2011). The CWB had an important impact on the 
distribution of grain through their ability to sell grain in different markets and extract premiums in excess of world price which in turn translated 
to higher returns was a claim of many who stood in support of the continued operation of the CWB. It was therefore imperative to assess whether 
there exists a relationship between wheat premiums earned and the export quantity supplied. Table B-14 in Appendix B shows the data collected 
to determine if there is a relationship between premiums earned and the quantity supplied. Table B-15 of Appendix B shows that there is no 
discernible relationship between wheat premiums and export quantity supplied to Japan. Insufficient data are available to reliably estimate the 
relationships between premiums earned in and quantities supplied to the Colombian market. 
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in the number of farmers who reported seeding spring wheat is found in CAR 2a; a decline of 
43.3% to 387 in 2011 relative to 2006 (Table 2.4). 
Table 2.4: Comparison of the Total Number of Farms that Reported Seeding Wheat and Barley in 2006 and 2011 
 
Source: Statistics Canada Census of agriculture (2011 and 2006).  
 
Grain is normally stored on farms after harvesting and then trucked to elevators. Producers 
decide whether to truck the grain themselves, use a for-hire trucking service to truck the grain or 
to utilize the services of commercial grain operators. Grain can be trucked to grain elevators or to 
a producer loading facility and occasionally, grain is trucked directly to domestic millers or to 
US markets. Grain is moved from grain companies by rail or by truck to either domestic users, 
US markets or to the port terminal. Grain is moved from the producer loading facility to the port 
via rail (Figure 2.8). 
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Figure 2.8: Trucking Within the Prairie Grain Handling and Transportation. 
Source: Quorum Corporation (2002).  
 
The Quorum Corporation (2002) noted that grain is commonly trucked to country 
elevators or less frequently, directly to rail hopper cars. It was further highlighted that 
the rationalization of railway networks and the subsequent decline in the number of 
elevators increased farmers’ demand for commercial trucking. Prior to 1997, 95% of the 
grain delivered to elevators was delivered by farm trucks with a 5 to 10 tonne capacity 
with an average distance of 25 kilometers (Transport Canada, 2010a).  With the closure 
of some elevators, farmers had to decide whether to haul their grain a greater distance 
or to sub-contract delivery to a trucking company. In an effort to gain the competitive 
edge over other elevators, some grain elevators partnered with trucking companies and 
offer both trucking services and grain handling services (Quorum Corporation, 2002). 
As a result, there has been a marked increase in the number of commercial short-hauls 
across the Canadian prairies. Figure 2.9 below shows a 32.2% increase in short-hauls in 
the 2009/10 crop year relative to the 1999/2000 crop year in the Prairies. This increase 
in trucking demand occurred in a context of a decline in the number of available 
country elevators (Doan, Paddock and Jan, 2003).  
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Figure 2.9: Composite Index – Short-Haul Trucking  
Source: Quorum Corporation (2010) 
 
The primary function of grain elevators is to receive, grade and prepare grain for shipment. They 
are responsible for calculating the dockage which is deducted from the farmer’s payment. For 
these services grain elevators charge farmers a ‘handling fee’.  There are four types of elevators: 
primary, process, transfer and terminal elevators. Primary elevators receive grains for 
forwarding, storage or for both storage and forwarding, while process elevators receive grain for 
storage and value added processing such as milling into flour. Transfer elevators receive grain 
that has already been inspected and weighed at another elevator (some elevators in the east being 
an exception) and terminal elevators receive grain that has already been inspected weighed and 
cleaned and treats the grain before it moves forward in the supply chain (CGC, 2009).  
 
Grain elevators are a located in many of the towns and cities on the Canadian prairies. However, 
there has been a decline in the number of grain elevators in operation and the significant increase 
in the level of firm integration over the past two decades. The decline in the number of elevators 
is attributed to the removal of the Crow Rate subsidy, which were payments made by the federal 
government to railway companies subsidizing the cost of grain movement to port (Storey, 2006), 
under the Western Grain Transportation Agreement Act of 1983. In 1995 farmers received a 
lump sum payment for the transition to an unsubsidized transportation system, which resulted in 
the abandonment of rail service to some towns and therefore made some elevators redundant 
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(Doan et al, 2003). Currently, there are approximately six major grain elevator companies in the 
Canadian prairies (Quorum Corporation, 2010), and as is shown in Table 2.5, there are 394 
elevators in operation relative to 1,035 in 1999 (CGC, 2012). 
 
Table 2.5: Number of Canadian Grain Elevators and Capacity 
 
Source: Constructed by author with data from CGC (2012) 
 
Grain is mainly transported across western Canada via rail. There are two major railway 
companies that provide services to most of western Canada, Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) 
and the newer Canadian National Railway (CNR). These two companies own approximately 
36,300 miles of railway across North America (CPR, 2011; CNR, 2011). Like grain elevators, 
the national rail industry is characterized by oligopolistic (more specifically, duopolistic) 
behaviour and in an unregulated market they may be able to influence the price of rail 
transportation services. 
  
Water is one of the cheapest modes to transport cargo (Min, 1991). Countries with developed 
waterways have found this to be a source of competitive advantage. For example, a well-
developed network of waterways in the United States has led to increased intermodal 
competition which in turn has led to lower rail rates (Sorenson, 1973). The Canadian prairies, 
however, lack such a network. The closest ports are to the north-east (Port of Churchill), east 
(Thunder Bay) and west (Vancouver and Prince Rupert). Although Churchill is spatially the 
closest export position to a significant portion of the prairies, grain movement through this port is 
constrained to periods when the ice has melted in the northern water channels. Furthermore, crop 
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movement to the western ports is complicated by the Rocky Mountain Range. To the east, the 
Great Lakes are the closest waterway. At the ports, crops are exported to international 
destinations using privately owned international vessels. 
 
In 2010, there were, on average, approximately 29,000 workers employed in the Canadian 
marine transport industry and the value of commercial transportation was $985 million or 0.1 
percent of GDP in 2010 (Transport Canada, 2010b). The importance of the industry is evident in 
its level of government involvelment even despite the consistent losses incurred by the St. 
Lawrence Seaway Management Company over the fiscal years 2000/01-2009/10 (Transport 
Canada, 2010b). Government operating, maintenance support as well as investment in port 
infrastructure totalled $225 million in 2010/11, while direct federal subsidies, grants and 
contributions from the Canadian government were $348 million (Transport Canada, 2010b). 
 
On the international scale, the international ocean freight industry experienced robust growth for 
the period leading up to 2008, as the world became more integrated, trade expanded as countries 
removed domestic trade barriers (Sachs, Warner, Aslund and Fischer, 1995; Chase-Dunn, 
Kawano and Brewer, 2000; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). As shown in Figure 2.10, world trade 
peaked in 2008 and was valued at US$16.9 trillion (WTO, 2012). The growth in trade is 
reflected in the increase in ocean freight rates.  For example, nominal ocean freight rates 
increased from US$18.50 in the crop year 2003/04 to US$85.00 in the crop year 2007/08 per 
short tonne for shipments originating in the North Pacific destined for Japan (CGC, 2008; CGC, 
2004). 
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Figure 2.10: The Annual Value of World Trade over the period 1991- 2011.  
Source: Constructed by author with data from WTO (2012). 
 
In the latter half of 2008, the shipping industry came to a standstill as international trade 
collapsed and freight rates plummeted. The accelerated growth in the ship building industry 
came to an abrupt halt in 2008 as the effect of the global financial crisis impacted the ocean 
freight industry. A semblance of normalcy returned to the markets in 2010 and 2011 as world 
trade recovered. Trade values grew from US$13 trillion in 2009 to US$18 trillion in 2011 
(Figure 2.10). 
 
This trend in trade is also depicted in ocean freights (Figure 2.11). There is an escalation in 
container freight rates beginning the second quarter of 2007, which peaked in 2008, then fell 
significantly toward the end of 2008 and the start of 2009, finally rebounding to some semblance 
of normalcy toward the end of 2009 (Slack and Gouvernal, 2011). 
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Figure 2.11: Container Freight Rates in Euros per Box 
Source: Slack and Gouvernal (2011). 
 
2.3.3.2 The Canadian Canola and Field Pea Supply Chains 
Canola can be exported as seed or, processed domestically into oil and meal. The meal is used as 
a high protein animal feed while oils are used for food and biodiesel purposes (CCC, 2011c). The 
integral players in the food canola supply chain are the producers, grain facilities and canola 
crushing plants. 
  
Despite the fact that there is a decline in the total number of farmers, the number of farmers in 
Saskatchewan who reported seeding canola increased by 5.3% to 15,736 in 2011 relative to 2006 
(Statistics Canada, 2012). Geographically, the most significant increases are found in the 
southern part of the province. In particular the number of farmers who reported seeding canola in 
CAR 4b more than doubled between the two census periods (Table 2.6). 
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Table 2.6: Comparison of the Total Number of Farms that Reported Seeding Canola and Field Peas in 2005 and 
2011 
 
Source: Statistics Canada Census of Agriculture 2011 and 2006.  
 
 
Canola is trucked from the farmer to elevators and/or crushing plants. At the elevators, canola is 
cleaned and stored for shipment to port via rail. Most of the canola produced is exported to 
Japan. Canola that is trucked to crushing plants is cleaned, crushed and the oil is extracted and 
the residual meal is included in feed for livestock and poultry rations (Ainslie, Dowlatabadi, 
Ellis, Ries, Rouhany and Schreier, 2006). Canola oil is suitable for human consumption, as an 
input in other food products such as margarine or for a variety of inedible uses such as cosmetics 
and biodiesel (Figure 2.12).  More than 85 per cent of Canadian canola is exported, with Japan 
and Mexico being the chief importer of the seed while United States is a significant importer of 
canola meal and oil (CCC, 2011d). 
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Figure 2.12: Canola seed to Oil Supply Chain.  
Source: Ainslie et al., 2006.  
 
The bulk field pea supply chain also begins with the farmer producing the crop. The number of 
farmers in Saskatchewan who reported seeding field peas decreased by 34% to 4,922 in 2010 
relative to 2005 (Statistics Canada, 2012). More specifically, the number of farmers who 
reported seeding field peas in CARs 2a and 5a declined by more than 60% between the two 
Census periods (Table 2.6). Farmers then truck crops to a cleaning facility or to an elevator 
where it is cleaned and then it is transported via rail to the ports where it is loaded onto ships and 
ocean freighted to various export destinations.  
 
2.3.4 Fuel Costs and Canadian Prairie Farming 
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Heichel (1976) highlighted that technology leads to increased productivity in agriculture that in 
turn is somewhat dependent on fossil fuels. Machinery such as trucks, direct-seeders and 
combines all make farming more efficient, but are driven by fossil fuels. This section shows that 
fuel costs are an important aspect of prairie farming and that these costs vary spatially across 
Saskatchewan.  
 
Fuel costs in Saskatchewan farming was between 7.1% and 9.5% of total farm expenses in 2011 
(Statistics Canada, 2012). This translates to a mean fuel cost per cultivated acre of $15.76. 
During the 2010/11 crop year, world crude oil prices rose to an average high of approximately 
$88.84 per barrel (NRCAN, 2012), which was approximately 66% of the cost in July 2008. Farm 
fuel costs differ spatially across Saskatchewan (Figure 2.13) where the spatial distribution of fuel 
costs per acre of cultivation in Saskatchewan is illustrated. With the exception of CAR 4b, fuel 
costs appear to increase as one moves in a northerly and easterly direction, hence indicating 
spatial heterogeneity in fuel costs in farming.  
 
Figure 2.13: Composite Index –Spatial Distribution of the Fuel Cost Per Acre in Saskatchewan in 2010. 
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Source: Created by author with source data from Census of Agriculture Statistics Canada, 2012 
 
Cost of production is both directly and indirectly influenced by oil prices. Figure 2.14 juxtaposes 
world crude oil prices with diammonium phosphate (DAP) fertilizer prices. During the 2008 oil 
spikes, there seemed to have been an increase in the correlation of the two prices. As confirmed 
by Baffes (2007), a 1% increase in oil prices is expected to translate to 0.33% increase in 
fertilizer prices. 
 
Figure 2.14: DAP Fertilizer Price and Crude Oil Price, 2005-2012 
Source: Created by author with data from Index Mundi, 2012 
 
2.3.5 Fuel Costs in Transportation  
2.3.5.1 Fuel Costs and Trucking 
Human Resource and Skills Development Canada (2012) noted that despite the increased 
demand for trucking services in Canada, the trucking industry’s growth is still impeded by rising 
fuel costs. In a bid to recoup losses due to changes in the fuel cost, many of the larger carriers 
include a fuel surcharge with the additional cost being borne by the customer. Smaller, owner-
operator trucking firms often cannot pass the surcharge on to the customer and must instead 
absorb these losses, resulting in smaller gross margins. As a result, some trucking firms have 
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been forced to exit the market (HRSDC, 2012). Truck surcharge rates have been trending with 
fuel prices as is evident from Figure 2.15.  
 
Figure 2.15: Trends in Canadian Domestic Fuel Surcharge and Oil Prices, 2009-2011 
Source: Constructed by author with data from National Traffic Services 2012 and EIA 2011b 
 
 
2.3.5.2 Fuel Costs and Rail 
Canadian freight transport relies to a great extent on diesel fuel. As diesel fuel prices increase, 
the cost to the rail companies increase. The fuel cost per freight revenue3 faced by the two major 
railway companies in western Canada is presented in Figure 2.16. It shows that between 1986 
and 1997 fuel cost represented approximately 10% of freight revenues earned. The ensuing 
period was characterized by sustained and rapid increases in the ratio such that in 2008 the ratio 
was approximately doubled.  It is also evident from Figure 2.16 that rail companies’ costs 
generally trend with world oil prices, with peaks in 2008 and troughs in 2009 in all three time 
series. 
                                                 
3 The ratio fuel cost per freight revenue is the total fuel cost divided by total freight revenues and shows how much is spent on fuel for every 
dollar earned in freight transportation.  
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Figure 2.16: Canadian Fuel Cost Per Freight Revenue and Average Annual World Crude Oil Prices: 1986-2009 
Source: Created by author with data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 404-0012 and CANSIM Table 404-
0004 and Index Mundi 2012. 
 
2.3.5.3 Fuel Costs and Ocean Freight 
With 80% of the world merchandise shipped by sea (UNCTAD, 2010), the shipping industry is 
vital not only to the Canadian economy but also to the world economy. The shipping industry is 
highly dependent on oil (UNCTAD, 2010). UNCTAD (2010) noted that a study by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has also investigated the 
impact of oil prices on maritime transport costs. Various studies have calculated differing 
estimates of the degree to which ocean freight rates and oil prices are related. Depending on the 
specification, the OECD study estimated an elasticity of freight rates to changes in oil prices 
ranging from 0.018 to 0.15. Hummels (2007) confirms the relationship between ocean freight 
rates and oil prices but estimated that elasticities range from 0.232 to 0.327. Mirza and Zitouna 
(2009) estimated elasticity of freight rates to oil prices ranging from 0.088 to of 0.103. UNCTAD 
(2010) estimated that freight elasticities lie between 0.281 and 1.05. If the elasticities reported by 
UNCTAD (2010) are most accurate, then it means that crude oil price could significantly impact 
the cost of transporting bulk commodities such as grains from the Prairies. 
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With the variations in costs of production and distribution, changing world commodity prices 
and the unpredictability of weather patterns, the question is raised: how are these competing 
distribution chains able to maintain a consistent and stable supply? To answer this question the 
discussion turns to a review of the literature on supply chains and vertical coordination. 
 
2.3.6 Vertical Coordination and Supply Chains 
A vertical market structure is defined for a set of firms in which the membership for a firm is 
determined by the existence of a cooperative relationship with at least one other firm in that 
industry (Baligh and Richartz, 1967). The authors defined a cooperative relationship as one that 
facilitates the exchange of goods and services between firms within the industry. They further 
stated that inter-firm relationships are influenced by the nature of cooperation and competition 
that is found within that vertical marketing channel. Vertical coordination speaks to the nature of 
vertical cooperation that exists within an industry. 
 
According to authors such as Williamson (1979), Henderson (1994) and Peterson, Wycowski, 
and Harsh (2001), the degree of vertical coordination can be placed on a continuum. At one end 
of the continuum, there are spot markets such as auctions which are used when no or minimal 
transaction costs are involved. However, as transaction costs increase, firms will move from spot 
markets towards contracts. The move towards vertical integration will continue as the likelihood 
of opportunism related to market uncertainty and asset specificity becomes more apparent with 
an increase in transaction costs.  
 
Transaction costs can be separated into four different categories: search costs, negotiating costs, 
monitoring costs and enforcement costs (Hobbs, 2005). According to Hobbs (2005) search costs 
and negotiating costs are incurred ex-ante by entering into contracts and are associated with fees 
related to searching for and gathering information relevant to the industry and the negotiation of 
contractual agreements, respectively. On the other hand, monitoring and enforcing cost are 
incurred in ex-post contracting, and are associated with fees related to monitoring performance 
and legal fees that may be necessary to ensure the adherence to the terms of the contract.  
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Furthermore, increased vertical coordination may be beneficial for industries where supply 
uncertainty exists (Carlton, 1979). For example, increased vertical coordination could reduce the 
uncertainty involved in securing supplies and the cost that would have been incurred in re-
negotiating one contract after another. Also, the likelihood of having to deal with opportunistic 
negotiators may also decrease as the terms of the contract are less likely to be abruptly or 
adversely altered. Furthermore, increasing the level vertical coordination provides producers a 
stable price throughout the contract period. 
 
In examining the organic wheat supply chain in Canada, Ferguson (2004) sought to ascertain the 
most beneficial form of coordination for each participant in the distribution chain. He found that 
producers benefitted most when they vertically coordinated with a producer-owned-firm (POF). 
Marketers benefitted most when the marketing firm is large and purchases on the spot market. 
Ferguson also highlighted that if producers decided to deal directly with processors, bypassing 
the POF, the producers would be less efficient and less effective marketers. This result supports 
the model outcome of Balderston (1958) who stated that the introduction of a new level of 
middlemen would reduce transaction costs in the vertical structure and thus a market with 
significant transaction costs and no middlemen would find the entrance of a middleman cost 
efficient. Therefore, the level of coordination in an industry depends on the magnitude of 
transaction costs involved (Williamson, 1979; Frank and Henderson, 1992).  
 
From the preceding discussion it can be inferred that any uncertainty in the wheat industry 
resulting from unpredictable oil price movements may result in increased vertical coordination to 
reduce transaction. There are other ways of cushioning the shocks from changing oil prices. This 
is manifested in Canada’s initiative to reduce fossil fuel dependence and implement clean energy 
use.  
 
2.4 Canadian Renewable Fuels Initiatives 
The Canadian government invested $1.1 billion towards funding specific programs aimed at 
achieving the long-term objectives of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions under the 
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Kyoto Protocol (Government of Canada, 2000).4 The Canadian federal government sought to 
reduce GHG emissions by promoting the blending of gasoline with ethanol to reduce GHG 
emissions in the transportation sector. This gave rise to the implementation of the Ethanol 
Expansion Programme (EEP). 
 
As part of the broader Renewable Fuels Strategy, the EEP was created in August 2003 costing 
$234 million (Olfert and Weesen, 2007) in the hope of reducing GHG emissions, promoting 
biofuel production and encouraging the development and sale of renewable fuel technologies and 
to provide market opportunities for farmers in rural areas (NRCAN, 2010a). The EEP’s specific 
objective was to provide economic support to firms constructing new ethanol plants or 
expanding existing capacity in an effort to develop more ethanol fuel markets and to increase 
consumer acceptance ethanol fuels (NRCAN, 2009). 
 
In an effort to expand the ethanol industry, the federal government instituted renewable fuel 
blend mandates of 5% for ethanol (which took effect on December 15, 2010) and 2% for 
biodiesel (which took effect July 1, 2011) (CRFA, 2010a). The government of Saskatchewan 
increased the province’s blend rate in from 5% to 7.5% in January 2007 (Enterprise 
Saskatchewan, 2012). 
 
In addition to mandated levels of biofuel usage, the federal and provincial governments instituted 
incentives for ethanol producers to further promote development and sustainability of biofuel 
production (Pohit, Biswas and Jaya, 2009). The Saskatchewan provincial government passed the 
Fuel Tax Act 2000 that provided a 15¢/l tax exemption as a form of tax relief to biofuel 
producers (Fuel Tax Act, 2000; Pohit et al. 2009). 5  Pohit et al. highlight that the federal 
government had instituted a 10¢/l excise tax exemption on ethanol fuel but as of April 2008, the 
federal fuel tax exemptions were repealed and replaced with specific producer payments, called 
the ecoENERGY for biofuels program (NRCAN, 2010a). The amendment mandated that eligible 
firms could receive payments of up to 10¢/l for ethanol producing firms and up to 20¢/l for 
biodiesel plant (NRCAN, 2010b; Le Roy, Elobeid and Klein, 2009). Table 2.7 shows the 
                                                 
4 In December 2011 the Canadian government withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol agreement (The Economist, 2011). 
5 The symbol¢/l means cents per liter. 
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schedule of incentive rates over the life of the ecoENERGY for biofuels program. Further 
restrictions apply under this program. Eligible firms should 
• realize a return of less than 20% (Pohit et al., 2009); 
• produce at least 5 million litres of renewable alternative to gasoline or 3 million litres of 
renewable diesel (NRCAN, 2010c); 
• not have received an operating incentive more than 30% of the 2 billion litre volume limit, 
and $500 million funding reserve for diesel producing firms (NRCAN, 2010c); 
• have environmental assessments conducted by Natural Resources Canada (NRCAN, 
2010c); and 
• be constructed by September 2012 (NRCAN, 2010c). 
 
Table 2.7: The Incentive Rate to Biofuel Producers over the Life of the ecoENERGY Program, 2008-2016 
 
Source: Natural Resources Canada (2010b). 
 
As a result of the support to the biofuel industry leading up to the 2008/09 fiscal year, the 
number of Canadian ethanol plants grew from 7 plants in February 2004 (Klein, Romain, Olar 
and Bergeron, 2004) to 14 operational plants in November 2010 (CRFA, 2010b). Capacity grew 
from 238 million litres per year in December 2003 to 1.67 billion litres in November 2010. There 
are 5 ethanol plants (Table 2.8) and 1 biodiesel plant (in Foam Lake) currently in operation in 
Saskatchewan with a combined plant capacity of 342 million litres per year for ethanol and 1 
million litres per year for the biodiesel plant (CRFA, 2010). There is a proposed cellulosic 
ethanol plant with an intended capacity of 75 million litres per year to be constructed in Nipawin, 
Saskatchewan (Canadian Biomass, 2012).  
 
Table 2.8: Locations and Capacities of Saskatchewan Ethanol Plants in 2010 
 
Source: Created by author with information from CRFA (2010). 
34 
 
 
Biofuel production is capital intensive and there are a number of required processes to convert 
bioproducts to fuel. There are two broad classifications of biofuels: first generation and second 
generation biofuels. The following section discusses the first generation biofuel production 
process. 
 
2.5 First Generation Ethanol Production and Biodiesel Production Processes 
First generation biofuels refer to fuels created from grains, beans and oilseeds. The first-
generation primary-process ethanol production commences with the purchase of the feedstock 
from farmers. In the United States the feed stock is predominantly corn (Morris and Hill, 2006; 
Persson, Garcia y Garcia, Paz, Jones, and Hoogenboom, 2009) but on the Canadian prairies and 
specifically in Saskatchewan, it is predominantly wheat (CRFA, 2010). Wheat with a low protein 
and high starch content such as the soft spring wheat and winter wheat varieties is preferred for 
ethanol production such as (FOBI, 2011).6  
 
A six-step process is used in the production of ethanol from grain. Grain is first milled, cooked 
and then allowed to ferment. After the fermentation process is complete, the solution is distilled 
and separated into ethanol and co-products in the form of wet distiller’s grain (WDG). The 
ethanol passes through dehydration and denaturing process after which it is ready for shipment to 
blenders who blend the ethanol with gasoline. Thereafter, ethanol blended gasoline is marketed 
to consumers. The co-products can be used as high protein component of feed for livestock. 
Figure 2.17 illustrates the process of ethanol production of an integrated ethanol plant and 
livestock feedlot on the Canadian prairies. 
 
                                                 
6 On the other hand, food wheat attracts the highest price when it has a high protein and low starch content. Sometimes when hard wheat varieties 
fail to meet the high protein requirements for food it is redirected, ex post, to biofuel production. This ex post decision creates added complexity 
to a complex model and is not explored in this thesis. 
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Figure 2.17: Production Processes of an Integrated Ethanol Plant and Livestock Feedlot in Saskatchewan 
Source: Pound-Maker, 2005. 
 
Biodiesel is made from vegetable oil, oilseed oil and/or animal fat through a process called 
transesterification (NREL, 2009).  Transesterification is the process by which glycerine is 
separated from feedstock oil by adding methanol and potassium hydroxide. The glycerine 
produced can be further refined and be reused in the biodiesel production process or can be used 
in cosmetics and soaps. The co-product of the transesterification process is crude biodiesel which 
through further refining can be blended and used in diesel engines or it can be reused in the 
biodiesel production process. The stages of the biodiesel production process are shown in Figure 
2.18. 
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Figure 2.18: Stages in the Production Process of Biodiesel.  
Source: NREL, 2009 
 
2.6 Farmer Land Use Decision Models 
The discussion now turns to topic of modelling. A model is a simplified construct of reality 
(Miller and Page, 2007). The primary aim of a model is to give insight as to the likely outcomes 
based on a set of assumptions and changes in model variables (Miller and Page, 2007).  In this 
section an overview of some of the various models used to examine changes in land use is 
presented. 
 
2.6.1 A Brief History of Land Use Modelling 
Models of land use have been in existence for almost two centuries (De La Barra, 1989). Most 
models are concerned with either land use of farmers and how it impacts land values or land use 
decisions regarding urban planning and development (Wingo, 1961; Alonso, 1964; Parker, 
Manson, Janssen, Hoffmann, Deadman, 2003). More recent applications explore the impacts that 
varying of land uses has on the environment (Seecharan, Gill, Kulshreshtha, Junkins and Bussler, 
2002; Happe, Hutchings, Dalgaard and Kellerman, 2011) and some others explore the suitability 
and profitability of energy crops (Scheffran, BenDor, Wang and Hannon, 2007; Scheffran and 
BenDor, 2009; Acheampong, Dicks and Adam, 2011; Song, Zhao and Swinton, 2011).  
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Von Thünen in 1817 (and later his work translated into English in 1966) was first to propose a 
model that explained the effects of transport costs on the location of activities and the 
functioning of the land market (Von Thunen 1966; De La Barra, 1989).  Von Thünen’s model 
assumes a large number of producers and landowners so that no individual producer or land 
owner is able to influence market price. It also assumes that land owners rent to the highest 
bidding producer; land is homogenous; a closed model; where there is no interaction with other 
regions; only one market centre where producers sell their crops and there is no cost to entry or 
exit.  This model shows that the price of the agricultural commodity influences the willingness 
(ability) of a producer to pay a land-owner rent for the land (Von Thünen rent) (De La Barra, 
1989). Thus land that is closest to the market (which is in the centre of the system) would attract 
the highest value and farmers planting the highest valued crop would be located closer to the 
market centre (De La Barra, 1989). The model also demonstrates that as crop competition 
increases, land values increase. Since land is a factor in the production of crop, crop prices also 
increase, which in turn leads to reduced demand for crops. As the quantity demanded decreases, 
producers are forced to find novel techniques to increase demand (De La Barra, 1989). 
 
Wingo (1961) and Alonso (1964) expanded the work of Von Thünen (as found in De La Barra, 
1989) by adding budget constraints adapted to an urban phenomenon analysis. However, De La 
Barra notes that these models are limited in that they have only a few feasible solutions that are 
difficult to realistically observe. He further noted that relaxing the assumption of one market 
place (Von Thünen) and the center of employment (Wingo and Alonso) causes the model to 
collapse. Another limitation noted by De La Barra (1989) is that the theoretical models suggest 
that individual demand curves can be summed to form an aggregate demand curve but he points 
out that demand curves could in fact vary by location and thus aggregation could lead to 
generalized inaccuracies. De La Barra also states that these limitations could be overcome by the 
use of spatial interaction models. 
 
Spatial interaction models were first made prominent in the work of Hansen (1959). The work of 
Wilson (1970) expanded the concepts of Hansen by introducing the maximum entropy approach 
in modelling. Wilson (1970) provided the platform for modelling a more general theoretic 
framework (De La Barra, 1989).  
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In Canada, the Canadian Regional Agricultural Model (CRAM) is a sector equilibrium model 
that is disaggregated across cereals, oilseeds, forage, potatoes, meats and animal by-products 
(eggs and dairy) over 55 agricultural regions in Canada (Gill and Colwill, n.d.). Production levels 
are converted from linear functions to non-linear functions using positive mathematical 
programming and optimized in General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) for each 
commodity in each region. The results that are yielded are static, spatially computed partial 
equilibrium results. The model has been used for various policy analyses in the areas of 
production (Webber, 1986), transportation (MacGregor Jenkins and Barber, 1994) and 
environmental impacts and assessment (Seecharan et al., 2002). Most recently Colwill (2006) 
and Smith (2009) have modelled biofuel production analyses. Smith (2009) uses CRAM to 
assess the impact of increased ethanol targets on the crop income, livestock and land use cover. 
He finds that increased ethanol targets have a significant impact on crop income in Alberta, 
Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec and Saskatchewan. He further notes that the impact to the livestock 
sector is minimal but that the impact on land cover is significant. Just below 300,000 acres of 
shrub land would be incorporated into agricultural production in Alberta, just over 150,000 acres 
of both shrub and forest land would be converted to agriculture in Ontario and approximately 
75,000 acres of shrub land would be converted in Saskatchewan. 
 
More novel approaches have been used to determine land use in agriculture, especially in light of 
the impetus towards the development of renewable fuels, include Song et al. (2011) who used a 
real options methodology to analyze farmers’ land use decisions as it pertains to the switching 
between traditional crops to energy crops. One of the significant contributions of using the real 
options approach is the fact that farmers cannot only switch from traditional crop rotations to 
energy crops but they can also switch back to traditional crops from energy crops, albeit at a 
cost. The authors concluded that for farmers converting to energy crops, the returns from energy 
crops would have to be more than double current returns before farmers begin switching. This is 
due primarily to the significant costs associated with switching.  
 
Acheampong et al. (2011) assess the impact of energy crop production for the use of biofuel 
purposes on US hay markets. The authors utilize ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate and 
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predict hay prices in Oklahoma. These prices were in turn used to parameterize a linear 
programming (LP) model that examined the profitability of the production of hay in excess of 
the profitability of energy crops. Their LP results showed that land set aside for energy crop 
production is likely to replace land used for hay thereby adversely affecting grazing animal 
production.  
 
Feng and Babcock (2010) used a theoretical approach to ascertain the impact of increased 
productivity yield on land use decisions under two regimes, government subsidies to ethanol 
producers and mandates of ethanol consumption. The land use options available to farmers were 
to either continue development of cultivated land (corn production) or to transform uncultivated 
land (forest or grassland) to agricultural purposes. They found that in the scenario of increasing 
yields and government subsidies to the ethanol industry there would be an expansion of 
cultivated acreage, thereby transforming uncultivated land to farmland. The authors argued that 
this occurs as the return to cultivated land would be higher than that of the uncultivated land, 
thus making it more profitable to transform uncultivated land. Conversely, they found that 
increasing yields under a government mandate would translate to decreasing cultivated acreage, 
as less land would be required to meet the existing demand. 
 
These models provide valuable insights into modelling land use. However, these models in one 
way or another, lack the ability to explain emergent phenomenon, to take into account factors 
such as spatial relationships, agent heterogeneity or complex agent interactions. Agent based 
models can take these factors into account. 
 
2.7 Agent Based Models 
Agent based models (ABM) are able to represent economic, dynamic social and environmental 
complexities by simulating interactions and feedbacks between agents with other agents and 
agents with the environment over time (Parker et al., 2003). This section reviews some of the 
literature on agent based modelling. This section also seeks to highlight the benefits of this 
modelling approach as a justification of the land use modelling technique chosen for this thesis. 
2.7.1 European ABM Studies 
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Several studies have applied the agent based approach to modelling. Balmann (1997) utilized 
ABMs in the analysis of path dependences of structural change in agriculture. Path dependence 
is defined by Page (2006) as the notion that current and future states, actions or decisions depend 
on, or are influenced by previous states, actions, or decisions. Balmann developed AgriPoliS, a 
cellular automaton model (CM), which divided the landscape in ordered plots over which farms 
compete. The model is based on a number of individually acting farms located at different points 
in an agricultural region.  Farms utilize a two-crop rotation and optimize their activities with 
respect to their expectations, financial state and existing assets. The author assessed model 
outcomes under varying initial conditions in the size of the modelled region and the varying 
levels of spatial density of farms on the landscape. He concluded that structural change is indeed 
path dependent. 
 
Happe et al. (2011), Happe, Balmann, Kellermann and Sachrbacher (2008), Happe (2006), also 
used AgriPoliS to ascertain the impact of various policy schemes on agriculture in Germany and 
Denmark. In Happe et al. (2008), the authors found similar results to that of Balmann (1997), in 
that the impact of policy changes on structural change in agriculture depended on the initial 
structure. Happe et al. (2011) combined AgriPoliS with the N-FARM model to assess the impact 
of structural change in agriculture on environmental emissions in Denmark. The authors found 
that structural change does impact the surplus accumulation of environmental gasses. 
 
ABMs provide increased research flexibility in that they can model complex relationships that 
otherwise would be impossible to capture. One such behaviour is that of imitation.  Polhill, Gotts 
and Law (2001) conducted a simulation-based study of agent imitation in decision making within 
a spatial framework over time. It compared the use of imitative relative to non-imitative land use 
practices and was concerned with improving the understanding of land use change in rural 
Scotland. The authors developed the FEARLUS simulation model for their study. The model 
indicated that the spatial and temporal structure of the environment and the strategies of other 
agents are important in defining the relative competitive properties of different strategies. The 
authors note that the success of a range of imitative strategies depends on the context in which 
imitation is taking place. 
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2.7.2 North American ABM Studies 
Some of the prior ABM graduate thesis studies at the University of Saskatchewan are closely 
related to the studies authored by Balmann and Happe. The works of Freeman (2005), Stolnuik 
(2008) and Anderson (2012) have all sought to assess the effects of structural change on 
Canadian prairie agriculture using ABMs and endogenous land markets. Freeman modelled the 
dynamic relationship between farm households and the resulting impact on the agrarian structure 
of a proto-typical rural municipality in the dark-brown soil zone region of Saskatchewan. 
Freeman also investigated the impact on land values. The ABM framework allowed for analysis 
of the impact of farmer management style on structural change. The thesis found that the 
incorporation of varied management styles marginally improved the survival rate of farm 
households. 
  
Stolnuik (2008) expanded the model of Freeman to capture the effect of mixed farms, economies 
of size and lumpiness of machinery investments on Saskatchewan agricultural structure. The 
author found that farms willing to produce livestock had an increased likelihood of survival as 
they were able to exploit returns from marginal land. His thesis also concluded that lumpy 
machinery investments engendered economies of size. The investment in machinery increased 
profits, which in turn, increased land bid values. Higher land bid values made it harder for small 
farms to grow and compete. 
 
 Lawrence (2011) assessed whether instituting an open access policy in the rail industry can 
curtail the behaviour of incumbent rail companies and to compute the effect of delayed grain 
shipment across the Canadian prairies to export position. He found that open rail access may lead 
to improved rail service. He however noted that the increased competition could in fact lead to 
both increased services and increased cost of shipping.  
 
Anderson (2012) built on the works of both Freeman and Stolnuik. Anderson identified the 
economic conditions that would prompt farmers to grow second-generation biofuel (SGB) crops. 
He also assessed the impact of SGB cropping on beef cow production and cropland use. The 
author found that energy crops have the potential to impact agricultural industry structure when 
biofuel prices are in excess of $2 per gigajoule. He further notes that beef cow farmers are better 
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off with the introduction of energy crops while grain farmers are negatively impacted as there is 
less land available which hampers their farm growth, their ability to compete and ultimately their 
likelihood of farm survival. 
 
Scheffran et al. (2007) and Scheffran and Ben Dor (2009) assessed the environmentally 
responsible and economically efficient agricultural land use options for the widespread 
implementation of renewable bioenergy crops. Their research identifies current and future 
obstacles and opportunities for renewable energy resources in Illinois, USA. They utilize an 
agent based model of system dynamics incorporating spatial elements using geographic 
information systems (GIS) to determine the incorporation of energy crops into the cropping mix 
of farmers. They take into consideration such factors as crop demand, price, subsidies and carbon 
credits as well as the location of ethanol plants and transportation patterns. They find that with 
increasing demand for biofuels, farmers will adjust their priorities to perennial biofuels mainly in 
the southern part of the state.  
 
 
Parker and Meretsky (2004) present an agent based model of land use that examines two 
competing land uses and the impact of their spillover effects. It is designed to test 
microeconomic theories of land use such as those posited Von Thünen (Polhill et al., 2008).  
Polhill et al. likened Parker and Meretsky’s model to an agent based equivalent of the cobweb 
model found in Ezekiel (1938), where, as shown in Figure 2.17, price expectations influence 
land-use decisions, which in turn determine the supply function. The supply interacts with the 
exogenous demand and reveals the realized price. 
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Figure 2.19: SLUDGE Process Overview  
(Ovals are endogenous/emergent elements; lateral boxes are exogenous/initialisation elements)  
Source: Polhill et al. 2008 
 
In the model used by Parker and Meretsky (2004), there are two potential uses for land, 
agriculture or urban development. The landscape is subdivided into parcels and the profitability 
of land use at each individual parcel is computed.  Profit for agriculture is given by the 
agricultural revenue less the fixed cost of the externality generated by urban activity. The profit 
for urban land is computed by urban revenue less the negative externality of neighbouring 
agriculture land, less the negative externality of neighbouring urban patches and less the fixed 
transportation cost based on the Euclidean distance from the market located at the city center 
influences. The negative spatial externalities in the profitability function create edge effects.7 
Parker and Meretsky also note that when transportation costs and the strength of demand for 
urban land influence landowner decisions, the model produces the classic Von Thünen outcome. 
That is, parcels with the highest profit are the one closest to the center market. Put another way, 
                                                 
7 The edge effects are referred to as “edge-effect externalities” (Parker, 2000). 
44 
 
land attracting the highest rents is spatially closer to the center market and appeared in concentric 
proximity to the center. With the inclusion of urban setback, agriculture-urban externalities and 
not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) effects and after increasing transportation costs, the spatial pattern 
outcomes move further away from the Von Thünen outcome. 
 
2.7.3 Advantages of Agent based Model Land Use Modelling 
Parker et al. (2003) review the emerging modelling technique of agent based (ABM) or multi-
agent simulation models (MAS). They observe that MAS (also known as land use cover change 
(LUCC) models) are models that combine two key components, the cellular model and the agent 
based decision-making model into an integrated system. The authors highlight that models can 
be classified as equation based, system models, statistical techniques, expert models evolutionary 
models, cellular model, hybrid models and agent based models. Table 2.9 provides a summary of 
the advantages and disadvantages of some of these approaches. 
 
Table 2.9: Pros and Cons of Equation Based, System and Statistical Techniques Models 
 
Source: Constructed by author with information from Parker et al. (2003). 
 
Agent based models may be preferred to other models when one wants to capture the impact of 
autonomous, heterogeneous, goal-oriented decision-makers, which take into account, the 
environment in which they make their decisions (Parker et al., 2003). Parker et al. highlight that 
ABMs can be used to model complex dynamic systems and that ABMs are also able to spatially 
Model Advantages Disadvantages 
Equation based 
Allows for quantification of 
theoretical models 
Must obtain numerical or analytical 
solution which limits the complexity of the 
model 
System models 
It allows for inter-temporal  
analysis which allows 
feedback over time 
Requires explicit identification of functional 
relationships over time and it is difficult to 
capture spatial relationships and is done at 
a very aggregated level  
Statistical 
techniques 
Use of econometric tools 
allow for the modeling of 
spatial relationships 
De-emphasizes the importance of decision 
making and the effect of institutions. 
Parameters represent average effects only 
useful for explaining dynamics of stationary 
processes and uniform over space and 
time. 
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represent interactions and feedbacks between socioeconomic and biophysical environment over 
time. This in turn, can reveal emergent phenomena resulting from decisions made by 
autonomous, heterogeneous agents.8  
 
Another feature of ABMs is the modelling of adaptation (Polhill et al., 2008). Parker et al. 
(2003) note that adaptive systems can influence outcomes at both the micro and macro scales. 
Agents adapt as they interact with other agent or the landscape and alter their behaviour in many 
diverse ways that can be hidden by the overall system behaviour (Smith and Page, 2007).  
 
The ability to model dynamics is a significant advantage of ABMs. Smith and Page (2007) note 
that non-ABM modelling approaches may be suitable when transition paths are short and 
conditions are stable. Parker et al. (2003) corroborate this and further note that, in reality, 
parameters may not be stable over time and further indicated that when spatial heterogeneity 
influences model outcomes ABMs models are suitable.  
 
This thesis seeks an approach that can model the complexities of four competing crop supply 
chains. The model must consider the spatial implications of distribution and transport costs. The 
selected model should be able to model interactions between agents and the landscape (in terms 
of productivity and cost) and agents and other agents in the model. Also, the model should be 
able to reflect the adaptive behaviour of elevators to changes in the model environment and 
reflect any emergent pattern from the industry. It is for these highlighted reasons that this thesis 
employs an agent based approach.  
                                                 
8 Auyang (1998) defined emergent phenomena as “the higher level structures that are both qualitatively and quantitatively different from their 
lower level components and not obtainable through aggregating, averaging, or other superposition of the micro-level components” (Parker et al., 
2003, p. 323).  
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CHAPTER 3: FARMCHAIN: AN AGENT BASED MODEL OF FARM 
COMMODITY SUPPLY CHAINS 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted some of the benefits of agent based modelling. This chapter 
puts forward the agent based model utilized in this thesis. This ABM, labelled the 
‘FARMCHAIN’ model, is characterized by competing crop supply chains that originate at the 
farm level. The FARMCHAIN model allows for the analysis of changes in farmer land allocation 
and its impact on elevator behaviour within the supply chain. 
 
While there may be some inherent similarities found in the model used in this research and 
Anderson’s (2012) modelling biofuel adoption and Lawrence’s (2011) modelling of crop 
movement to export port position, this model is structurally different in its focus. That is, the 
FARMCHAIN model seeks to capture the macro-scale emergent phenomena of elevator pricing 
behaviour from increased crop competition and higher energy costs. 
 
Very little is known about wheat pricing behaviour under the post single-desk selling era of 
Canadian grain elevators as, under the single-desk selling regime elevators had little control on 
the impact on farmgate prices as the industry was highly regulated (Schmitz and Furtan, 2000). 
However with the passing of the Freedom of the Farmer Act (Bill C-18, 2011), elevators may 
more strategically price their own services, influencing net farmgate prices, and potentially 
inducing more uncertainty as to the ramifications of their future behaviour. Crop production in 
western Canada is characterized by many heterogeneous farmers located on a productively 
variable landscape. In addition, western Canadian farmers produce a variety of crops whose mix 
has been shifting over time, resulting in multiple competing supply chains which include wheat 
and other cereals export for food, cereals for ethanol and canola for crushing plants or export. 
The ability to explore elevator behavior in a spatially competitive and dynamic context with 
many heterogeneous agents is one of the major advantages of agent based modelling. That is 
agent based modelling allows for the simulation of future elevator behaviour under structural 
change, new business conditions or a changing climatic environment. The next section describes 
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the structure and flow of the FARMCHAIN model, commencing with an overview and thereafter 
describing the model in greater detail.  
 
3.2 An Agent based Model of Supply Chains-The FARMCHAIN Model 
The approach utilized in the FARMCHAIN model is a variant of the Simulated Land Use Edge 
Effects (SLUDGE) model proposed by Parker and Meretsky (2004) in that it follows the 
classical cobweb model in agricultural economics (Polhill et al., 2008), but in this case, crop 
supply is only influenced by prices of the previous period and expected future prices. 
 
3.2.1 Model Overview 
This section provides an overview of each agent in the model and how they relate to each other. 
The FARMCHAIN model includes five types of agents: 1) farmers; 2) grain elevators; 3) canola 
crushing plants 4) ethanol plants; and 5) a biodiesel plant.  
 
Farmers have two primary roles FARMCHAIN model: 1) farmers decide cropping mix and land 
allocations and 2) farmers make trucking or distribution decisions. Famers initially observe 
world prices and allocate their land to four crops: wheat, canola (CAN), barley (BAR) and field 
peas (FP), this is the rotation problem. While the rotation problem can be solved using linear 
programming problem (further discussed later), the computational time increases significantly 
due to the large number of farmer agents. Within the rotation problem is the sub-problem of 
which wheat type to grow: wheat types: wheat for biofuel (FW) and spring wheat or wheat for 
food (SW).9 It is assumed that the wheat types are perfect substitutes.  
 
Farmers decide which of the the soft or the hard wheat varieties to be planted based on their 
relative expected gross margins. After the farmer solves the sub-problem, the farmer decides 
how much land should be allocated to wheat and the other three crops based on the expected 
returns of the four crops. Crop land allocation after the first period is based on the expected gross 
margins. Expected gross margins are a function of the preceding period’s prices, current prices, 
                                                 
9 As highlighted in Section 2.5, preferred wheat for food is generally high in protein and low in starch while wheat for biofuel production is 
ideally low protein and high starch. 
48 
 
production costs, storage and handling, trucking, rail and ocean freight costs. After harvest and 
depending on the crop, farmer agents select the destination and market. They can haul the crop to 
an elevator, a crushing plant and/or an ethanol plant. Biofuel wheat is trucked directly to the 
ethanol plant, while food wheat, peas and barley are trucked to elevators. Farmer agents can 
truck canola to either an elevator or a crushing plant, whichever is closer. After farmer agents 
identify and haul the crop to its destination, actual trucking costs and applicable elevator costs 
are calculated.  
 
In the case of deliveries made to an elevator, elevator agents compute fees for handling and 
storage based on the level of spatial competition that exists within a predefined proximity radius. 
As time progresses, elevators adjust handling and storage fees based on the amount of crop 
received relative to the other competitors within their proximity radius. Elevators allocate crops 
received to either export or domestic use. In the case of export crops, rail transport costs to the 
ports are then computed and apportioned to the farmer based on relative quantities sent to the 
elevator. Crops directed to port are then assessed for ocean freight costs and apportioned to the 
farmer based on relative quantities produced. 
 
Domestically processed crops include canola crushed for food/feed export (oil and meal) and 
biodiesel; and wheat for biofuels. Canola production is assumed to be directly hauled by truck to 
one of six oilseed crushing plants or to a grain elevator, whichever is closer. Oilseed crushing 
plants are assumed to charge the average storage and handling fees charged by other elevators 
plus an additional crushing margin. It is assumed that a portion of the crushing plant’s product is 
transported to export position by rail with the remainder being transported to the biodiesel plant 
by rail. Actual allocations are based on historical patterns. Thereafter, actual associated rail costs 
computed and apportioned to the farmer. 
  
Ethanol and biodiesel plants produce biofuels. Biofuels produced first satisfy domestic demand; 
biofuel surpluses are assumed to be exported through the Vancouver port. Next, the associated 
rail costs are computed and apportioned back to the farmer. Biofuel prices are computed as a 
function of crude oil prices and petroleum prices. Processing margins are deducted and the 
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resulting price is the return to biofuel cropping before transportation and production costs have 
been subtracted. 
 
As shown in Figure 3.1, production quantities in the FARMCHAIN model’s logistic chain moves 
from the farm level to the ports (bottom-up) while information, in the form of prices and costs, is 
transmitted from the top-down. The ensuing sections first describe the role of agents in the model 
according to the bottom-up movement of crops, starting with the landscape, then the farmers and 
finally the alternate distribution channels. Thereafter, the top-down information flow of prices, 
costs and expectations are discussed in a context of how the model transitions into the following 
period.   
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Figure 3.1: Simplified FARMCHAIN Flow Diagram.  
Source: Created by author 
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3.2.2 Landscape 
The FARMCHAIN model geographically represents the agricultural production landscape of the 
20 Census Agricultural Regions (CARs) in Saskatchewan. The model landscape is comprised of 
106,346 patches, of which 757 patches represent water masses and are therefore excluded from 
the model. A patch covers approximately 1,964 acres of Saskatchewan agricultural land. 10 
Patches contain CAR identification information, soil zone information, production and crop 
production cost coefficients. The landscape layer contains the information used in characterizing 
their associated farmer agents. 
 
3.2.3 The Farmer Agents 
Each farmer agent is randomly “sprouted” from the landscape and is assigned the characteristics 
of its associated patch. For replication purposes, the randomly sprouted farmer agent is created 
based on a random seed algorithm. The FARMCHAIN model sprouts 36,952 farmers, the number 
of farmers that reported in the 2011 Census of Agriculture (Statistics Canada, 2012), and is 
allocated in the same fashion for respective CARs.  
 
Pivotal to the model results are the farm-level production decisions. These decisions are 
influenced by the differing farmer agent characteristics. Farmer agents are heterogeneous based 
on farm size, location and price expectations. Farm size is exogenously computed and is constant 
for all replications. Farmer agent farm size is randomly assigned and is uniformly distributed 
around the mean farm-size of farmers of each of their respective CARs. The total land-size of 
farmers approximately reflects the total seeded acreage in 2010 of spring wheat, canola, barley 
and field peas. Farmers also differ in their location. 11 That is, they not only differ in their 
proximity to grain elevator agents, ethanol plant agents and crushing plant agents but they also 
may differ based on the soil zone in which they are situated. Differences in soil zones may imply 
differences in cost of production and crop yield coefficients, thus increasing farmer agent 
                                                 
10 The patch size is computed as the approximate area of all 20 CARs divided by the number of patches in that fall within the 20-CAR boundary 
shapefiile. The approximate area is obtained from ArcGIS area tool. 
11 The model represents the location of the farmer agent as a reference point of crop delivery and does not geographically represent the spatial 
construct of a bounded farm. To ensure no overlap a patch is larger than the largest farm size in the model. This means for every patch that has a 
farmer there would be unutilized land. 
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heterogeneity.12 Farmers also differ in their formulation of expected prices from one time period 
to another. The following section explains how farmers formulate their expectations.  
 
3.2.3.1 Price Expectations 
Ezekiel (1938) proposed that farmer expectations were as a result of previous period’s price 
observations. Nerlove (1958) expanded this noting that price expectations not only depend on 
prior price observations but also can adapt to previous forecast errors. The rational expatations 
literature arose highlighting expectations do not only incorporate lagged price information but all 
the information relevnt to the formulation of expectations and could include futures prices 
(Muth, 1961). Sulewski, Spriggs and Schoney (1994) however show that even though lagged-
price models and futures prices are accurate indicators of future commodity prices, it 
inadequately captures Canadian farmers’ expectation formulation for wheat and canola. In the 
FARMCHAIN model it is assumed that farmer agents formulate price expectations following a 
variant of the rational expectations literature, where expected prices are a stochastic function of 
past and expected future prices. That is, the model’s farmer agents express their price 
expectations as a weighted average of gross margins earned in period 𝑡 and an estimate of the 
future gross margins yet to be observed in period 𝑡 + 1. The estimate of the future gross margin 
is given by the expected world price in period 𝑡 + 1 less the realized variable costs (variable 
production costs and costs associated with storage and handling) of period 𝑡. It is assumed that 
farmer agents are also heterogeneous differ according to their view of markets. A farmer that is 
more forward looking would have a higher weight on future expectations of gross margins. 
However, if the farmer has a greater weight on realized gross margins, the farmer believes that 
past performance is a better indication of future performance. The expectations formulation is 
expressed as: 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡+1𝑗  = �(1 − 𝜑𝑛) × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑗 + 𝜑𝑛  × (𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡+1𝑗 − 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑗)�× 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑗,𝑙                                                                                                   … (1) 
                                                 
12 Crop yields are assumed to be static and differ only by location. 
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Thus expected prices differ for the 𝑗𝑡ℎ crop, across the 𝑛𝑡ℎ farmer agent, over 𝑡𝑡ℎ time period 
and for farmers in the 𝑙𝑡ℎ location. The weight, 𝜑𝑛, used in the price expectations formulation is 
exogenously created and follow a uniformly random distribution with values between 0 and 1.  
Therefore as 𝜑𝑛 → 1, the 𝑛𝑡ℎ  farmer agent is more forward looking. However, in the initial 
period 𝑡 = 0 farmers’ crop expectations are equal to the world crop prices of the period, while 
biofuel wheat expected crop price at period 𝑡 = 0 is zero. The farmer agent’s expected price 
influences the crop land allocation. 
 
3.2.3.2. Land Allocation 
Farmer agents make land-use and transportation decisions based on economic and agronomic 
considerations. The farmer agent allocates land to four crops: wheat, canola, barley and field 
peas. The farmer decides whether to seed spring wheat or biofuel wheat. Since spring wheat and 
biofuel wheat are assumed to be perfect agronomic substitutes and the farmer agent can switch 
between the two wheat types at zero cost. 
  
Following a variant of Oglethorpe (1995), farmer agents maximize expected crop returns subject 
to agronomic or resource constraints: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 = �𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑗 × 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑗5
𝑗=1
× 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑗     … (2) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 ∶ 
𝐴 × 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≤ 𝑏                                                                                                                                   … (3) 
Where 𝐴 represent the matrix of agronomic coefficients and 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 represents the vector of land 
allocation variables and  𝑏 is a vector containing the right-hand-side (RHS) of resource limits. 𝑗 
denotes the 𝑗𝑡ℎ crop. The model can explicitly be written to show the rotational problem and the 
sub problem of the wheat types. Therefore equations (2) and (3) may be expressed as: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑍 = 𝑅𝑤𝑋𝑤 + 𝑅𝑏𝑋𝑏 + 𝑅𝑋𝑐 + 𝑅𝑝𝑋𝑝                                                                                       (4)   
𝑠. 𝑡. :  𝑋𝑤 + 𝑋𝑏 + 𝑋𝑐 + 𝑋𝑝  ≤ 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 
  𝑋𝑐  ≤ 𝛼𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠  
  𝑋𝑝  ≤ 𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 
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  𝑅𝑤𝑋𝑤 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥[ 𝑅𝑆𝑊𝑋𝑤𝑆𝑊 ,  𝑅𝐹𝑊𝑋𝑤𝐹𝑊]                                                                                     (5) where 𝑤 = 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡, 𝑏 = 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑒𝑦, 𝑐 = 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑎, 𝑝 = 𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠, 𝑅 = expected gross margin 
 𝛼𝑐 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑎, 𝛼𝑝 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠 
𝑀𝑎𝑥[ 𝑅𝑆𝑊𝑋𝑤𝑆𝑊 ,  𝑅𝐹𝑊𝑋𝑤𝐹𝑊] = 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚, 𝑋 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
A linear programming problem is a method of “allocating resources to activities” (Hillier and 
Lieberman, 2001, p.153). In this case farmer agents are seeking to allocate their land resource to 
competing crops. An analysis of relative historical allocations of the spring wheat, canola, barley 
and field peas as shown in Figure 2.6, reveals that canola and wheat compete with each other for 
the acreage majority while peas and barley compete at lower proportions. Utilizing this 
information in modelling, it is assumed that the number of basic feasible solutions (BFS) could 
be reduced to a very limited, finite, discrete set. The FARMCHAIN model uses 8 BFS and selects 
the option that maximizes each farmer agent’s expected return as seen in equation (1). These 
eight BFS are called solution packages and the optimal solution is determined through a three-
stage iterative process. 
 
In the first stage of the iteration process the farmer agent solves the sub-problem indicated in 
section 3.2.1 by ranking expected returns for food wheat (SW) and biofuel wheat (FW). As 
shown in Table 3.1 basic feasible solutions 1 through 4 food wheat is produce instead of biofuel 
wheat and the opposite is true for basic feasible solutions 5 through 8. In the second stage farmer 
determine land allocations to the four crops. Farmers compare the gross margins of canola, dry 
peas, barley and wheat (the wheat-type selected from the sub-problem) to determine how much 
land is allocated between the four crops. The land proportion of wheat to seed relative to canola 
is then determined based on the expected gross margins of wheat to relative to canola.  
 
Concurrently, the farmer agent determines the proportion of land to seed barley relative to field 
peas based on the comparison of their expected gross margins. In the final stage farmers selects 
one of eight basic feasible solutions that maximise their expected returns. The selected acreages 
are summed and relative proportions computed. These relative proportions become BFS1 as 
shown in Table 3.1. The relative proportions or land allocation ratios are the same as the 
production coefficients in the discussed in Section 3.2.2 and they differ by CAR. 
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Table 3.1: FARMCHAIN Model Optimal Solution Selection Process  
 
Source: Constructed by author 
 
3.2.3.3 Actual Farm Production and Production Costs Computation 
After farmers have decided cropland allocation in the 𝑡𝑡ℎ period, they produce, store crops for 
ready for transport to market and compute actual production costs. Total farm production is 
computed as the land allocation ratio multiplied by the land-size multiplied by yield associated 
with the location of the farmer. This can be written more formally as: 
𝑄𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡𝑗 × 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 × 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑗,𝑙                                                                             … (6) 
where 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡𝑗  is the allocation ratio at time period 𝑡  for crop 𝑗 . Land size is the total 
number of acres the farmer has to cultivate and 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑗,𝑙 is the yield in tonnes per acre for crop 𝑗 
associated with the farmer operating in the 𝑙𝑡ℎ  location. Production costs are computed as a 
function of the soil zone in which the farmer is located and represent the total variable cost of 
production. 
Initially in time period 𝑡 = 0, the unit production cost is given by: 
𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑃0
𝑗 = 𝑇𝑉𝐶𝑗,𝑙                                                                                                                                       … (7) 
Where TVC is the total variable cost per acre of producing crop 𝑗 in the 𝑙𝑡ℎ location 
For 𝑡 > 0, the unit production cost is given by: 
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𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑃𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑃𝑡−1𝑗 + 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙0𝑗  × (𝜀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 × %∆𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) + 𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟0𝑗× �𝜀𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟 × %∆𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒�                                                                                   … (8) 
Where 𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
𝑗  is the total variable cost per acre (later converted to a cost per tonne) in the 
previous period for the 𝑗𝑡ℎ  crop, 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙0
𝑗  is the initial fuel cost component, 𝜀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙  represents the 
pass-through of oil prices to fuel prices, %∆𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 is the real annual growth in crude oil price 
per barrel, 𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟0
𝑗 is the initial fertilizer cost component and 𝜀𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟 represents the pass-
through of oil prices to fertilizer prices. 
The total variable cost of production is given by: 
𝐶𝑂𝑃𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑃𝑡𝑗 × 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒                                                                                                              … (9) 
The total variable cost of production is converted to total variable cost per tonne by dividing total 
variable cost associated with the 𝑗𝑡ℎ crop by the total production of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ crop. 
 
3.2.3.4 Crop Storage, Trucking Choice and Trucking Costs 
After the crop is produced, it is stored on the farm. It is assumed that there are no capacity 
constraints in on-farm storage and that the on-the-farm storage costs are fixed at zero. At this 
stage, farmers now consider distribution channels. That is, farmers determine whether the crop 
has to be trucked to grain elevators, crushing plants or an ethanol plant. Food wheat, barley and 
field peas are trucked to grain elevators, canola goes to either elevators or crushing plants and 
biofuel wheat goes to ethanol plants. 
 
In order for a farmer to choose an elevator, the farmer first counts the number of elevators within 
a pre-determined trucking threshold. If there is at most one elevator within the threshold, then the 
farmer delivers the crop to the closest elevator. If there is more than one elevator within this 
threshold, the farmer delivers the crop to the elevator with the lowest storage and handling costs. 
This decision holds for wheat, barley and field peas. For canola, farmers transport the seed to the 
nearest elevator or crushing plant and biofuel wheat is trucked to the nearest ethanol plant.  
 
When the farmer decides the destination of the crop, the crop is then transferred to that 
destination and the trucking cost computed. Following Lawrence (2011), total trucking cost is a 
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function of trucking distance, the amount of crop 𝑗 in storage to be hauled and fossil fuel prices 
and is given by: 
 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑗 = ��𝛼𝑗 +  𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑗  ×  𝛽𝑗� ×  𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑗� × [1 + %𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡] … (10) 
The trucking cost is comprised of 𝛼𝑗and 𝛽𝑗 – linear parameters of the unit cost of trucking crop 
𝑗, 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡
𝑗- the Euclidean distance between the farmer and the elevator, crushing plant 
or ethanol plant chosen by the farmer, 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝑗- farmer’s storage of harvested crop 𝑗 to be 
transported by truck in time period 𝑡and %𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡  – trucking surcharge applied in 𝑡𝑡ℎ 
period. The trucking surcharge rate is computed as: %𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 =  %𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡−1  × [1 + (%∆𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 × 𝜀𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒)]                           … (11) 
The surcharge in period 𝑡 is equal to the surcharge of the previous period grown at the rate of 
change of oil prices multiplied by 𝜀𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒, the elasticity of trucking surcharge rate to changes 
in oil prices.  
 
3.2.4 Distribution Channels 
Farmer agents in the FARMCHAIN model are at the start of the crop supply chain and must 
deliver crops produced to the marketing channel assigned to the crop. As seen in Figure 3.1, the 
network of crop movement thereafter either moves to port or exits the FARMCHAIN model by 
assuming that it has been used for domestic consumption and is valued at the world price. The 
exception is canola. Canola is sent to both elevators and crushing plants. At the crushing plant, 
canola undergoes additional processing with the export portion railed to ports and the domestic 
portion forwarded the biodiesel plant for further processing. The following sections further 
explain the structural operations of each agent type in the rest of the supply chain. 
 
3.2.4.1 Grain Elevators  
Elevator agents seek to maximize handling fees while farmers seek to minimize handling costs 
and elevator agents learn from their interactions with farmers and other elevators within close 
proximity in order to estimate their own fees. In the FARMCHAIN model, it is assumed that 
grain elevators are spatially competitive. It is also assumed that grain elevators influence the 
farmgate return to farmers through their elevation, cleaning and storage (handling) fees. It is also 
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assumed that elevators compete for farmers’ harvest crops using spatial Bertrand price 
competition: elevators employ an undercutting price strategy in order to maximise grain 
throughput relative to other elevators in close proximity. As such, the higher the number of rival 
elevators, the lower the handling fees charged by the elevator. These fees are assumed to be 
proxies of the financial health of elevators in that the higher the fees charged by an elevator, the 
more financially viable is that elevator. Furthermore, it is assumed that an elevator discontinues 
operation if its competitive handling fees fall to zero for all four crops received in a given time 
period. The fee charged by an elevator increases if the amount of crop transported to the elevator 
exceeds the average crop transported to elevators within a predefined proximity radius (called 
close proximity), decreases if the amount of crop transported to the elevator is less than the 
average crop transported to elevators within close proximity and remains the same if it is equal to 
the average crop transported to elevators within close proximity.   
 
It is also assumed that elevators do not have capacity constraints. Thus one elevator could handle 
all the grain or none of it. In addition, it is also assumed that crops trucked to elevators, with the 
exception of canola, will be either moved to port or exits the FARMCHAIN model and assumed 
to be used for domestic consumption valued at the world price.  It is further assumed that all the 
canola trucked to elevators is forwarded directly to the ports. Most of the exports crops from the 
prairies are shipped through Prince Rupert, Vancouver, Thunder Bay or Churchill. However 
because the Prince Rupert port is so far from Saskatchewan elevators and historically very little 
has moved through Churchill (CGC, 2011; CGC, 2008), the FARMCHAIN model only uses the 
Vancouver (West) and Thunder Bay (East) ports. Rail costs are then computed for crops and 
given: 
. 
𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑗 = �𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 ∗ 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∗  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑝�  × (1 + %𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)                                                                                             … (12) 
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Where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝑗  denotes the export supply in tonnes in period 𝑡 of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ crop, 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 is 
an adjustment factor that is used to calibrate rail costs. 13  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑝  denotes the geodesic 
distance of the elevator to the port in the 𝑝𝑡ℎ location. Rail costs increase annually at the rate of 
the rail surcharge rate. The rail surcharge rate is assumed be equal to the trucking surcharge rate.  
 
The associated rail cost to farmers for a given crop for a given period is apportioned by 
calculating the amount of crop transported to that elevator in that period divided by the total 
amount of crop that is delivered to that elevator in that period multiplied by the total rail cost 
computed for that elevator.  
 
3.2.4.2 Canola Crushing Plants 
The model assumes that canola is transported to a crushing plant if the farmer is closer to a 
crushing plant than an elevator.  Similar to the elevators, it is assumed that there are no capacity 
constraints. It is also assumed that crushing plants do not directly spatially compete with 
elevators for canola. Another assumption is that crushing plants deduct a constant processing 
margin in excess of handling and storage fees charged to farmers. The canola crop at the 
crushing plant is processed and then transported via rail to the ports and to the biodiesel plant. 
Each crushing plant has built-in the distance to the two ports and the distance to the biodiesel 
plant.  
 
Like elevators, rail costs at the crushing plant are apportioned to the farmer based on the canola 
transported to that crushing plant divided by the total crop delivered to the plant in that period 
multiplied by the total rail costs associated with the crushing plant.  
 
3.2.4.3 Biodiesel Plant 
Canola oil is transported via rail from crushing plants to the biodiesel plant. It is assumed that 
there are no capacity constraints for processing canola oil. Canola oil is processed into biodiesel 
and is first used to meet domestic mandated amounts. Domestic demand for biodiesel is a 
                                                 
13 The rail cost per tonne used in Nolan and Carlson (2005) is not reflective of costs in 2010. Therefore the adjustment factor captures the scale of 
calibration to the Nolan and Carlson estimates. 
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derived demand from the local diesel fuel oil demand.  The local diesel demand which is 
estimated as a linear function of time is given by:  𝐷𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡(𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠) = 𝜃  + (𝜇 ∗  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)                                                               … (13) 
where 𝜇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃 are estimated coefficients 
The corresponding biodiesel demand is the mandated amounts. That is, the percent mandate is 
multiplied by the diesel demand in the period: 
𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡 = 𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙_𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒% ∗  𝐷𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡                            … (14) 
 
If production exceeds mandated amounts then the excess is assumed to be transported via rail to 
Vancouver for export. The rail cost for the biodiesel plant is computed and given by the 
following function: 
𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐷 = �𝐵𝐷𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 ∗ 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∗  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑣𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝜔𝐵𝐷�  ×  (1 + %𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)                                                                                            … (15) 
where 𝐵𝐷𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑡 is the surplus biodiesel produced in litres in period 𝑡 and 𝜔𝐵𝐷is the conversion 
factor of litres of biodiesel to tonnes. 
 
The rail costs are then apportioned to farmers who sent their grain to the canola crushing plant 
based on the farmers’ relative share of the crop sent to the crushing plant and the relative share of 
the canola oil supplied to the biodiesel plant relative to the total canola oil supply to the biodiesel 
plant. 
 
3.2.4.4 Ethanol Plants 
Industrial wheat is trucked directly to the ethanol plants. It is assumed that there are no capacity 
constraints for processing the grain. Grain is processed into ethanol and is used to meet domestic 
mandated amounts. Domestic demand for ethanol is a derived demand from the demand for local 
gasoline.  Local gasoline demand is estimated as a linear function of time and is given by:  𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡(𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠) =  𝛾 +  (𝛿 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)                                                                                   … (16)  
where 𝛾 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿 are estimated coefficients 
The corresponding ethanol demand is the mandated amounts: 
𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡 = (𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙_𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒%) ∗  𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡                                                  … (17) 
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 If production exceeds mandated amounts then the excess is transported by rail to Vancouver for 
export. The rail cost for ethanol plants is computed and given by the following function: 
𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐸𝑡ℎ = �𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 ∗ 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∗  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑣𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝜔𝐸𝑡ℎ�  ×  (1 + %𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)                                                                                            … (18) 
where 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑡  is the surplus ethanol produced by the ethanol plant in litres in period 𝑡 and 
𝜔𝐸𝑡ℎis the conversion factor of litres of ethanol to tonnes. The rail cost is thereafter apportioned 
to farmers who sent their grain to the ethanol plant. 
 
3.2.4.5 Ocean Freight Computation 
Products slated for export are assumed to be transported by ship from the port to the export 
country.  In order to obtain farmgate prices an estimate of ocean freight costs must be computed. 
It is assumed that products shipped through western port are destined for Japan while products 
shipped through the eastern ports are destined for Venezuela.14 The ocean freight rate per tonne 
of export product (export crop or export biofuel) slated for transport to 𝑑𝑡ℎ destination in time 
period 𝑡 can be expressed as: 
𝑂𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑑= 𝑂𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1𝑗,𝑑  × �1 + �%∆𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 × 𝜀𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡��                    … (19) 
where 𝜀𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 is percentage change ocean freight rate due a 1% change in oil price and is the 
elasticity estimate obtained from Hummels (2007). 
  
The total ocean freight cost for the 𝑗𝑡ℎ export produce that goes either east or west is given by: 
𝑂𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡
𝑗 =  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑗,𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡  × 𝑂𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑗,𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  × 𝑂𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡                                                                         … (20) 
where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝑗,𝑑 represents crop export quantity in tonnes or the converted tonne equivalent 
of litres of biofuel destined for export. 
 
3.2.5 Computation of Gross Margins 
                                                 
14 The South American continent was selected because most wheat shipments in the crop year 2010-2011 were destined for the western 
hemisphere, with Venezuela receiving the most shipments (CGC, 2011).  
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Since crops are transported from the farm level through the ports (bottom-up) as shown in Figure 
3.1, information in the form of prices and costs move from the top of the model down to the 
farmer. At the end of a simulation period, farmers observe crop and biofuel prices, costs of 
production, processing and handling to compute their gross margins. The following sections 
discuss price observations and the computations of gross margins in the FARMCHAIN model. 
 
3.2.5.1 Price Observations 
It is assumed that world crop prices are exogenously determined for spring wheat, barley, canola 
and field peas.  Biofuel prices are assumed to be determined based on the energy equivalent price 
of their fossil fuel counterparts. Following Tyner and Taheripour (2007), gas price is linear 
function of the crude oil price: 
𝑝𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑡 =  𝜌𝑔𝑎𝑠 + ( 𝜎 𝑔𝑎𝑠 × 𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡)                                                                   … (21)  
where 𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 is the price of crude oil in period 𝑡. 𝜌𝑔𝑎𝑠 and 𝜎 𝑔𝑎𝑠 are estimated scalars. 
Tyner and Taheripour (2007) proposed a proportional conversion of gas prices and ethanol 
prices, noting that ethanol prices are approximately the energy equivalent of gas prices. The 
FARMCHAIN utilizes this principle but uses the conversion factor implied by Pimentel, Patzek 
and Cecil (2003) (described in the next chapter) and adds a variable that captures government 
ethanol policy impacts. Thus the energy equivalent price adjusted for ethanol processor returns 
of ethanol is given by: 
𝑝𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑡 = (𝜏𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙 ×  𝑝𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦) × (1 − 𝜋)                                      … (22) 
Where 𝜏𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙  is a scalar parameter and 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦  is the cent per litre government 
support to the ethanol plant and 𝜋 represents the percent sales margin to ethanol producers. The 
ethanol plants are assumed to deduct a margin which is a function of oil-prices: 
𝑒𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡−1  +  �ℵ𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙  ∗ (1 +  𝜀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙  ×  %∆𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)�                 … (23) 
where ℵ𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙  is the portion of ethanol non-feedstock production costs that is attributable to 
fuel. Similarly, the diesel price is a linear function of world crude oil prices given by: 
𝑝𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑡 =  � 𝜌𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙 +   𝜎 𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙  ×  𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡�                                                                     … (24)   
where  𝜌𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙 and 𝜎 𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙   are estimated coefficients. 
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As in the case of ethanol plants, the model assumes that the price of biodiesel is the energy 
equivalent of price of diesel fuel. This model adds a variable subsidy in cents per litre such that 
the price of biodiesel adjusted for processor returns is given by: 
𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡 = (𝜏𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙 ×  𝑝𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦)  × (1 − 𝜋)                                             … (25) 
where 𝜏𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙 is an estimated coefficient and 𝑏𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 is the cent per litre government 
support to the biodiesel plant and 𝜋 represents the percent sales margin to biodiesel producers. 
The biodiesel plant is assumed to deduct a margin which is a function of oil-prices: 
𝑏𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 =  𝑏𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡−1  +  �ℵ𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙  ∗ ( 𝜀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 ×  %∆𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)�                        … (26) 
Where ℵ𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙is the portion of biodiesel non-feedstock production costs that is attributable to 
fuel. 
 
3.2.5.2 Computation of Farmer Gross Margins 
After the prices have been obtained, farmers compute their gross margins that are equal to the 
world price of the crop less the variable cost of crop production, transportation, handling and 
storage. In periods in which the farmer agent does not produce biofuel wheat, a biofuel memory 
variable (FW_MEMORY) recalls the last estimated cost of production per tonne that is incurred 
for producing biofuel wheat. Similarly, there is a spring wheat memory variable 
(SW_MEMORY) that farmer agents utilize if spring wheat production for that farmer is zero. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that there is no biofuel production in the first period.15 In this case, 
the farmer agent sets the biofuel memory variable equal to the total production and trucking costs 
of spring wheat in that period.  
 
In periods where the farmer agent does not produce biofuel wheat, the farmer agent’s 
hypothetical gross margin is equal to ethanol price less the processing margin less 
FW_MEMORY. Conversely, if the farmer agent does not produce spring wheat then the farmer 
agent’s hypothetical gross margin is the world price of wheat minus SW_MEMORY. The gross 
margins are used to compute the expected returns for the next period.  
3.3 Summary 
                                                 
15 The model uses the first four periods for initializing the model to reduce initialization effects. 
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This chapter outlined the design of the FARMCHAIN model. The model comprises five types of 
agents: farmers, grain elevators, ethanol plants, biodiesel plant and canola crushing plants. The 
role of each agent type was outlined and rules and assumptions governing behaviour and inter-
agent interactions were also stated. Pivotal to the FARMCHAIN model results are the land use 
decision of farmers. This chapter outlined the general framework under which farmer agents 
made their cropping decisions, of how crops moved through supply/value chain to the port to be 
exported to foreign destinations and how prices were observed and costs apportioned to the 
farmer. Chapter 4 provides parameter estimates for the structural and behavioural equations 
outlined in this chapter. This includes data used in characterizing the agents and the landscape. 
Also, the following chapter provides values for the model initialization as well as descriptions of 
global variables in the model and how there were generated.  
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CHAPTER 4: FARMCHAIN DATA, PARAMETERIZATION AND 
INITIALIZATION 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter described the flow of the FARMCHAIN model, outlining the structural and 
functional relationships between agents in the supply chain. This chapter specifies the model 
initialization, the various structural coefficients, prices and yield coefficients.  
4.2 The Landscape 
The Saskatchewan landscape is heterogeneous, differing in arable land, crops commonly grown 
and associated yield potential and cost of production. These patches contain land quality and 
land use allocation coefficients, yields and associated costs of production. 
  
4.2.1 Patch Soil Quality, Yield and Cost of Production 
Unfortunately geographic information system (GIS) data are unavailable to meet all patch data 
requirements. In the case of spring wheat16, barley and canola yields and land quality, a shapefile 
exists (AAFC, 2008). In Figures 4.1 through Figures 4.3, the spatial patterns of average yields 
are displayed for spring wheat, barley and canola, respectively. Unfortunately, this database does 
not include field peas and there are some areas which have no yield information assigned; 
accordingly, field pea yields and areas without yield information are assigned yields based on the 
2012 Crop Planning Guide soil type area averages. Costs of production are also assigned to 
patches based on soil zones (Table 4.1). These are remapped based on soil zone (Figure 4.4) to 
the land quality boundaries as displayed in Figures 4.1 - 4.3. 
 
                                                 
16Wheat yields from the shape file are generic to all wheat.  Biofuel wheat yield is assumed to 1.07 times that of spring wheat as computed from 
the 2012 Crop Planning Guide (Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 2012b). 
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Figure 4.1: Saskatchewan Spring Wheat Yield by Census Agricultural Region 
Source: Created by author with data from Land Potential Database (AAFC, 2009). 
  
 
It is important to note the spatial heterogeneity that exists within a CAR. This may impact the 
farmer agent gross margins and ultimately land allocation decisions. This is shown in Figure 4.1, 
where CARs 5A, 5B, 7B, 8B, 9A and 9B have the highest wheat yields but the southwestern 
CARs have the lowest yields. This pattern is also consistent for Figures 4.2 and 4.3.  
 
67 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Saskatchewan Barley Yield by Census Agricultural Region 
Source: Land Potential Database (AAFC, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Saskatchewan Canola Yield by Census Agricultural Region 
Source: Land Potential Database (AAFC, 2009). 
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Figure 4.4: Saskatchewan Soil Zones 
Source: Land Potential Database (AAFC, 2009) and Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 2012b. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Yield and Production Cost data by Crop by Soil Zone 
 
Source: Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture 2012b. 
 
4.2.2 Production Packages (Land Allocation Ratios) 
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Another shapefile outlines the boundary of the CAR and contains unique land use allocation 
coefficients or production packages (as outlined in Chapter 3). The land allocation coefficients, 
which can be found in Table B-1 of Appendix B, are transferred to the patches and specify the 
percentage of land allotted for each crop in each patch. 
 
4.2.3 Farm Location 
Another integral part of the landscape is the farm agent location. Farmers are initially randomly 
distributed across the CAR but once their location is assigned, it is kept constant across 
simulation replications and scenarios.  Initial assignment is based on a random seed algorithm. In 
comparison to the ABM models of Freeman (2005), Stolnuik (2008) and Anderson (2012), 
FARMCHAIN farmers are relatively simple and are differentiated only by farm land size, 
location and price expectations. In order to demonstrate the assignment process, two numbers; 
100 and 98,238, are chosen at random to be the random seeds. The resulting farm assignments 
are displayed in Figures 4.5 and Figures 4.6, respectively. In Figures 4.5 and 4.6 five farmer 
agents are selected at random; farmer 5 (orange), farmer 33,500 (red), farmer 9,108 (yellow), 
farmer 15,000 (pink) and farmer 25,000 (green).17 Freeman found that farm assignment does not 
result in path dependency. Nevertheless, this hypothesis will be tested and further discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
 
 
                                                 
17 All patches are the same size and each patch represents 1964 acres. A farmer is “sprouted” from a patch that is selected at random without 
replacement and his land size is at most 1825 acres, which is less than the patch size. 
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Figure 4.5: Random Farmer Agent Generation Based on Random Seed Algorithm: 100 
Source: Created by author from FARMCHAIN model. 
 
Figure 4.6: Random Farmer Agent Generation Based on Random Seed Algorithm: 98238 
Source: Created by author from FARMCHAIN model. 
4.2.4 Elevator and Processing Plants Locations 
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Grain elevators, ethanol plants, crushing plants and the biodiesel plant locations are based on 
approximate actual locations. A GIS shapefile is created based on the approximate location 
coordinates, obtained from Google Maps™ and geocoded into ArcMap©.  Thereafter, the 
geodesic distances to port is computed externally and joined to the shapefiles.18 The geographic 
locations of grain elevators (red houses), crushing plants (green houses), ethanol plants (yellow 
house) and the biodiesel plant (violet circle) is shown in Figure 4.7. The geodesic distance to port 
can be found in Table B-2 of Appendix B. 
 
Figure 4.7: Locations of Elevators, Crushing Plants, Ethanol Plant and Biodiesel Plant in Saskatchewan 
Source: Created by author.  
4.3 Exogenous Crop Price Time Paths 
World crop price paths are exogenously determined and stored in text files.19 Due to the length 
of time it takes to complete a simulation, 50 time paths for each of the four crops (food wheat, 
canola, barley and field peas) is chosen. 
                                                 
18 Geodesic distances are computed using the formula at http://www.cpearson.com/excel/latlong.aspx given by: RadiusEarth ∗ ((2 ∗ ASIN(SQRT((SIN((RADIANS(X1− coord) − RADIANS(X2 − coord))/2)^2) +  COS(RADIANS(X1 − coord)) ∗COS(RADIANS(X2 − coord)) ∗  (SIN((RADIANS(Y1− coord)− RADIANS(Y2 − coord))/2)^2))))), where Xi-coord is the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  x-coordinate 
and Yi-coord is the 𝑖𝑡ℎ y-coordinate. 
19 Biofuel prices are determined endogenously and depend on crude oil prices. 
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4.3.1 Price Path Generation Process 
Exogenous prices in Canadian dollars are based on de-trended prices and hence are adjusted for 
inflation and exchange rates. All world prices, with the exception of canola prices, are obtained 
from the UN Comtrade website (UN Comtrade, 2010). Price data from this website represent 
carriage in freight (CIF) prices (prices before ocean freight is deducted). 20  Real prices are 
displayed in Figure 4.8. More information on these prices can be found in Table B-3 of 
Appendix B. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Detrended Real Annual World Prices for Wheat, Barley, Canola and Field Peas, 1991-2009.  
Source: UN Comtrade, 2012; *Canola prices obtained from FAO STAT, 2012. 
 
It is evident in Figure 2.7 that prices are contemporaneously related, and, in nominal terms, 
strongly upwards trending such that prices of all four crops increased significantly in 2008 and 
then markets corrected in 2009. After adjusting for inflation and differences in the US$:CAN$ 
exchange rate, prices are still very highly correlated (Table B-4). Price time paths are estimated 
using an autoregressive (AR) process for the adjusted prices, randomly resampling residuals to 
generate time paths. The inflation adjusted price data are fitted to AR(2) processes. 21  The 
regression results are shown in Table B-5. The residuals are stored for resampling in order to 
generate time paths for the model. Selected time paths had to meet three criteria: 1) no crop price 
                                                 
20 CIF canola prices are not obtainable. FOB prices for canola are used as proxies CIF prices and are obtained from FAO-STAT website (FAO-
STAT, 2012). 
21 The data are first tested for stationarity using Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests and are all stationary at the 5% level of significance. 
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should fall below $100 for any time period of the time path estimation; 2) the correlations 
between wheat and the three other crops should be within 20% of their historical correlations. 
Paths are generated for 15 time periods; and 3) the price space around the mean is adequately 
sampled. The 50 time paths generated for wheat, barley, canola and field peas appear to meet 
these criteria (Figures 4.9 through 4.12). 
  
 
Figure 4.9: Projected Price Paths in Dollars per Tonne for Wheat for 15 Periods 
Source: Created by author from author’s calculations. 
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Figure 4.10: Projected Price Paths in Dollars per Tonne for Barley for 15 Periods 
Source: Created by author from author’s calculations. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Projected Price Paths in Dollars per Tonne for Canola for 15 Periods 
Source: Created by author from author’s calculations. 
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Figure 4.12: Projected Price Paths in Dollars per Tonne for Field Peas for 15 Periods 
Source: Created by author from author’s calculations. 
  
 
4.3.2 Crude Oil Prices 
Crude oil prices are endogenously determined and depend on the oil price scenario. In any 
scenario the real oil price is initialized at $82.88 and reflects the real oil price at the beginning of 
2010.  
 
4.4 Farmer Agents 
The following sections describe the data used to facilitate decision processes of the farmer. 
Continuing the discussion of Chapter 3, the proceeding sub-sections goes into greater detail 
highlighting the data used to parameterize equations. The discussion commences with farmer 
price expectations. 
 
4.4.1 Price Expectations 
The notion of weighted gross margins is proposed in Chapter 3. Recall equation (1): 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡+1𝑗  
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= �(1 − 𝜑𝑛) × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑗 + 𝜑𝑛  × (𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡+1𝑗 − 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑗)�× 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑗,𝑙                                                                                                                      … (1) 
The 𝜑𝑛  in equation (1) is exogenously generated following a uniformed distribution and 
randomly assigned to a farmer agent. Figure 4.13 shows the distribution of 𝜑𝑛of farmers. 
 
Figure 4.13: Distribution of 𝜑𝑛 of farmers.  
Source: Created by author. 
 
4.4.2 Farm Size  
Farm size of the farmer agent is assumed to be randomly and uniformly allocated three standard 
deviations around the mean farm size of the CAR. The coefficient of variation in farm land sizes 
is assumed to be 25% for the 20 CARs. Total farm size used in the model represents a total crop 
land acreage which is less than a 1% deviation from of the sum of the actual wheat, canola, 
barley and field pea seeded acres in 2011. From Figure 4.14, it is evident that the distribution of 
the farm size of farmer agents is positively skewed with the mean land size of approximately 578 
acres and the median land size of 546 acres. The maximum land size of farmer agents is 1,825 
acres while the minimum land size is 71 acres. 
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Figure 4.14: Distribution of Land Size of Farmer Agents.  
Source: Created by author. 
 
4.4.3 Land Allocation Packages 
In Chapter 3 the basic feasible solutions to the famers’ optimization problem were reduced to 
eight basic feasible solutions and could be iteratively tested to derive an optimal solution. A 
summary of the feasible solutions is presented Table 4.2. It reflects average allocation ratios 
across the 20 CARs. The coefficient of variation indicates the relative degree of dispersion 
around the mean. It is evident that the wheat-types would have received a land allocation 
between 35% and 48% of total land allocation on average, while canola would have been allotted 
allocation ratio between 18% and 32% of total land allocation on average. Barley and peas would 
compete at lower percentages. Therefore, barley, on average, is seeded on 16 to 22% of total land 
while peas are seeded on 12 to 18% of total land. 
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Table 4.2: Provincial Mean and Standard Deviation of Land Allocation Ratios, Saskatchewan 
 
Source: Computed from author’s calculations. 
 
4.4.4 Production Costs 
At time 𝑡 = 0 the unit production cost given by 𝑇𝑉𝐶𝑗,𝑙 for the 𝑗𝑡ℎ crop in the 𝑙𝑡ℎ location is equal 
to the total variable costs outlined in Table 4.1 and depends on the location of the farmer on the 
landscape. Chacra (2002) and Baffes (2007) provide estimates of elasticities of changes in oil 
prices to changes in fuel prices and changes in oil prices to changes in fertilizer prices of 0.75 
and 0.33, respectively. 
 
4.4.5 Trucking Costs 
A trucking cost schedule is obtained from Weyburn Inland Terminal website. An ordinary least 
squares regression is applied to the data to determine the functional relationship between 
trucking distance and the trucking cost per tonne. Table 4.3 shows the parameter estimates for 
the trucking function outlined in equation (4). 
 
Table 4.3: Trucking Cost Parameter Estimates 
 
Source: Weyburn Inland Terminal. 
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To compute the fuel surcharge elasticity, weekly percent surcharge and oil price data are 
obtained from the National Traffic Services (2012) and Energy Information Administration EIA 
(2011b), respectively. The data series are transformed by taking the logarithm. Both data series 
are tested for stationarity and are found to be integrated of order 1. The Johansen Cointegration 
test is administered and the trace test found that there is one cointegrating vector. Table B-6 in 
Appendix B shows the result of the cointegration test. The important thing to note is that the 
vector error correction model allowed for the estimation of the elasticity of changes in oil prices 
to changes in percent surcharge. According to the estimation 𝜀𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 in equation (9) is 1.04. 
This means that a 1% increase in oil prices would yield a 1.04% increase in the percent surcharge 
rate in the long-run. It is assumed in the FARMCHAIN model that the initial trucking surcharge 
rate is 10%. 
 
4.5 Grain Elevators  
Grain elevators are next in the FARMCHAIN supply network. Grain elevators receive crops 
trucked from farmers. A brief discussion of data used in determining storage and handling fees, 
crop disposition follows. 
  
4.5.1 Storage and Handling Fees 
Elevators handling and storage fees are assumed to be a function of the competitiveness within a 
predefined threshold. The six most prominent elevator companies in Saskatchewan are identified 
and tracked individually; all other elevators are treated as one group. Handling fees are assigned 
based on company and the level of competition within “close” proximity. The greater the levels 
of competition, the greater the likelihood that fees will be lower than the maximum fees. Table 
B-7 of Appendix B shows the maximum fees charged by an elevator company in 2010. Since the 
pricing behaviour of elevators is specifically unknown, fees are modified randomly assigned and 
are assumed to be based on the number of competitors in close proximity. For example, if an 
elevator (GE1) has three close competitors and, for a given period, the amount of wheat obtained 
from farmers is less that the average wheat receipts of all of the four elevators, then GE1 would 
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reduce fees by an amount that is selected randomly choosing a integer between one and four  (the 
number competitors plus GE1). 
 
4.5.2 Crop Disposition 
As noted in the previous chapter, a portion of crops delivered to elevators is forwarded to the 
port for export while the remainder disappears from the chain through domestic use. Utilizing 
1996/97-2010/11 crop movement, approximately 43% of wheat production is forwarded to 
western ports. Over the same period, approximately 74% of field pea production is moved 
through western ports. In contrast, 19% of barley production is moved through western ports 
while 3% of barley production is moved through eastern ports (Table 4.4).  
 
Table 4.4: FARMCHAIN Model Export Crop Disposition from Grain Elevators 
 
Source: Computed by author with data from CGC Canadian 
Grain Exports 2010-2011 and CANSIM Table 001-0010. 
 
Canola elevator deliveries are shipped through eastern or western ports. Although the total export 
ratio of canola was on average 55% of production over the period 1996/97-2010/11, it is 
assumed that canola leaving elevators is moved to the western and eastern ports at ratios of 89% 
and 11%, respectively. This only applies to elevators. With regards to crushing plants, it is 
assumed that canola crushing plants deliveries are transported via rail to either the ports or to the 
biodiesel plant. It is further assumed that 45% of crushing plant canola crop receipt is assumed to 
be forwarded to biodiesel plants, while 49% and 6% of canola crop receipts is assumed to be 
moved to the western and eastern ports, respectively. 
 
4.6 Ethanol and Biodiesel Demand 
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Local trends in gasoline and diesel demand are estimated as a linear function of time. Figure 4.15 
shows the trend in Saskatchewan retail gasoline and diesel sales over the period 1991-2011 and 
trend regression extrapolation for ten additional periods.  
 
Therefore equations (13) and (16) of Chapter 3 can therefore be respectively parameterized as:  𝐷𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡(𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠) = −113,470,246  +  (57,559 ∗  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)  𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡(𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠) =  −78,300,000 +  (40,051 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)  
 
Furthermore, the biodiesel blend requirement is 2% in Saskatchewan while the ethanol blend 
requirement is 7.5% as highlighted in Section 2.4. The conversion factors that convert tonnes of 
wheat to ethanol and tonnes of canola to biodiesel,  𝜔𝑒𝑡ℎ and 𝜔𝐵𝐷, are computed to be 371.75 
and 1,083, respectively. These statistics were computed with data from GWA-DAF (2006) and 
FAPRI (2006) for ethanol and biodiesel, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Trend in Actual and Projected Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Sales in Saskatchewan, 1991-2019 
Source: Created by author with data compiled from CANSIM Table 326-0009 
 
 
4.7 Rail Costs 
82 
 
Nolan and Carlson (2005) estimated the rail cost to be $0.02097 per tonne-mile. The adjustment 
factor, 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟, of 2.2 is used to calibrate rail costs to be more reflective of estimates found in 
Canadian Grain Commission’s Canadian Grain Exports 2010/11. In the case of biofuels, litres 
are converted to tonnes based on the following conversion factors: 
• 1 litre of ethanol (𝜔𝐸𝑡ℎ) = 0.0007892 metric tons  
• 1 litre of diesel (𝜔𝐵𝐷) = 0.000885 metric tons22  
4.8 Ocean Freight Costs 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, in order for farmers to compute gross margins, they need to deduct 
ocean freight costs from the observed world price. The initial ocean freight rate of products 
leaving the west coast is assumed to be $26.38/tonne, the average of ocean freight rates from the 
North Pacific to Japan over the period August 2010 – December 2010 as reported in Canadian 
Grain Exports 2010/11. Using the same base and a relative price ratio of 70%, the initial freight 
rate from the St. Lawrence to South America is estimated at $19.67/tonne.23 Furthermore, the 
parameter for the elasticity of ocean freight rates to changes in crude oil prices obtained from 
Hummels (2007), 𝜀𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 in equation (19), is 0.337. 
 
4.9 Farmgate Price Determination 
In order to obtain farm gate prices, data are needed to estimate ethanol and biodiesel prices. The 
following sub-sections describe how biofuel prices are determined. That is, the following sub- 
sections present the data used to estimate the relationship between biofuel prices and fossil fuel 
prices. 
 
4.9.1 Ethanol Price Estimations 
Following Tyner and Taheripour (2007), data are collected on oil prices and gasoline prices. 
Monthly oil prices (NRCAN, 2009) and monthly Saskatchewan retail gasoline prices (CANSIM 
                                                 
22 It is assumed that a litre of biodiesel weighs the same as diesel. Conversions for ethanol and biodiesel are obtained from Hazell (2013). 
23 The approximate distance from the Vancouver to Jakarta is over 13,000km while the distance to Tokyo is approximately 7,500km. The 
schedule of freight rates posted in the Canadian Grain Exports 2010/11  (CGC, 2011) indicate that freight rates from the Pacific Northwest to 
Japan is approximately 70% of that charged from the Pacific Northwest to Indonesia when the freight rate from the Pacific Northwest to 
Indonesia is $26.75. It is assumed that the approximate distance from the St. Lawrence to Venezuela, in South America, is 4500km and it is also 
assumed that freight rates can be apportioned by distance. 
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Table 326-0009) are adjusted for inflation. Gasoline prices are further adjusted downward for the 
25¢/l federal and provincial government aid. This yields the pure price of gasoline. 
 
The data series are then tested for stationarity using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. It is 
found that the data series are stationary after first differencing. Given that both series are 
integrated of order 1, I(1), the Johansen Cointegration test is administered (Table B-8 in 
Appendix B for results). It is found that there is one cointegrating vector implying a long-run 
linear relationship between oil prices and gasoline prices. The long-run component of the 
resulting vector error correction model (VECM) is used to parameterise equation (21). Table 4.5 
shows the result of the cointegrating relationship of the VECM. 
 
Table 4.5: VECM Gasoline Price on Oil Price Results 
 
Source: Created from author’s computation. 
 
Therefore 𝜌𝑔𝑎𝑠 and 𝜎 𝑔𝑎𝑠 is estimated to be 42 and 0.56 respectively. 
Tyner and Taheripour (2007) estimated that the fuel equivalent price of ethanol is 70% of the 
price of gas. Pimentel (2003) however noted that it would take 1.6 litres of ethanol to acquire the 
energy equivalent of a litre of gas. Therefore 𝜏𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙= 0.625. 
  
It is assumed that energy related variable costs, 𝜔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙= $0.20/l and the initial ethanol margin, 
𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛0 = $0.30/l, based on the study of ethanol production by the Government of 
Western Australia in 2006. In their study, energy related cost ranged from $0.07 to $0.09/l. The 
study also estimated that the non-feedstock variable cost of production was between $0.13 and 
$0.15/l. If these costs are reflected in 2010 prices they would closely approximate parameter 
values utilized.    
 
There are considerable risks involved in operating a biofuel processing plant. It is assumed that 
entrepreneurship is rewarded by deducting a margin which is a percentage of sales. This margin 
is represented by  𝜋 in equations (23) and (26) in Chapter 3. To be eligible for the federal 
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government programs, returns must be less 20% (Pohit et al., 2009). Since downside risk is 
significant in this industry, it is assumed that the margin will be close to 20%. Thus it is assumed 
that this rate is similar and constant across all ethanol plants and the biodiesel plant at 17.5%. 
 
4.9.2 Biodiesel Price Estimations 
 The estimation approach for biodiesel prices is identical to that for ethanol. Oil prices (NRCAN, 
2012) and retail diesel prices in Saskatchewan (CANSIM Table 326-0009) are adjusted for 
inflation. In order to give a pre-tax price, diesel fuel prices are further adjusted downward for the 
39¢/l federal and provincial government aid. 
 
The data series are then tested for stationarity using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. It is 
found that the data series are stationary after first differencing. Given that both series are 
integrated of order 1, I(1), the Johansen Cointegration test is administered (Table B-9 in 
Appendix B for results). It is found that there is one cointegrating vector implying a long-run 
linear relationship between oil prices and gasoline prices. The long-run component of the 
resulting vector error correction model (VECM) is used to parameterise equation (21). Table 4.6 
shows the result of the cointegrating relationship of the VECM. 
 
Table 4.6: VECM Diesel Price on Oil Price Results 
 
Source: Created from author’s computation. 
 
Therefore  𝜌𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙  and 𝜎 𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙  are estimated to be 33 and 0.52, respectively. Tyner and 
Taheripour (2007) estimated that the fuel equivalent price of ethanol is 90% of the price of gas. 
This means that 𝜏𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙= 0.9.  
 
It is assumed that 𝜔𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙= 14¢/l and that the initial ethanol margin: 𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛0 = 0.66. 
These estimates are based on the 2009 estimates presented on the  Ontario Ministry of 
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Agriculture Food and Rural Affairs (OMFRA) website, in which methanol cost estimates are 
$0.13¢/l and the total operating cost excluding feedstock is $0.40 ¢/l. 
 
4.10 Summary 
The parameter values and initial values of used in the FARMCHAIN model were discussed in 
this chapter. These values included production coefficients used to characterize the landscape 
and farmer productivity. Farmer heterogeneity was also delineated and its affect on production 
response is described. Parameters for crude price linkages to crop production, trucking costs, rail 
costs, ocean freight costs and biofuel production were highlighted. Initial values for the annual 
crude price as well as initial values for grain handling and canola processing were highlighted. 
These parameters and initial values are important for the generation of simulated data. The initial 
values outlined in this chapter are used paramtererize the FARMCHAIN model. The various 
commodity price time paths for the four crops (section 4.3) are the exogenous prices to the 
model and are held constant over the various energy price scenarios.  
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CHAPTER 5: VERIFICATION, VALIDATION AND RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
The two major objectives of this thesis are to 1) identify the real annual crude oil price that 
would entice farmer agents to switch from producing food wheat to producing biofuel wheat; and
 2) to assess the impact of different government biofuel policies and increases in real crude oil 
prices on elevator behaviour. Through simulating the linkages between crude oil prices and 
Canadian prairie agriculture, these objectives are achieved by examining different scenarios with 
differing growth rates in real annual oil prices, levels of government support to the biofuel 
industry and levels of spatial competition between elevators. This chapter proceeds by outlining 
the verification process, followed by the base model’s validation and results. Thereafter, 
counterfactual scenario results are presented for comparative purposes. Next, the impact of 
increased spatial competition between elevators is analyzed with respect to industry structure and 
performance. Finally, the chapter assesses the consequences of increasing oil prices and 
sustained biofuel polices on grain elevator pricing behaviour.  
 
5.2 Model Verification  
The FARMCHAIN model is verified at each stage of the model building process. Initially, the 
model landscape is verified by randomly selecting patches in the model, and comparing yield, 
production and cost coefficients with the tables created for the respective GIS shapefiles. Rules 
governing the processes of a farmer searching for an elevator, a farmer trucking his crop, an 
elevator identifying its competitors and all other decisions/computations are first coded in 
smaller models and verified for numerical accuracy in calculations as well as adherence to 
decision rules. After the codes are verified, they are incorporated into the larger model and are 
then re-verified using agents selected at random.  
 
When the simulation model is complete, agents are then selected at random and variables under 
their control are then verified over successive time periods. Finally, a smaller scale but complete 
prototype model is run with agents’ and global variables exported to Microsoft Excel© 
worksheets where they are once again verified and checked for validity. 
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5.3 Simulation Results 
In total, eight scenarios are simulated using the FARMCHAIN model. Scenarios are differentiated 
by 1) the level of spatial competitiveness between elevators; 2) the growth rate in real crude oil 
prices and 3) the level of government support to the biofuel industry. Each scenario is simulated 
over fifteen time periods and fifty replications. The first four periods of each simulation are used 
to initialize the model, while in the fifth period the various scenario parameters are applied. The 
following discussion commences with the presentation of the results from the base model.  
 
5.3.1 Base Scenario 
The base model, labelled Scenario E0%-S25¢-R40km, represents current real world conditions 
and is used as a benchmark for comparison for the counterfactual scenarios. The base scenario 
incorporates actual 2010 elevator numbers and the current level of spatial competition level 
(P40km). In addition, government subsidies to the biofuel industry are sustained over the 
simulation period at: 25¢/l and 39¢/l in the ethanol and biodiesel industries, respectively. Finally, 
real annual crude prices are set at no annual growth (E0%). 
 
5.3.1.1 Model Validation 
Model validation refers to the comparison of model output results to reality or the assessment as 
to whether or not the simulation accurately represents what it is purported to depict (Gilbert, 
2008). This model is validated based on four comparisons to real world data. This section 
discusses these comparisons. 
 
5.3.1.1.1 Model Wheat Production versus Actual Historical Wheat Production 
To begin this process, simulated wheat production is compared to actual historical Saskatchewan 
wheat production. Simulated total wheat production lies within the actual production range 
between 1999 and 2010. More specifically, an average of 8 million tonnes of wheat is produced 
in the FARMCHAIN model and this simulated amount is approximately 290 thousand tonnes 
greater than the actual mean wheat production over the period 1999-2010 (Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1: Comparison of Simulated and Actual Historical Wheat Production (tonnes) 
 
Source: Constructed by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model, with data from Statistics Canada CANSIM 
Table 001-0010. 
 
In a spatial context, food wheat production approximates actual three-year historical averages of 
spring wheat production. Census agricultural regions (CARs) 5 through 7 accounts for most of 
the spring wheat production while CARs to further north account for the least production (Table 
5.2). 
Table 5.2: Comparison of the Spatial Extent of Simulated Wheat Production to Historical Averages 
 
Source: Constructed by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model and with data from Saskatchewan Ministry 
of Agriculture (2012). 
 
5.3.1.1.2 Simulated Ethanol Production versus Actual Ethanol Capacity 
Ethanol production is compared to the existing production capacity of ethanol plants. It is 
expected that the simulated wheat production would not exceed actual ethanol capacity. 
However, the simulated mean ethanol production almost doubles the current ethanol capacity 
(Table 5.3).24 This overestimation is due to the underlying assumptions of the model.  
 
Table 5.3: Comparison of FARMCHAIN Simulated Ethanol Production and Actual Ethanol Production Capacity 
 
Source: Constructed by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model and CFRA (2010). 
 
                                                 
24 This difference between simulated ethanol production and actual ethanol capacity is primarily driven by the difference between simulated 
wheat for biofuel use and actual wheat for industrial use proportions. 
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It is assumed that ethanol production monotonically increases with feedstock. This implies that 
ethanol production is bounded only by the amount of wheat directed to the biofuel industry. It is 
also assumed that there are only two uses for wheat: wheat for biofuel or industrial purposes and 
wheat for food consumption. Therefore all wheat that is not consumed as food is used to produce 
bioethanol. 
 
In actuality, wheat has other uses, which includes wheat used for animal feed. The relative 
proportions of non-food domestic wheat disposition in the model in comparison to historical 
average non-food domestic wheat disposition proportions are shown in Table 5.4. It is shown in 
the table that simulated biofuel wheat proportions in the FARMCHAIN model more accurately 
represent the total non-food disposition of wheat than for the industrial use disposition of wheat. 
This means that simulated estimates of biofuel wheat and ethanol production are conservative 
upper bound estimates of actual levels. 
 
Table 5.4: Comparison of Simulated and Actual Domestic Wheat Disposition 
 
Source: Constructed by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model and Statistic Canada Table 001-0041. 
 
  
 
 
5.3.1.1.3 Estimated Mean Elevator Fees 
Due to its importance to farmers’ cropland allocation decision process, average initial food wheat 
elevator handling fee from the simulation is compared to those presented in Canadian Grain 
Exports reports (CGC, 2004; CGC, 2008; CGC, 2010; CGC, 2011). The mean elevator wheat 
handling fee generated by the model is $1.64/t lower than the estimate provided by the Canadian 
Grain Commission over the crop years 2001/02-2010/11 (Table 5.5). This is largely due to the 
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significant and uncharacteristic increase in mean primary elevating costs in the 2010/11 crop 
year to $24.48/t from $21.51/t the previous crop year. Nevertheless, the simulated mean is within 
1 standard deviation from the mean estimates obtained from the Canadian Grain Commission’s 
Canadian Grain Exports reports over the 11-year period. 
 
Table 5.5: Simulated Mean Wheat Handling Fees Versus Estimates from Canadian Grain Exports Report over the 
Crop Years 2001/02-2010/11 ($/t) 
 
Source: Constructed by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model and CGC (2004), CGC (2010), CGC (2011). 
 
 
5.3.1.1.4 Cropping Patterns 
This thesis primarily focuses on the impact of increased competition between food and biofuel 
wheat and therefore is less concerned with modeling other competing crops including canola, 
barley and field peas. Overall cropping patterns are chosen for validation because at a minimum, 
high level output patterns should remain somewhat consistent if we have developed a reasonable 
representation of the farming landscape. The mean simulated cropping pattern for all crops in the 
FARMCHAIN model is presented in Table 5.6. Given recent changes in the sector, the simulated 
seeded acres for canola underestimate the three-year average (2008-2010) but it overestimates 
barley and field pea allocations. The actual three-year average (2008-2010) allocation of canola, 
barley and field peas was 7.8 million acres, 3.1 million acres and 2.8 million acres, respectively 
(Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 2012), while in 2010 canola received the highest land 
allocation across the prairies (Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 2012). As different as the 
simulation and reality are in this respect, it is worth noting that canola still consistently received 
the highest land allocation in the model. Ultimately, the difference between the simulated and 
actual cropping pattern of canola generated here is due to the current high price of canola relative 
to wheat, a situation that has prompted farmers only recently to seed proportionately more canola 
than wheat. This means canola may continue to dominate the proportion of acres seeded in the 
province under the current price relationship, and that the simulated results are not an 
unreasonable representation of the reality.  
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Table 5.6: Simulated Mean Cropping Patterns, Base Scenario  
 
Source: Constructed by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model. 
 
 
5.3.1.2 Base Scenario (E0% - S25¢ - R40km) Output Variable Performance 
Analysis 
While a considerable number of output variables can be extracted from the model, four key 
simulated output variables are used to provide answers to the aforementioned research questions. 
These variables are: 1) total food wheat production, 2) total biofuel wheat production, 3) the 
mean number of elevators, and 4) the mean elevator wheat handling fees. Again, we note that the 
base scenario is characterized by relatively low spatial competition between elevators (R40km), 
combined with zero growth in real annual crude oil prices (E0%) and sustained government 
support to the biofuel industry (S25¢). Under this scenario, it is found that mean food wheat 
production fluctuates around 6.4 million tonnes while mean biofuel wheat yield equivalent 
production fluctuates around 1.6 million tonnes over periods 4 through 15 (see Figure 5.1). 25 
Therefore a sustained biofuel support policy does not lead to any notable increases in biofuel 
wheat production.  
 
The stability in wheat production is evident despite a significant decline in the number of 
elevators in the industry. In assuming a competitive pricing, elevators employ an undercutting 
pricing strategy in order to expand market share and mean fees decline as a result. Specifically, 
mean food wheat handling fees decline by 61.1% to $7.08/t over the simulation period. This 
price cutting strategy continues until the least competitive firms are forced to exit the industry. 
This is known as industry ‘shakeout’. 26  The mean number of elevators declines by 70.5% to 52 
                                                 
25 Yield equivalent biofuel wheat production means that biofuel wheat production is adjusted downward (dividing by a factor 1.07) to account for 
the fact that biofuel wheat yield is 1.07 times that of food wheat in the model. This allows for the direct comparison farm production terms of 
tonnes of wheat produced.  From henceforth all subsequent references to biofuel wheat production are adjusted for yield equivalence. 
26 Industry “shake out” is defined here as a significant decline in the number of firms in an industry within a relatively short period of time 
(Horvath, Schivardi and Woywode, 2001) 
92 
 
over the simulation period (Figure 5.1). Although this decline is significant, it is not 
unreasonable as over the period 1999-2010 there was an actual decline of 61.9 per cent from 
1035 in 1999. Such a decline would mean that on average, the throughput of an elevator would 
be approximately 136,000 tonnes of wheat in the last simulation period, approximately triple that 
of the initial period. Therefore, under the base scenario, when elevator firms employ a Bertrand 
pricing strategy there is industry consolidation and an increase in elevator capacity. 27  This 
finding is consistent with historical data as the prior consolidation of the industry led to firms 
investing in larger capacity plants (Storey, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Simulated Mean Food Wheat Production, Biofuel Wheat Production, Food Wheat Handling Fees and 
Number of Elevators in the Base Scenario 
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model. 
 
Embedded in the revealed elevator consolidation, and driven by assumptions of the model, is the 
notion that elevator consolidation is brought about by spatial inefficiencies. It is assumed that 
marginal costs are zero for all elevator firms in the FARMCHAIN model. This assumption 
implies that any exit of elevators from the industry is totally attributable to spatial inefficiencies. 
                                                 
27 Bertrand pricing strategy is the pricing strategy employed by firms in which the Nash equilibrium is the competitive equilibrium, that is, the 
equilibrium is marginal cost pricing. The outcome of such a strategy is that the inefficient firms are forced to exit the industry. 
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Initial prices set by elevators are lower with higher levels of rival competition. Also, higher 
levels of competition influence the degree of price change from one period to another. Therefore, 
a higher level of rival competition results in an accelerated decline in fees charged and a higher 
probability of insolvency. It therefore follows that elevator firms that are in locations that have a 
relatively higher density of elevators stand a greater chance of becoming insolvent. The initial 
spatial concentration of the elevators on the simulated landscape, based on actual 2010 
geographical data (CGC, 2012), is shown in Figure 5.2. Here, the closer a patch in the simulation 
is to an elevator, on the landscape, the darker the shade of that patch.28 
 
Figure 5.2: The Initial Spatial Concentration of Elevators on the Landscape  
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model. 
 
It is evident that from this Figure 5.2 that there is a large area of elevator concentration located in 
the eastern CARs (cluster or area A), with a minor area of concentration in the western part of 
the province (cluster or area B), while other much smaller pockets of elevator concentration exist 
in other parts of the province. As elevators compete spatially for wheat over the simulation 
period, the least competitive elevators are eventually forced to exit the market (Figure 5.3). The 
change in the spatial pattern of locations over the simulation indicates that elevators are 
effectively “surrounded” by other elevators are more susceptible to failure since they are less 
likely to be able to draw the same amount of grain as elevators on the periphery. In the 
simulation, these ‘besieged’ elevators are constantly forced to reduce handling fees in an effort to 
                                                 
28 Blue Patches represents water masses and are excluded from the model analysis. 
A 
B 
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compete for wheat. As this process continues over time, these elevators are eventually forced to 
exit the market. Ultimately, this situation leads to what is termed a ‘donut’ shape of stable 
elevator location patterns, shown in Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3: The Spatial Concentration of Elevators on the Landscape after 15 Periods  
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model. 
 
While somewhat emergent, this finding seems to accord with the prior notions of Lösch (1954) 
in the debate in the literature on location models (Hotelling, 1929; Lösch 1954). Specifically, 
Hotelling argued that, in the case of a duopoly, firms have a tendency to agglomerate. This 
assessment was countered by Lösch, who noted that the Hotelling outcome was only obtained 
under certain unrealistic conditions (see Appendix A). Lösch asserted that a location model 
accounting for the minimization of transportation costs of goods in the location decisions of 
firms would not lead to agglomeration, but to rather to firm dispersion in equilibrium. It is 
argued that the transition observed over simulated time from Figure 5.2 to Figure 5.3 supports 
Lösch’s supposition in that elevators surviving the industry shakeout are located farther apart 
from each other than when they started. In the FARMCHAIN model, this result is driven by the 
fact that interior wheat elevators necessarily have a reduced catchment area relative to those 
located on the periphery. Since the elevators compete using spatial Bertrand pricing (but measure 
B 
A 
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performance of their strategy by observing relative quantities of deliveries or relative market 
share), elevators in the interior always reduce handling fees in an effort to compete and this 
process will force them to eventually shut down. As elevators begin to exit the market, those that 
remain are necessarily located farther apart with growing catchment areas by default.  
 
5.3.1.3 Path dependency: Does Farmer Agent Location Assignment Matter? 
Page (2006) defines path dependency as the effect often found in agent based modelling in which 
decisions made by agents in earlier time periods significantly affect future possibilities. Is this a 
potential issue with this situation? Due to the large number of farmer agents, it is suspected that 
location assignment will not affect results. In this section the possibility that initial farmer 
location assignments on the simulated landscape significantly affects the overall behaviour of 
agents as well as the model outcomes is examined. To assess whether the results from the base 
model are statistically different when the spatial assignment of farmer agents change, statistical 
tests of the difference between the simulated variable means are conducted based on two random 
seed algorithms used to generate farmer locations. The base scenario (scenario E0%-S25¢-
R40km) under a random seed assignment of “100” and “98238” is compared. These results are 
shown in Table 5.6. It is revealed that altering farmer agent location in this manner does not 
yield statistically different model results at either the 1% or 5% level of significance.  
Table 5.7: Statistical Test for the Difference between Means of FARMCHAIN Model Output Results 
 
Source: Computed by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model. 
 
5.3.2 Counterfactual Scenarios 
The counterfactual scenarios are designed to test the sensitivity of wheat production, and elevator 
behaviour under current conditions (i.e. the base scenario) to increases in spatial competition, 
decreases in government support to the biofuel industry and increases in world crude oil prices. 
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More specifically, the counterfactual variables include: 1) a 40 km expansion of the competitive 
radius of grain elevators from the base to 80 km (R80 km), 2) a steady decline in government 
bioenergy support from 25¢ / l  and 39¢ / l  in the base ethanol and biodiesel support to and 18¢ / 
l and 19¢ / l (S18¢), respectively and 3) trend increases in energy prices of 10% per year (E10%) 
relative to no growth in the base scenario. All eight scenarios are summarised in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.8: Summary of Scenarios 
 
Source: Created by the author. 
 
The counterfactual scenario results are presented and discussed in the following order of variable 
changes- 1) spatial competition; 2) declining government fuel subsidies and 3) increasing energy 
prices. 
 
5.3.2.1 Base Energy Prices and Sustained Biofuel Support (S25¢)  
Two levels of spatial competition, R40km (base) and R80km (high spatial competitiveness) are 
examined with the other two counterfactual variables set at their base values. Under the base 
level of elevator competiveness (R40km), no growth in world energy prices (E0%) and sustained 
biofuel support of 25¢/l (S25¢), food and biofuel wheat production under constant elevator fees 
is initially relatively close to current industry levels. This scenario is the base scenario that is 
presented in Section 5.3.1.2 and the key findings are reiterated here for comparative purposes to 
the higher level of spatial competition (P80km). In the base scenario, the pricing strategy which 
is assumed to be utilized by elevators results in decreased elevator fees. Over the simulated 
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period, elevator handling fees decline by 61.1% by the end of period 15 from the initial level in 
period 4 (Figure 5.1).29 These reduced handling fees lead to systematic elevator depopulation. 
For example, by period 15, the average number of elevators declines to 52 from 176 (Figure 5.1). 
Despite the significant change in the structure of the wheat handling industry, there is no 
significant change in the ratio of mean food wheat to total wheat produced over the simulation 
period. That is, food wheat production consistently accounted for approximately 80% of total 
wheat produced (Figure 5.1). This may be primarily due to the fact that the higher transportation 
cost of hauling grain further distances may be offset by reductions in elevator handling fees in 
latter periods of the simulation and does not entice farmers to change their choice of wheat crop 
allocation. 
 
In comparison to the base level of spatial competition, increasing the competitive radius to 80km 
leads to a dramatically greater level of elevator competition primarily reflected in what is best 
characterized as a “roller coaster” of elevator fees. After three periods of initialization, and 
allowing a few more periods for agent behavior to change because of the lags associated with 
agent expectations, it is clear that handling fees in this case start to dramatically decrease in 
period 6 until they reach about 52.6% of the original fee by period 8 (Figure 5.4). Ultimately, 
this dramatic decline in handling fees leads to an industry ‘shakeout’ where most of the original 
176 elevators are forced to exit the industry between periods 4 through 8, leaving just under 20 
remaining elevators by the end of the simulation (Figure 5.4). The sharp decline in elevator fees 
shift the comparative attractiveness from biofuels wheat production back to food wheat slightly, 
stabilizing production briefly for periods 7 and 8 (Figure 5.5). Once this extreme “carnivorous” 
or cutthroat competition is finished, elevators then seem to shift to extracting more “rents” from 
the farmer agents with rapidly rising elevator fees: mean elevator fees increase over time to 
$20.73/t by period 12 (Figure 5.4) before declining again as competition is rekindled, an effect in 
part due to reduced food wheat deliveries and increased biofuel deliveries (Figure 5.5). After 
period 12, there is a minor change in the number of elevator exits and mean elevator numbers 
decline to just 17 units at the end of the simulation period, a 67.5% decrease from the base 
                                                 
29 The first four periods are used to initialize the model thereafter the counterfactual scenarios are imposed. Therefore the fourth period is used as 
an initial benchmark for each simulation period. 
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scenario. All of this is accompanied by a reduction in mean handling fees at the end of period 15 
to $16.15/t (Figure 5.4), $1.31 above period 4 handling fees and 1.3 times the base scenario.  
 
 
Figure 5.4: Simulated Mean Elevator Wheat Handling Fees and the Number of Elevators- Base Energy Prices and 
Biofuel Support (E0%-S25¢-R40km and E0%-S25¢-R80km) 
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model. 
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Figure 5.5: Simulated Food Wheat and Biofuel Wheat Production under High Spatial Competition, Base Energy 
Prices and Biofuel Support (E0%-S25¢-P80km)  
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model. 
 
5.3.2.2 Base Energy Prices and Declining Biofuel Support (S18¢) 
Using the base 40km radius of spatial elevator competition and assuming declining biofuel 
support but with no growth in crude prices, food (biofuel) wheat production increases (declines) 
by 31.9% (81.6%) over the simulation period (Figure 5.6).  This is due primarily to the decline in 
government support to the biofuel industry. As support diminishes the price that ethanol 
producers can offer feedstock producers is relatively lower than food wheat prices. Therefore, on 
average, the net return to seeding biofuel wheat would be less than that of food wheat.  
 
This dramatic shift from bioenergy to food wheat production is further exacerbated by a decline 
in handling fees emanating from the Bertrand price competition. Specifically, handling fees 
decline from $18.22 in period 4 to $7.33/t (2.4% above the base) in period 9 and increase slightly 
to $9.32/t (31.7% above the base) in period 15 (Figure 5.7). The smaller overall decline relative 
the base scenario is driven primarily by the reduced competition for wheat deliveries from the 
bioenergy sector in the latter periods of the simulation. That is, there are endogenous effects 
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generated from declining government support to the biofuel industry; as support declines, 
ethanol plants price less competitively and are therefore unable to attract as many producers. As 
a result, there are increased elevator deliveries and hence, elevators observing this, are able to 
extract more rents from producers by charging higher handling fees.  
 
The reduced inter-industry competition results in a marginally milder industry shakeout when 
compared to the base. In other words, the reduced competition for producers’ wheat increases the 
probability of solvency of elevators. More specifically, from the simulation it is found that there 
are, on average, 54 elevators solvent at the end of period 15, 69.2% below the initial number of 
176 but 3.8% over the base scenario (Figure 5.7). 
 
Increasing the level of spatial competition to 80km results in a similar wheat production 
phenomenon as is found in the base scenario in which the dynamics of spatial competitiveness 
neutralizes the effect of decreasing government support to the biofuel industry, yielding 
relatively stable food wheat and biofuel wheat production. The increased competitive radius 
initially generates extreme or cutthroat competition which depresses elevator fees to $8.13/t by 
period 8, (Figure 5.7). Concurrently, the reduced handling fees charged lead to a 50.1% exodus 
of the initial 176 elevators from the industry by the end of period 8. After the industry ‘shakeout’ 
has occurred, intra-industry competition significantly decreases and so does the rate of elevator 
insolvency. That is, by the end of period 12 the elevators have stopped exiting the industry and 
by the end of the simulation period there are 18 elevators in operation (Figure 5.7). The reduction 
in competition after period 8 allows solvent elevators extract increased rents from producers and 
as such there is a significant in recovery in elevator fees to $21.37/t by period 15 (Figure 5.7).  
 
The decrease in government support from 25 to 18¢/l makes the cropping of food wheat more 
attractive to producers. However, with response lags of producers and the increased intensity of 
competition which leads to a significant adjustment in the number of elevators very early in the 
simulation (that in turn led to significantly higher fees), the growth in food wheat production 
found under low competition is not particularly evident in the higher level of spatial competition. 
That is, food (biofuel) wheat production is relatively static at 6.5 (1.5) million tonnes. This 
means that average food (biofuel) wheat production under high competition is 6.7% (53.8%) 
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lower (higher) than food (biofuel) wheat production under low competition. Relative to the base 
scenario, the impacts of declining government support and increasing competition result in 
marginal increases of 0.9% and 1.3% in both average biofuel and food wheat production, 
respectively. This implies that wheat, as a result, is marginally more competitive relative to 
canola in this scenario than in the base scenario. 30 Total wheat production in this scenario 
exceeds 8 million tonnes in each period after the industry ‘shakeout’ in period 8 (Figure 5.6) 
while in the base wheat production is below 8 million tonnes for the entire simulation (Figure 
5.1). 
 
Figure 5.6: Simulated Mean Food Wheat and Biofuel Wheat Production- Declining Biofuel Support and Base 
Energy Prices (E0%-S18¢-R40km and E0%-S18¢-R80km)   
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model. 
 
  
                                                 
30 Since yields do not change over time, the only way to increase production is to increase land allocation. Recall in Chapters 3 and 4 that wheat 
competes with canola therefore expansion of wheat acreages arise primarily at the expense of canola acreages. 
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Figure 5.7: Simulated Mean Elevator Handling Fees and Number of Elevators- Declining Biofuel Support and Base 
Energy Prices (E0%-S18¢-R40km and E0%-S18¢-R80km) 
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model. 
 
5.3.2.3 Ten Percent Growth in Real Annual Crude Oil Prices (E10%) 
The final set of scenarios in the simulation are founded upon a 10% annual increase in real crude 
oil prices, along with the two levels of government support to the biofuel industry and two levels 
of spatial competition. Note that a sustained 10% annual increase in real crude oil prices over the 
duration of the simulation is very aggressive, and with compounding results in a 318% increase 
over 15 years. This has a profound impact on not only the value of bioproducts but also on farm 
operating and transport costs.  
 
5.3.2.2.1 Sustained Biofuel Support (S25¢) 
The direct economic effect of higher energy prices is so overwhelming that spatial competition 
and government support have little overall impact on the simulated mean food wheat production. 
Food wheat production decreases substantially while simulated mean biofuel wheat production 
increases over the simulation period (Figure 5.8). This is driven by the idea that increases in fuel 
prices increase both food wheat transportation and production costs thereby reducing the 
competitiveness of food wheat. On the other hand, increases in fuel prices make the cropping of 
biofuel wheat more attractive and indirectly makes food wheat less competitive. In particular, 
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when compared to initial levels of spatial competition at the end of period 4, average simulated 
food (biofuel) wheat production steadily decreases (increases) by 89% (240%) to 619,000 tonnes 
(7.3 million tonnes) by the end of period 15. Additionally, on between periods 9 and 10, biofuel 
wheat production surpasses food wheat production, with the estimated price of crude being 
between$133.48 /barrel and $146.83/ barrel (Figure 5.8). Placed in context, given that the annual 
price of crude in 2008 was $104 (the highest on record), prices would have had to be at least 
28% higher than they were in 2008 to entice a majority of the farmers to switch to biofuel wheat 
production. 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Simulated Food Wheat and Biofuel Wheat Production- 10 Percent Growth in Energy Prices and 
Sustained Biofuel Support (E10%-S25¢-R40km and E10%-S25¢-R80km).  
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model. 
 
The patterns of grain elevator competition as measured by mean handling fees charged and 
elevator numbers (Figure 5.9) are generally consistent with the results shown in Section 5.3.2.1, 
except that instead of stabilization in handling fees at period 11, there is a significant decline in 
fees.  It appears that after period 11, changes in handling fees are as a result of crop competition 
and not due to spatial competition. Since at that period of time biofuel production is more 
attractive to farmers, elevators continue to lower fees in order to compete for the declining food 
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wheat supplies. In particular, under low spatial competition (R40km), elevator fees continues its 
decline in period 12 and by period 15, declines to a remarkable low of $1.09/t (84.6% below the 
base) as is displayed in Figure 5.9. The average number of elevators in this case declines to 
approximately 50 (4.1% below the base) from 176 over the simulation period (Figure 5.9).   
 
A high level of spatial competition (R80km) results in similar dynamics as is presented in the 
lower level of spatial competition (R40km). Increasing the level of spatial competition increases 
the elasticity of food wheat production to increases in biofuel wheat prices from 3.5 to 4.0 in 
absolute terms. Specifically, under high competition, food wheat production significantly 
declines by 92.7% to 420 000 tonnes (94.1% below the base) over the simulation. The increased 
sensitivity brought about by the increased competition is primarily driven by elevator responses 
to the changing industry conditions. 
 
A similar industry shakeout is observed, with handling fees falling to $7.63/t (60.9% below the 
base) as of period 8, resulting in falling elevator numbers but a return of fees to $15.00/t before 
declining again to $4.29/t. However, the disruptive nature of the greatly diminished wheat supply 
prevents spatial elevator monopsonies from forming as competition intensifies again driving 
elevator fees down to 69.2% of base prices at the end of period 15. The impact of this destructive 
competition is such that at the end of period 15, elevator numbers decline from 176 units to 
approximately 16 units, the fewest of any of the simulated scenarios (Figure 5.9).  The overall 
higher fees charged under increased spatial competition relative to low spatial competition 
reduces the relative competitiveness of food wheat production to biofuel wheat production. This 
has in turn led 32.1% lower food wheat production under high spatial competition relative to low 
spatial competition at the end of period 15 (Figure 5.8).  
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Figure 5.9: Simulated Mean Elevator Wheat Handling Fees and the Number of Elevators- 10 Percent Growth in 
Crude Oil Prices and Sustained Biofuel Support (E10%-S25¢-R40km and E10%-S25¢-R80km).   
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model. 
 
5.3.2.2.2 Declining Biofuel Support (S18¢) 
In the last scenarios, declining industry support for biofuels is combined with strong growth in 
energy prices at the aforementioned 10% per year. Using the base level of competition (P40km), 
the former strong shift from food to bioenergy wheat by farmers is slightly moderated as 
compared to the previous scenarios: in this case, biofuel wheat production surpasses food wheat 
production later in the simulation, and at approximately $178 / barrel oil price (Figure 5.10) with 
final food wheat production at only 1.4 million tonnes (80% below the base) (Figure 5.10). The 
mean handling fees decline from $18.22/t to $1.81/t (or 74.5% below the base) in the last period 
(Figure 5.11). In turn, the average number of elevators declines from 176 to approximately 50 
units (69% below the base) by the end of period 15 (Figure 5.11).  
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Figure 5.10: Simulated Food Wheat and Biofuel Wheat Production- 10% Growth in Crude Oil Prices and Declining 
Biofuel Support (E10%-S18¢-R40km and E10%-S18¢-R80km).   
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model. 
 
Under greater levels of spatial competition, simulated average food/bioenergy wheat production 
is slightly higher/lower than the previous scenarios with sustained biofuel support, reflecting the 
effect of lower spatial competition (Figure 5.10). Mean biofuel wheat production surpasses food 
wheat production in period 11 in this case, with a corresponding crude price per barrel of 
approximately $162 (Figure 5.10). While the general time path of fee charges and elevator 
numbers follow that of the like scenario with lower competition, the loss of cropland allocation 
from food to bioenergy wheat generated from relatively lower wheat competition and the 
associated higher levels of grain competition allows elevator fees to remain somewhat higher in 
the later years at $6.36/t, or 2.5 times higher at the end of period 15 (Figure 5.11). The mean 
number of elevators in this scenario is also slightly higher than before at 17 units (Figure 5.11). 
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Figure 5.11: Simulated Mean Elevator Wheat Handling Fees and the Number of Elevators- 10% Growth in Crude 
Prices and Declining Biofuel Support (E10%-S18¢-R40km and E10%-S18¢-R80km).   
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model. 
 
5.4 Summary Discussion of Cropland Allocation, Elevator Fee Behavior and 
Elevator Density 
In this chapter, the FARMCHAIN agent based simulation model was both verified and validated. 
Verification was done using random sampling of outcomes and checking them for logical 
consistency and accuracy. Next, the FARMCHAIN model was validated by comparing several 
key variables, including mean simulated wheat production, wheat disposition, elevator fees, and 
cropping patterns, against historic mean values. The simulated results were found to be close to 
historic wheat production levels and farm cropping patterns. Simulated elevator fees were not 
close to historic 2010-11 levels, but this could be accounted for by the uncharacteristically high 
levels of handling fees for that crop year. Based prior work, it was believed that path dependency 
would not be a factor in terms of the spatial assignment of farms because of the large number of 
farmer agents and plots. This was found to be the case.  
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5.4.1 Cropland Allocation 
In the next sections, the base and counterfactual scenario were delineated. A total of seven 
counterfactual scenarios were designed to test sectoral wheat production, elevator behavior and 
density against a continuation of current conditions (called the base scenario). Counterfactual 
variables were based on 1) differences in levels of spatial competition (40 and 80km), 2) 
differences in government biofuel support and (25 and 18¢/l), and 3) energy price trends (0 or a 
10% increase per year).  The base scenario is formed by the first value in each set of parentheses.   
 
In terms of sector wheat production in the base scenario, after the period of initialization, mean 
food wheat production increased by 12.7% between periods 4 and 5 held relative steady for the 
remainder of the simulation. Reducing biofuel support to 18¢/l and keeping other variables at 
base, the reduced price that ethanol plants offered farmers caused biofuel/food wheat to be 
less/more attractive to farmers and resulted in a 81.6% decline/ 31.9% increase in biofuel/food 
wheat production.  Under higher levels of spatial competition, biofuel wheat share of land 
allocation of 26% (under base biofuel support) and 20% (under declining biofuel support) was 
substantially above low competition shares of 20% (under base biofuel support) and 13% (under 
declining biofuel support), respectively. Higher biofuel wheat production resulted from the effect 
of intense competition in the earlier periods of the simulation that caused in significant industry 
‘shakeout’. The remaining firms were able increase fees significantly which in turn led to 
farmers responding by seeding more biofuel wheat. 
 
When oil prices increased persistently at 10% per year, ethanol plant operators were able to offer 
farmers a higher price. Over time, farmers adopted biofuel wheat as it became relatively more 
attractive than food wheat. Farmers begin to switch, in the aggregate, between periods 9 and 12. 
Future oil prices during these periods were set to within the range of $133.48 to $177.66 per 
barrel. In 2008, the year with the highest crude price on record, the annual average real crude 
price was approximately $104.31  Placed in context, oil prices would have to be at least 28% over 
that of the 2008 crisis period to facilitate an aggregate shift in production to biofuel wheat.  
However, in general, the increased viability of biofuel wheat driven by increases in oil prices 
                                                 
31 Source: Computed by author with data from Statistics Canada (2012) and NRCAN (2012) 
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minimally impacts the inter-crop competition between wheat and canola. Total wheat production 
was consistently between 7.9 and 8.2 million tonnes, with higher levels of production occurring 
under higher level of competition, after industry ‘shakeout’ occurred. 32  
 
Overall, mean food/biofuel wheat production is greater under lower/higher levels of spatial 
competition, declining/sustained biofuel industry support and there is no-growth/growth in real 
crude prices (Table 5.8). The reduction in food wheat production resulting from increased spatial 
competition varies between 464 thousand tonnes (under declining biofuel support and no growth 
in oil prices) and 77 thousand tonnes (under sustained biofuel support and 10% growth in oil 
prices). On the other hand, increased spatial competition increases biofuel wheat production 
between 129 thousand tonnes (under declining biofuel support and no growth in oil prices) and 
553 thousand tonnes (under sustained biofuel support and 10% growth in oil prices). This 
indicates that increased spatial competition favours the biofuel industry more than it would hurt 
the food wheat handling sector. This may provide valuable intuition into policy, as policies that 
increase competition in the food handling sector may lead to net benefits to wheat production as 
a whole. 
 
When biofuel industry support declines, food wheat production increases by between 473 
thousand and 627 thousand tonnes (the difference between scenarios 5 and 7 and scenarios 6 and 
8, respectively, in Table 5.8). Alternatively, biofuel wheat production declines by between 468 
thousand (the difference between scenarios 5 and 7) and 629 thousand tonnes (the difference 
between scenarios 6 and 8). From a policy perspective, policies geared toward sustaining or 
increasing wheat production is not viable if biofuel support is declining, crude oil prices are 
growing and the level of spatial competition between elevators is low because the benefit in food 
wheat production would be negated by the loss in biofuel wheat production thereby resulting in a 
net reduction in wheat production. 
  
                                                 
32 It is suspected that intercrop competition was constrained by the historical land allocation constraints. 
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Table 5.9: Summary of Simulated Wheat Production by Scenario  
  
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model. 
 
 
5.4.2 Elevator Behaviour and Density 
It is clear from this work that elevator market structure matters and that market structure 
influences overall pricing behaviour. When spatial competition was extended to 80 km, the 
combination of 1) predatory elevator behavior and 2) ethanol feedstock prices and the effect of 
fees on farmers’ gross margin expectations create dynamically unstable elevator fee equilibria 
that resemble what was coined “roller coaster” phenomena, consisting of three phases: 1) 
elevator industry shakeout or market rationalization, 2) spatial monopsonistic pricing, and 3) and 
resumption of elevator competition.  This is best exemplified by the dynamics of high spatial 
competitiveness displayed in the base energy price and government support scenario. At first, 
cutthroat competition depresses elevator fees. This in turn leads to an industry shakeout resulting 
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in (many cases) less than 25 surviving elevators. These remaining elevators are located in 
‘donut’ patterns, characterized by no surviving elevators in the middle of a spatial group of 
elevators. Subsequently, industry shakeout is followed by a shift for the remaining elevators to 
monopsonistic pricing of elevator fees, ratcheting elevator fees to higher and higher levels. 
Farmers then realize lower food wheat returns due to higher handling and transportation fees and 
thus switch from food to biofuel wheat. This conversion ensues in declining food wheat supplies, 
eventually leading to a return to greater elevator competition over time with lower handling fees.  
 
Diminished government biofuel subsidy and/or increasing oil prices can also alter the speed and 
type of dynamic adjustments under increased spatial competition. While a diminished 
government biofuel subsidy does not have much effect, major increases in energy prices such as 
those associated with the assumed 10%/year increase in oil price scenario can. In the latter case, 
the initial dynamics are similar to that generated by the low (R40 km) spatial competition 
scenario. However, the impact of steadily increasing biofuel wheat prices dramatically 
diminishes food supplies, forcing elevators to shift from their previous role of spatial 
monopsonists and to vigorously reassume the role of cutthroat or carnivorous competitors so that 
elevator fees are driven down once again. 
 
In general, as shown in Table 5.9, the rate of elevator survival declines with increased spatial 
competition but increases when spatial competition is high and biofuel industry support is 
declining. Elevator tariff rises to its highest when crude oil prices are not growing and biofuel 
industry support is declining and spatial competition is high but falls to its lowest when crude oil 
prices are increasing, biofuel industry support is sustained and spatial competition is low. 
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Table 5.10 Summary of Simulated Grain Elevator Performance, by Scenario  
 
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model. 
 
 
5.4.3 Discussions of the Key Assumptions Driving the FARMCHAIN Model 
In brief review, two key assumptions that significantly influence the results of the FARMCHAIN 
simulation model. 33 The first assumption is that of no individual elevator capacity constraints. 
With no capacity constraints, elevators that are unable to attract a desired level of grain are duly 
forced to continue to reduce handling fees to attract grain, meaning that over time they will 
ultimately be forced to exit the industry. If there were capacity constraints in the model, elevators 
who can charge relatively lower handling fees would be filled to capacity, after which any excess 
supply of grain would then be received by other proximate elevators. It is believed that this 
assumption would increase the mean survival rate of elevator agents, resulting in more stable 
average handling fees for food wheat. 
 
The second key assumption pertains to the internal rules governing elevator spatial 
competitiveness. It is assumed that elevators spatially compete for grain by modifying the prices 
offered to farmers. The degree of price adjustment in the simulation is assumed to be random and 
depends on the number of elevators that are in close proximity. This assumption may result in an 
overestimation of the magnitude of elevator price changes, although the direction is consistent 
with expectations. 
                                                 
33 The assumption that wheat has only two primary end uses also imposes some limitation as biofuel production is somewhat overestimated. In 
general, if simulated biofuel wheat production could be adjusted downward to reflect current capacity levels, it is likely that the price at which 
farmers would be enticed to switch would increase. 
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Together, these assumptions likely result in a simulated elevator density that is too sparse to be 
realistic. Under the most extreme conditions of 80 km radius of spatial competition and a 10% 
annual increase in energy prices, extreme competition for diminishing food wheat supplies 
resulted in only 16 surviving elevators.  The realism of this estimate has to be further examined. 
Using the simulated density, the average elevator would have a catchment radius of 
approximately 130 km with a total throughput of around 27,000 tonnes. The initial average 
throughput at the beginning of the simulation is approximately 35,000 tonnes. However in 
Scenario 4, where there is a significant decline to 18 surviving elevators but no marked decline 
in food wheat deliveries, the annual throughput would increase to approximately 390,000.34 This 
would likely require a basic redesign of the surviving elevators and their associated rail track 
towards much higher throughput and a likely shift in function to that of an inland terminal. While 
storage and handling are subject to considerable economies of size, there are also considerable 
increases in transport costs from the farm and this could result significant increases in the 
demand for primary highways leading to the remaining delivery points. These are important 
considerations but are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
The simulation results reported and discussed are underlaid by underlying energy, crop and other 
assumptions outlined. However, other exogenous shocks to the supply chain such as industrial 
action at the ports, increase rail freight rates due to increased market power or weather shocks 
that could change crop yield could significantly alter the model outcomes. 
  
                                                 
34 This outcome is due to the assumptions driving spatial competition between elevators. 
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
6.1 Summary of the FARMCHAIN ABSM 
This thesis used an agent based model to assess the impact of increasing future world oil prices, 
government biofuel support and levels of spatial competition on future Saskatchewan wheat 
production and elevator structure.  The agent based model, FARMCHAIN, was comprised of over 
35,000 farmer agents, 176 grain elevator agents, 5 ethanol plant agents, 6 crushing plant agents 
and a biodiesel plant agent placed on the 20 Saskatchewan census agricultural regions.  In terms 
of behavioral assumptions, elevator and farmers behavior were fundamental to the FARMCHAIN 
model. Farmer agents were assumed to react according to their own individual expectations of 
net gross margin based on a weighted historical average: they choose a crop mix based on the 
comparative profitability of biofuel and food wheat; canola; barley; and field peas. Biofuel wheat 
was moved into the ethanol production chain while food wheat moves into a differing chain that 
includes both domestic and export markets.  World commodity prices are assumed to be 
exogenous. Variable farm costs of production were static over time but transportation costs vary 
with energy costs. These costs and applicable elevator handling costs were deducted from the 
world price to form individual farmer agents’ gross margins. The gross margins, along with the 
next period prices were used to formulate the farmers’ expectations and the subsequent land 
allocation decisions of the next period. 
 
Eight scenarios were delineated consisting of a base and seven counterfactuals according to two 
levels of three counterfactual variables. The scenarios were formed by 1) two levels of spatial 
competition between elevators (40 km and 80 km), 2) two annual oil price trends (none and 10% 
per year) and 3) two levels of government support to the biofuel industry (25¢/l and 18¢/l). Each 
scenario was simulated over a fifteen-period time horizon with the first four periods being used 
to initialize agent behavior and was replicated fifty times based on differing exogenous world 
price paths.  
 
6.2 Counterfactual Conclusions 
Expansion of the biofuel industry was sustainable only under increases in world crude oil prices. 
At sustained biofuel support, it was concluded that real annual crude prices would have to 
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surpass $133 per barrel in order to entice farmers to switch from producing food wheat to 
producing biofuel wheat. Sustained government support to the biofuel industry was not sufficient 
to facilitate a significant change in the cropping behaviour of farmers. Increased elevator 
competition results in lower handling fees which in turn reduces the competitiveness of cropping 
biofuel wheat. Declining biofuel support reduced the inter-wheat competition which in turn 
alleviated the competitive pressure in the elevator industry, leading to increased food wheat 
production and a higher survival rate of elevators. Also, higher levels of spatial competition, led 
to overall higher levels of biofuel wheat production. Higher competition led to an accelerated 
decline in fees and subsequent elevator insolvencies. Surviving elevators were able to charge 
higher fees which led to producers seeding a relatively higher proportion of biofuel wheat. 
 
An emergent result is that elevator market structure and elevator behavior matter in both elevator 
fees and in food versus biofuel production. The combination of increased competition from 
predatory elevator behavior and feed forward of prices and fees to farmer agent gross margin 
expectations creates dynamically unstable elevator fee equilibria that resemble a “roller coaster” 
of three stages. First, the initial increased level of spatial competition between elevators to an 
increased industry shakeout. After the industry shakeout occurred, the remaining elevators 
locations were spatially clustered in a donut shape, as the peripheral elevators which drove out 
interior elevators. In the second stage after the shakeout, dramatically reduced elevator numbers 
resulted in spatial monopsonistic fee pricing. In response food wheat production declined and, in 
the extreme case where increased oil prices led increased biofuel wheat prices, food wheat 
production considerably diminished (92.7% decline from the initialisation period).  In the third 
stage, the rationalized market puts increasing pressure on elevators to resume competition 
resulting in lower elevator fees and somewhat higher food wheat production.35  
 
6.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Study 
The FARMCHAIN model is in some ways a “proof of concept” and the next generation of 
models should incorporate individual elevator capacity constraints and logistic decisions in grain 
movement in a manner similar to that of Lawrence (2011).  In addition, FARMCHAIN 
                                                 
35 Elevators would lose money if handling fees set were less than marginal costs. It was assumed that marginal costs were zero. Therefore on 
average elevators were not losing money. 
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incorporates relatively simplistic elevator behavior; further studies should explore alternative 
elevator company pricing behaviour in the post-single-desk-selling era. This could include more 
sophisticated differential pricing across the entire western Canadian prairie landscape. Under 
assumptions of spatial Bertrand pricing, it was shown that there could be a dramatic industry 
“shakeout” resulting in the surviving elevators capturing a many fold increase in market share. A 
further extension to this thesis would be to analyse the effect market collusion in such a setting. 
The accompanying increase in storage and throughput means that increased investment and 
adjustment costs should be incorporated into the elevator company decisions. In addition, the 
modelling of railway agents should also be incorporated in future research to assess the impact of 
their behaviour on the system and how other agents’ behaviours influence rail agent decisions.   
 
Finally, technological and structural change at the farm level was excluded. If real oil prices 
consistently increase over time, it would be reasonable to assume that technology would adapt 
(for example the introduction more fuel efficient machinery) within the 12-year period. Thus this 
study could be merged with the work of Anderson (2012) in the future to assess the impact of 
increased food wheat competition on elevator behaviour. 
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APPENDIX A: ECONOMIC MODELS OF SPATIAL COMPETITION 
Modeling the impact of spatial relationships on behavioral outcomes has proven to be quite 
difficult due to the inherent complexities involved. The theoretical work of Hotelling (1929), 
Lösch (1954), D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), Shaked (1982), Osborne and 
Pitchik (1986), and Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) provide frameworks through which agent 
behaviour may be explained based on spatial relationships. This section briefly highlights the key 
contribution of these authors to the literature on models of spatial competition. 
 
Hotelling (1929) develops and solves a pricing model in which products are differentiated by 
firms’ geographical location in the market. Location models are usually designed to identify the 
optimal location of sellers on a spatially uniformed continuum of consumers. This optimal 
location of the selling firm is influenced by the price set by the firm and the consumers’ 
transportation costs to that firm. Firms may either alter their position or prices in order to 
maximize market share which in turn maximizes profits. Hotelling found that in a case of only 
two firms the equilibrium would be that firms locate in the centre of the market. Hotelling’s 
notion of firm agglomeration (to the centre) in the case of two firms is refuted by Lösch (1954). 
Lösch indicates that the Hotelling solution only holds in an isolated case under a set of 
unrealistic assumptions. He further notes that agglomeration only takes place if firms do not 
react to its competitors’ actions and if the demand for the commodity is inelastic. Further 
refuting the findings of Hotelling, D’Apremont et al. (1979) highlighted that there is no 
equilibrium when the two firms are close to each other. They further stated that, with some minor 
alterations to Hotelling’s model, an equilibrium could exist everywhere on the linear city 
continuum. Rasmusen (2007) indicates that the collapse of the Hotelling model is due to the fact 
that there are discontinuities in the firms’ objective functions and as such, Hotelling only 
computes a local optimum which is different from the global optimum. 
 
Hotelling however noted that when there were more than two firms there is no pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium as firms on the periphery would want to move toward the centre whilst those 
on the interior would want to increase market share by moving to the periphery. In this regard, 
Lösch indicates that if the one-dimensional line was substituted for a two-dimensional plane and 
there are more than two competing firms, then at the optimum, firms would be equidistant from 
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each other. The works of Shaked (1982), Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), and Osborne and Pitchik 
(1987) highlight the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium in firm location. Shaked 
highlighted that the three-firm location problem does indeed have a mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium. The author’s finding implies that firms in equilibrium will stay away from extreme 
quartiles and choose locations in the remaining half with equal probability. Dasgupta and Maskin 
derived two existence theorems for the mixed-strategy equilibrium in games with discontinuous 
payoff functions. The authors used the examples of the Bertrand pricing game with capacity 
constraints (which has a discontinuous payoff function) and the Hotelling location model to 
show the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium in firm location. Osborne and Pitchik expand 
on the work of Dasgupta and Maskin and noted that the search for an equilibrium could be 
reduced to solving at most three non-linear equations. The authors found that a there exists both 
pure strategy and mixed strategy subgame perfect equilibria in location choices of the firms. 
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Table B-2: Agent location and Geodesic Distances to Ports or Biodiesel Plant 
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Table B-2 (Cont’d): Agent location and Geodesic Distances to Ports or Biodiesel Plant  
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Table B-2 (Cont’d): Agent location and Geodesic Distances to Ports or Biodiesel Plant (Cont’d) 
 
Source: Created by author with data from Google Maps™ and www.cpearson.com 
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Table B-3: World Crop Prices Adjusted for Inflation and Converted to Canadian Dollars 
 
Source: Created by author’s calculations with data from Statistics Canada Table 176-0049, UN Comtrade (2012), 
Canola prices obtained from FAO STAT (2012) 
 
 
Table B-4: Correlation Matrix of Crop Prices after Inflation adjustment, 1991- 2009 
 
Source: Computed by author’s calculations, with data from Table B-3. 
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Table B-5: Crop Price Auto-regression results 
 
Source: Created by author’s calculations, with data from Table B-3. 
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Table B-6: Johansen Cointegration Test Result for Trucking Surcharge Estimation 
 
Source: Author’s Computations with data from National Traffic Services 2012 and EIA 2011b 
142 
 
Table B-7: Elevator Maximum Handling Fees in Used in the FARMCHAIN Model 
  
Source: Computed by author with data from Canadian Grain Commission 2012 
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Table B-8: Johansen Cointegration Test Results for Cointegration between Gasoline and Oil Prices, 1991-2010 
 
Source: Author’s computations with data from Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 326-0009 
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Table B-9: Johansen Cointegration Test Results for Cointegration between Diesel Fuel and Oil Prices, 1991-2010 
 
Source: Author’s computations with data from Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 326-0009 
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Table B-10: Price Adjusted Wheat Premium Earned in and Quantities Supplied in Tonnes to the Japanese and 
Colombian Markets 
 
Source: Computed by author with data from UN Comtrade (2012) 
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Table B-11: Regression Results of Premiums on Canadian Wheat Exports to Japan 
 
Source: Author’s computations refer to Table B-10 
 
Table B-12: FARMCHAIN Model Simulation Output for Scenarios with Sustained Biofuel Support and No Growth 
in Crude Oil Prices 
 
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN Model 
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Table B-13: FARMCHAIN Model Simulation Output for Scenarios with Declining Biofuel Support and No Growth 
in Crude Oil Prices 
 
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN Model 
 
Table B-14: FARMCHAIN Model Simulation Output for Scenarios with Sustained Biofuel Support and 10% per 
Annum Growth in Crude Oil Prices 
 
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN Model 
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Table B-15: FARMCHAIN Model Simulation Output for Scenarios with Declining Biofuel Support and 10% per 
Annum Growth in Crude Oil Prices 
 
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN Model 
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APPENDIX C: NETLOGO© CODES AND MODEL DATA 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; FARMCHAIN MODEL ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
 
extensions[gis] 
globals [skcar-dataset 
         c1a-dataset  c1b-dataset 
         c2a-dataset  c2b-dataset 
         c3an-dataset c3as-dataset  
         c3bn-dataset c3bs-dataset 
         c4a-dataset  c4b-dataset 
         c5a-dataset  c5b-dataset 
         c6a-dataset  c6b-dataset 
         c7a-dataset  c7b-dataset 
         c8a-dataset  c8b-dataset 
         c9a-dataset  c9b-dataset 
         sksoil-dataset 
         cargill-dataset 
         louisd-dataset 
         patterson-dataset 
         pnh-dataset 
         richardson-dataset 
         viterra-dataset 
         otherges-dataset 
         cp-dataset 
         ep-dataset 
         bd-dataset 
         roa-dataset 
         rla-dataset 
         town-dataset 
 
         realworld-width 
         realworld-height 
         xfactor 
         yfactor 
 
          
         pcanfood 
         pcanenergy 
         wpsw 
         wpbar 
         wpcan 
         wpfp 
          
         total-sw-production 
         total-can-production 
         total-fw-production 
         total-fp-production 
         total-bar-production 
          
         all-ges 
         grainhandlers 
         patches-in-model 
         ghwithcan ghw/ocan 
          
         gewithsw  gew/osw 
         gewithbar gew/obar 
         gewithfp  gew/ofp 
         cpwithcan cpw/ocan 
         epwithfw  epw/ofw 
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         fwithsw  fw/osw 
         fwithbar fw/obar 
         fwithfp  fw/ofp 
         fwithcan fw/ocan 
         fwithfw  fw/ofw 
  
  
         SWVCsupply 
         SWTBsupply 
         SWdomsupply 
          
         barVCsupply 
         barTBsupply 
         barTBsupplyt1 
         dtbbarsupply 
         dtbbarpremt          
         bardomsupply 
         pvcbart 
         ptbbart 
 
          
         fpVCsupply 
         fpTBsupply 
         fpdomsupply 
          
         CANVCsupply 
         CANTBsupply          
         CANBDsupply 
          
         diesel-demand 
         Biodiesel_demand 
         Biodsupply 
         tot-exp-Biodsupply 
         pdt 
         pbdt 
         bdmargin 
         fbdp          
         Biod-fgpcan 
         pbdcant 
          
          
         fwsupply 
         ethsupply 
         total-dom-ethdemand 
         tot-exp-ethsupply 
         gasoline-demand 
         ethanol_demand 
         pgast 
         crude-price 
         petht 
         fethp 
         epmargin 
         meanethdemand 
         nsgreatd        
         pfwt  
         pfwt1 
         
          
         gebswlist 
         gebfplist 
         gebbarlist 
         gebcanlist 
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         swpricelist 
         fwpricelist 
         cppricelist 
         swprodlist 
         fwprodlist 
         ngelist 
         countges 
         avgebasissw 
         avgebasisfp 
         avgebasisbar 
         avgebasiscan 
          
          
         meangmsw 
         meangmcan 
         meangmbar 
         meangmfp 
         meangmfw 
          
         meanofcsw 
         meanofcbar 
         meanofccan 
         meanofcfp 
         meanofcfw   
             
         meangebasissw 
         meangebasisfp 
         meangebasisbar 
         meangebasiscan 
         
         meanrailcostSW 
         meanrailcostbar 
         meanrailcostcan 
         meanrailcostfp 
         meanrailcostfw 
         
         meantruckcostsw 
         meantruckcostbar 
         meantruckcostcan 
         meantruckcostfp 
         meantruckcostfw              
 
         meancopsw 
         meancopfp 
         meancopbar 
         meancopcan 
         meancopfw 
          
         landlist 
         discfactlist 
         
         wpswlist 
         wpbarlist 
         wpcanlist 
         wpfplist 
           
         year   
         runs 
         truck-surcharge 
         rail-surcharge 
          
         OFReast 
         OFRwest 
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         vcsw 
         vcbar 
         vcfp 
         vcfw 
         vccan 
          
]  
          
breed [roas   roa] 
breed [rlas rla] 
breed [towns town] 
breed [ports port] 
breed [eps ep] 
breed [cplants cplant] 
breed [bds bd] 
breed [cargills cargill] 
breed [louisds louisd] 
breed [pattersons patterson] 
breed [pnhs pnh] 
breed [richardsons richardson] 
breed [viterras viterra] 
breed [otherges otherge] 
breed [farmers farmer] 
 
patches-own [cid 
             zone 
             land-id  
             ysw ycan yfw yfp ybar 
             mwmbw 
             mwmbc 
             mwmbb 
             mwmbf  
             mwmfw  
             mwmfc  
             mwmfb  
             mwmff  
             mcmbw  
             mcmbc  
             mcmbb  
             mcmbf 
             mcmfw 
             mcmfc 
             mcmfb 
             mcmff 
             swfuel swfert swTVC 
             canfuel canfert canTVC 
             barfuel barfert barTVC 
             fpfuel fpfert fpTVC 
             fwfuel fwfert fwTVC              
             swcop cancop fwcop fpcop barcop] 
 
Farmers-own [myphi                                                              
             swr canr fwr fpr barr                                            
             fallow 
             fpfal canfal 
             land                                                             
             discfact                                                         
             fstorsw fstorcan fstorfw fstorfp fstorbar                        
             fgpsw fgpcan fgpfw fgpfp fgpbar                                  
             swa cana fwa fpa bara                                            
             ranksw rankcan rankfw rankfp rankbar                             
             swy cany fwy fpy bary                                            
             fgec-sw fghc-can fepc-fw fgec-fp fgec-bar                        
             trkdistsw trkdistcan trkdistfw trkdistfp trkdistbar              
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             truckcostsw truckcostcan truckcostfw truckcostfp truckcostbar    
             trucksursw trucksurcan trucksurfw trucksurfp trucksurbar 
             tottruckcsw tottruckccan tottruckcfw tottruckcfp tottruckcbar 
             railcostsw railcostcan railcostfw railcostfp railcostbar         
             basiscostsw basiscostcan basiscostfp basiscostbar                
             swcmemory 
             fwcmemory 
             edsw edcan edfw edfp edbar                                       
             var1 var2 var3 
             ucopsw ucopbar ucopcan ucopfp ucopfw                             
             copsw copbar copcan copfp copfw                                  
             exppsw exppbar exppcan exppfp exppfw                             
             OFCsw OFCbar OFCfp OFCcan OFCfw                                  
] 
 
cplants-own [distvc distpr distch disttb distbd                               
             storcan                                                          
             basiscan                                                         
             VCcanqty TBcanqty CHcanqty BDcanqty                              
             canrailcVC canrailcTB canrailcBD                                 
             cantotrcost 
             ofcostcan 
             railmargincan 
] 
 
 
eps-own [epstorfw                                                             
         distVC 
         ethproduct 
         dom-ethsupply 
         exp-ethsupply 
         ethrailc 
         ethtotrcost 
         nsgd 
         tded 
         ofcostfw 
         ] 
bds-own [distvc 
         canrailcvc 
         cantotrcost 
         ofcostcan 
         bdproduct 
         dom-Biodsupply 
         exp-Biodsupply] 
 
cargills-own [ 
gestorsw gestorbar gestorfp storcan                                           
basissw basisbar basisfp  basiscan 
nclosege 
distvc distpr distch disttb 
domswqty dombarqty domcanqty domfpqty 
               
               
VCswqty TBswqty VCbarqty TBbarqty 
VCcanqty TBcanqty VCfpqty TBfpqty 
railmarginsw railmarginbar railmarginfp railmargincan 
rv1 rv2 
swrailcVC swrailcTB swrailcCH                                   
barrailcVC barrailcTB barrailcCH                                
fprailcVC fprailcTB fprailcCH                                   
canrailcVC canrailcTB canrailcCH 
swtotrcost bartotrcost cantotrcost fptotrcost                   
ofcostsw ofcostbar ofcostfp ofcostcan                           
              ] 
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louisds-own [ 
gestorsw gestorbar gestorfp storcan                                           
basissw basisbar basisfp  basiscan 
nclosege 
distvc distpr distch disttb 
domswqty dombarqty domcanqty domfpqty 
               
               
VCswqty TBswqty VCbarqty TBbarqty 
VCcanqty TBcanqty VCfpqty TBfpqty 
railmarginsw railmarginbar railmarginfp railmargincan 
rv1 rv2 
swrailcVC swrailcTB swrailcCH                                   
barrailcVC barrailcTB barrailcCH                                
fprailcVC fprailcTB fprailcCH                                   
canrailcVC canrailcTB canrailcCH 
swtotrcost bartotrcost cantotrcost fptotrcost                   
ofcostsw ofcostbar ofcostfp ofcostcan                           
              ] 
 
pattersons-own [ 
gestorsw gestorbar gestorfp storcan                                           
basissw basisbar basisfp  basiscan 
nclosege 
distvc distpr distch disttb 
domswqty dombarqty domcanqty domfpqty 
               
               
VCswqty TBswqty VCbarqty TBbarqty 
VCcanqty TBcanqty VCfpqty TBfpqty 
railmarginsw railmarginbar railmarginfp railmargincan 
rv1 rv2 
swrailcVC swrailcTB swrailcCH                                   
barrailcVC barrailcTB barrailcCH                                
fprailcVC fprailcTB fprailcCH                                   
canrailcVC canrailcTB canrailcCH 
swtotrcost bartotrcost cantotrcost fptotrcost                   
ofcostsw ofcostbar ofcostfp ofcostcan                           
              ] 
 
pnhs-own [ 
gestorsw gestorbar gestorfp storcan                                           
basissw basisbar basisfp  basiscan 
nclosege 
distvc distpr distch disttb 
domswqty dombarqty domcanqty domfpqty 
               
               
VCswqty TBswqty VCbarqty TBbarqty 
VCcanqty TBcanqty VCfpqty TBfpqty 
railmarginsw railmarginbar railmarginfp railmargincan 
rv1 rv2 
swrailcVC swrailcTB swrailcCH                                   
barrailcVC barrailcTB barrailcCH                                
fprailcVC fprailcTB fprailcCH                                   
canrailcVC canrailcTB canrailcCH 
swtotrcost bartotrcost cantotrcost fptotrcost                   
ofcostsw ofcostbar ofcostfp ofcostcan                           
              ] 
 
richardsons-own [ 
gestorsw gestorbar gestorfp storcan                                           
basissw basisbar basisfp  basiscan 
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nclosege 
distvc distpr distch disttb 
domswqty dombarqty domcanqty domfpqty 
               
               
VCswqty TBswqty VCbarqty TBbarqty 
VCcanqty TBcanqty VCfpqty TBfpqty 
railmarginsw railmarginbar railmarginfp railmargincan 
rv1 rv2 
swrailcVC swrailcTB swrailcCH                                   
barrailcVC barrailcTB barrailcCH                                
fprailcVC fprailcTB fprailcCH                                   
canrailcVC canrailcTB canrailcCH 
swtotrcost bartotrcost cantotrcost fptotrcost                   
ofcostsw ofcostbar ofcostfp ofcostcan                           
              ] 
 
viterras-own [ 
gestorsw gestorbar gestorfp storcan                                           
basissw basisbar basisfp  basiscan 
nclosege 
distvc distpr distch disttb 
domswqty dombarqty domcanqty domfpqty 
               
               
VCswqty TBswqty VCbarqty TBbarqty 
VCcanqty TBcanqty VCfpqty TBfpqty 
railmarginsw railmarginbar railmarginfp railmargincan 
rv1 rv2 
swrailcVC swrailcTB swrailcCH                                   
barrailcVC barrailcTB barrailcCH                                
fprailcVC fprailcTB fprailcCH                                   
canrailcVC canrailcTB canrailcCH 
swtotrcost bartotrcost cantotrcost fptotrcost                   
ofcostsw ofcostbar ofcostfp ofcostcan                           
              ] 
 
otherges-own [ 
gestorsw gestorbar gestorfp storcan                                           
basissw basisbar basisfp  basiscan 
nclosege 
distvc distpr distch disttb 
domswqty dombarqty domcanqty domfpqty 
               
               
VCswqty TBswqty VCbarqty TBbarqty 
VCcanqty TBcanqty VCfpqty TBfpqty 
railmarginsw railmarginbar railmarginfp railmargincan 
rv1 rv2 
swrailcVC swrailcTB swrailcCH                                   
barrailcVC barrailcTB barrailcCH                                
fprailcVC fprailcTB fprailcCH                                   
canrailcVC canrailcTB canrailcCH 
swtotrcost bartotrcost cantotrcost fptotrcost                   
ofcostsw ofcostbar ofcostfp ofcostcan                           
              ] 
 
 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; TO SETUP THE MODEL ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
to setup 
  load-world 
  crtagents 
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  ;patch-info 
  ;farm-info 
 
end 
 
 
to Load-world 
random-seed rand-seed 
clear-everthing 
load-gis 
assign-yields-n-costs 
assign-packages 
load-prices 
set-year 
 
end   
   
to clr-reset 
  clear-turtles 
  clear-patches 
  clear-drawing 
  clear-all-plots 
  reset-ticks     
end 
 
to reset 
random-seed rand-seed 
clr-reset 
load-gis 
assign-yields-n-costs 
assign-packages 
load-prices 
set-year 
crtagents 
end 
   
to clear-everthing 
  clear-turtles 
  clear-patches 
  clear-drawing 
  clear-all-plots 
  clear-output 
  ca 
end 
 
to load-gis 
 Ask Patches [ 
   set pcolor white] 
  
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;load esri shp files into netlogo ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
  gis:load-coordinate-system "data/NewSkcar/skcar.prj" 
  set skcar-dataset gis:load-dataset "data/NewSkcar/june28skcar.shp"   
  set sksoil-dataset gis:load-dataset "data/Sksoil/Sksoil2.shp"    
  set cargill-dataset gis:load-dataset 
"data/NewGES/IndividualGES/cargill.shp" 
  set louisd-dataset gis:load-dataset "data/NewGES/IndividualGES/louisd.shp"                                           
  set patterson-dataset gis:load-dataset "data/NewGES/IndividualGES/pat.shp" 
  set pnh-dataset gis:load-dataset "data/NewGES/IndividualGES/pnh.shp" 
  set richardson-dataset gis:load-dataset 
"data/NewGES/IndividualGES/rich.shp" 
  set viterra-dataset gis:load-dataset 
"data/NewGES/IndividualGES/viterra.shp" 
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  set otherges-dataset gis:load-dataset 
"data/NewGES/IndividualGES/otherge.shp" 
  set cp-dataset gis:load-dataset "data/Biodiesel/crushplant.shp" 
  set bd-dataset gis:load-dataset "data/Biodiesel/Biodieselplant.shp" 
  set ep-dataset gis:load-dataset "data/EPS/EPS1.shp" 
   
     
  gis:set-world-envelope gis:envelope-of skcar-dataset 
  set realworld-width 631.6     ;; width of world in km, determined from 
calculating the geodesic distance on ArcGIS  
  set realworld-height 631.3    ;; height of world in km, see above 
  
;; factor = GIS units per netlogo unit 
  set xfactor realworld-width / world-width 
  set yfactor realworld-height / world-height 
  
  
 ;ask netlogo to draw CAR boundaries 
 gis:set-drawing-color black  
 gis:draw skcar-dataset 1 
 
 
 
;Load road network 
;gis:set-drawing-color blue - 2  
;gis:draw roa-dataset 0.5 
 
;load soil zones 
;gis:set-drawing-color grey  
;gis:draw sksoil-dataset 0.1 
 
;load rail network 
;gis:set-drawing-color grey  
;gis:draw rla-dataset 2 
 
;load town network 
; gis:set-drawing-color black 
; gis:draw town-dataset 1 
end 
 
 
to assign-yields-n-costs 
 
; yields to patches 
foreach gis:feature-list-of sksoil-dataset[ 
ask patches gis:intersecting ?[ 
  set zone (gis:property-value ? "ZONE_1") 
  set land-id (gis:property-value ? "AREA") 
  set ysw (gis:property-value ? "YLDWHT") * 0.001 / 2.47105381 * 1.5             
  set ycan (gis:property-value ? "YLDCAN") * 0.001 / 2.47105381 * 2 
  set yfw (gis:property-value ? "YLDWHT") * 0.001 / 2.47105381 * 1.5 * 1.07       
; Industrial Wheat has a higher yield than traditional wheat (Crop Planning 
Guide 2011) 
 ;set yfp ycan * 1.423845068                                                      
; Field peas yield has historically been 1.4 times the yield of canola 
(Statistics Canada) 
  set ybar (gis:property-value ? "YLDBAR") * 0.001 / 2.47105381 * 0.75                    
   
 
   
  set swfuel (gis:property-value ? "SWFUELCOST") 
  set swfert (gis:property-value ? "SWFERT_COS") 
  set swTVC (gis:property-value ? "SWTOTVAR_E")  
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  set barfuel (gis:property-value ? "BARFUELCOS") 
  set barfert (gis:property-value ? "BARFERT_CO") 
  set barTVC (gis:property-value ? "BARTOTVAR_") 
   
  set canfuel (gis:property-value ? "CANFUELCOS") 
  set canfert (gis:property-value ? "CANFERT_CO") 
  set canTVC (gis:property-value ? "CANTOTVAR_") 
   
  set fpfuel (gis:property-value ? "FPFUELCOST") 
  set fpfert (gis:property-value ? "FPFERT_COS") 
  set fpTVC (gis:property-value ? "FPTOTVAR_E") 
   
  set fwfuel swfuel 
  set fwfert swfert 
  set fwTVC swTVC  
]] 
 
;if yields = 0 for current location set yields to average yield based soil 
zone obtained from Crop Planner  
ask patches[ 
  if ysw = 0 
  [if zone = "BROWN" 
    [set ysw 29.8 * 0.027216] 
   if zone = "DARK BROWN" 
    [set ysw 34.2 * 0.027216] 
   if zone = "BLACK" 
    [set ysw 41.8 * 0.027216]] 
 
  if ycan = 0 
  [if zone = "BROWN" 
    [set ycan 23.2 * 0.022680] 
   if zone = "DARK BROWN" 
    [set ycan 33.1 * 0.022680] 
   if zone = "BLACK" 
    [set ycan 36.7 * 0.022680]] 
 
  if yfw = 0 
  [if zone = "BROWN" 
    [set yfw 32.8 * 0.027216] 
   if zone = "DARK BROWN" 
    [set yfw 41.8 * 0.027216] 
   if zone = "BLACK" 
    [set yfw 51.4 * 0.027216]] 
 
  if yfp = 0 
  [if zone = "BROWN" 
    [set yfp 31.6 * 0.027216] 
   if zone = "DARK BROWN" 
    [set yfp 36.9 * 0.027216] 
   if zone = "BLACK" 
    [set yfp 37.2 * 0.027216]] 
   
  if ybar = 0 
  [if zone = "BROWN" 
    [set ybar 48.6 * 0.021772]                                  
   if zone = "DARK BROWN" 
    [set ybar 61.3 * 0.021772] 
   if zone = "BLACK" 
    [set ybar 70.6 * 0.021772]] 
] 
end 
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to assign-packages 
;assign packages to patches 
foreach gis:feature-list-of skcar-dataset[ 
ask patches gis:intersecting ?[ 
  set cid gis:property-value ? "CAR" 
  set mwmbw gis:property-value ? "MWMBW" 
  set mwmbc gis:property-value ? "MWMBCAN"  
  set mwmbb gis:property-value ? "MWMBBAR"  
  set mwmbf gis:property-value ? "MWMBFP"  
  set mwmfw gis:property-value ? "MWMFW" 
  set mwmfc gis:property-value ? "MWMFCAN"  
  set mwmfb gis:property-value ? "MWMFBAR"  
  set mwmff gis:property-value ? "MWMFFP"      
  set mcmbw gis:property-value ? "MCMBW" 
  set mcmbc gis:property-value ? "MCMBCAN"  
  set mcmbb gis:property-value ? "MCMBBAR"  
  set mcmbf gis:property-value ? "MCMBFP"  
  set mcmfw gis:property-value ? "MCMFW" 
  set mcmfc gis:property-value ? "MCMFCAN"  
  set mcmfb gis:property-value ? "MCMFBAR"  
  set mcmff gis:property-value ? "MCMFFP" 
  ]] 
end 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; LOAD PRICE LIST ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
to load-prices 
 
file-open (word "data/textfiles/timePaths/Wheat Time Path/wtp" TimePath 
".txt") 
set wpswlist file-read 
file-close 
 
file-open (word "data/textfiles/timePaths/Barley Time Path/btp" TimePath 
".txt") 
set wpbarlist file-read 
file-close 
 
file-open (word "data/textfiles/timePaths/Canola Time Path/ctp" TimePath 
".txt") 
set wpcanlist file-read 
file-close 
 
file-open (word "data/textfiles/timePaths/Field Pea Time Path/ftp" TimePath 
".txt") 
set wpfplist file-read 
file-close 
end 
 
 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; set the Year;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
to set-year 
set year 2010 
end 
 
 
to patch-info 
ask patches with [cid != 0 and land-id != 0][set pcolor brown + 3] 
ask patches with [cid != 0 and land-id = 0][set pcolor blue + 3] 
ask patches with [cid = 0][set pcolor black] 
show "Number of Patches in the Model:" show count(patches with [cid != 0 and 
land-id != 0]) 
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set patches-in-model (patch-set patches with [cid != 0 and land-id != 0]) 
show "Number of Patches in Water:"  show count(patches with [cid != 0 and 
land-id = 0]) 
show "Number of Patches in CAR:" show count(patches with [cid != 0]) 
Show "Number of Acres per Patch:" show  210358335 / count(patches with [cid 
!= 0]) 
end 
 
to crtagents 
  crtfarmers 
  crtges 
  crteps 
  crtcps 
  crtbd 
end 
 
 
to crtfarmers 
Ask n-of 1501 patches with [cid = "1a" and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
    ]] 
 
 
Ask n-of 1496 patches with [cid = "1b"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
 
Ask n-of 1094 patches with [cid = "2a"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
 
Ask n-of 2018 patches with [cid = "2b"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
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Ask n-of 955 patches with [cid = "3an"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
 
Ask n-of 1758 patches with [cid = "3as"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
 
Ask n-of 1864 patches with [cid = "3bn"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
 
Ask n-of 1050 patches with [cid = "3bs"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
 
Ask n-of 859 patches with [cid = "4a"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
 
Ask n-of 910 patches with [cid = "4b"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
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  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
 
Ask n-of 2893 patches with [cid = "5a"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
Ask n-of 2965 patches with [cid = "5b"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
 
Ask n-of 2575 patches with [cid = "6a"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
 
Ask n-of 2616 patches with [cid = "6b"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
 [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
 
Ask n-of 1412 patches with [cid = "7a"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
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   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
 
Ask n-of 1428 patches with [cid = "7b"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
 
Ask n-of 1920 patches with [cid = "8a"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
 
Ask n-of 1899 patches with [cid = "8b"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
Ask n-of 3276 patches with [cid = "9a"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
  [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
 
 
Ask n-of 2463 patches with [cid = "9b"and land-id != 0] 
[sprout-farmers 1 
   [set shape "person" 
   set color blue 
   set swy ([ysw] of patch-here) 
   set cany ([ycan] of patch-here) 
   set fwy ([yfw] of patch-here) 
   set fpy ([yfp] of patch-here) 
   set bary ([ybar] of patch-here) 
   ]] 
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file-open "data/textfiles/Landsize/june28Landsize.txt" 
set landlist file-read 
file-close 
foreach sort farmers[ 
  ask ? [set land first landlist 
         set landlist but-first landlist]] 
 
 
file-open "data/textfiles/Degree of Responsiveness/DORjune28.txt" 
set discfactlist file-read 
file-close 
 
foreach sort farmers[ 
  ask ? [set discfact first discfactlist 
         set discfactlist but-first discfactlist]] 
 
end  
 
to farm-info 
show "Number of farmers in the model:" show count(farmers) 
show "Total Crop-land acreage:" show sum([land] of farmers) 
 
end  
 
 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; Create Grain Elevators ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
to crtges 
foreach gis:feature-list-of cargill-dataset 
[ask patches gis:intersecting ? 
 [sprout-cargills 1 
 
  [set shape "house" 
    set color red 
   set size 10 
  set distVC gis:property-value ? "DISTANCEVC" 
  set distpr gis:property-value ? "DISTANCEPR" 
  set distch gis:property-value ? "DISTANCECH" 
  set disttb gis:property-value ? "DISTANCETB"   ]]] 
   
foreach gis:feature-list-of louisd-dataset 
[ask patches gis:intersecting ? 
 [sprout-louisds 1 
 
  [set shape "house" 
    set color red 
   set size 10 
  set distVC gis:property-value ? "DISTANCEVC" 
  set distpr gis:property-value ? "DISTANCEPR" 
  set distch gis:property-value ? "DISTANCECH" 
  set disttb gis:property-value ? "DISTANCETB"   ]]]  
 
foreach gis:feature-list-of patterson-dataset 
[ask patches gis:intersecting ? 
 [sprout-pattersons 1 
 
  [set shape "house" 
   set color red 
   set size 10 
   set distVC gis:property-value ? "DISTANCEVC" 
   set distpr gis:property-value ? "DISTANCEPR" 
   set distch gis:property-value ? "DISTANCECH" 
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   set disttb gis:property-value ? "DISTANCETB"   ]]]  
 
foreach gis:feature-list-of pnh-dataset 
[ask patches gis:intersecting ? 
 [sprout-pnhs 1 
 
  [set shape "house" 
    set color red 
   set size 10 
  set distVC gis:property-value ? "DISTANCEVC" 
  set distpr gis:property-value ? "DISTANCEPR" 
  set distch gis:property-value ? "DISTANCECH" 
  set disttb gis:property-value ? "DISTANCETB"   ]]]  
 
foreach gis:feature-list-of richardson-dataset 
[ask patches gis:intersecting ? 
 [sprout-richardsons 1 
 
  [set shape "house" 
    set color red 
   set size 10 
  set distVC gis:property-value ? "DISTANCEVC" 
  set distpr gis:property-value ? "DISTANCEPR" 
  set distch gis:property-value ? "DISTANCECH" 
  set disttb gis:property-value ? "DISTANCETB"   ]]]  
 
foreach gis:feature-list-of viterra-dataset 
[ask patches gis:intersecting ? 
 [sprout-viterras 1 
 
  [set shape "house" 
    set color red 
   set size 10 
  set distVC gis:property-value ? "DISTANCEVC" 
  set distpr gis:property-value ? "DISTANCEPR" 
  set distch gis:property-value ? "DISTANCECH" 
  set disttb gis:property-value ? "DISTANCETB"   ]]]  
 
foreach gis:feature-list-of otherges-dataset 
[ask patches gis:intersecting ? 
 [sprout-otherges 1 
 
  [set shape "house" 
    set color red 
   set size 10 
  set distVC gis:property-value ? "DISTANCEVC" 
  set distpr gis:property-value ? "DISTANCEPR" 
  set distch gis:property-value ? "DISTANCECH" 
  set disttb gis:property-value ? "DISTANCETB"   ]]]  
 
set all-ges (turtle-set cargills louisds pattersons pnhs richardsons viterras 
otherges) 
 
end 
 
 
to crteps 
foreach gis:feature-list-of ep-dataset 
[ask patches gis:intersecting ?     
[sprout-eps 1 
  [set shape "house" 
   set color yellow 
   set size 15 
   set distVC gis:property-value ? "DISTVC"]]] 
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end 
 
to crtcps 
foreach gis:feature-list-of cp-dataset 
[ask patches gis:intersecting ?     
[sprout-cplants 1 
  [set shape "house" 
    set color green 
   set size 13 
  set distVC gis:property-value ? "DISTANCEVC" 
  set distpr gis:property-value ? "DISTANCEPR" 
  set distch gis:property-value ? "DISTANCECH" 
  set disttb gis:property-value ? "DISTANCETB" 
  set distBD gis:property-value ? "DIST_BioD_"]]] 
 
set grainhandlers (turtle-set cplants all-ges)   
end 
 
to crtbd 
foreach gis:feature-list-of bd-dataset 
[ask patches gis:intersecting ?     
[sprout-bds 1 
  [set shape "circle" 
    set color violet 
   set size 15 
   set distvc 1406.790765]]]   
 
end 
 
 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; Get World Prices  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;  
 
to set-world-prices 
ifelse ticks <= 4 
[set year 2010] 
[set year year + 1] 
 
 
 
;SPRING WHEAT 
set wpsw first wpswlist 
set wpswlist but-first wpswlist 
;BARLEY 
set wpbar first wpbarlist  
set wpbarlist but-first wpbarlist  
;CANOLA  
set wpcan first wpcanlist 
set wpcanlist but-first wpcanlist  
;FIELD PEAS  
set wpfp first wpfplist 
set wpfplist but-first wpfplist   
 
Ifelse ticks = 0 
[set crude-price 82.88 
 set pfwt 0]                                                        
; Real Average North American Crude Oil Price for January 2010 Canadian 
$/barrel 
[set crude-price crude-price * (1 + (doil-price / 100))]   
end 
 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; ASK FARMERS TO PRODUCE ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
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to produce 
  farm 
  store 
  cmpt-cop 
 ; show "Production Complete" 
end 
 
to farm 
  getprice 
  allocate-acreage 
  plant 
end 
 
 
 
to getprice 
  
 
ifelse ticks = 0 
  [ask farmers 
   [set exppsw  wpsw * swy 
    set exppbar wpbar * bary 
    set exppcan wpcan * cany 
    set exppfp wpfp * fpy 
    set exppfw pfwt * fwy]] 
  [ask farmers 
   [set exppsw (fgpsw * (1 - discfact) + (discfact) * (wpsw - vcsw)) * swy 
    set exppfw (fgpfw *(1 - discfact) + (discfact) * (pfwt - vcfw)) * fwy 
    set exppbar (fgpbar * (1 - discfact) + (discfact) * (wpbar - vcbar)) * 
bary 
    set exppcan (fgpcan * (1 - discfact) + (discfact) * (wpcan - vccan)) * 
cany 
    set exppfp (fgpfp * (1 - discfact) + (discfact) * (wpfp - vcfp)) * fpy 
    ]] 
 
 
  end 
   
   
   
   
to allocate-acreage 
ifelse bio-ethanol 
[ask farmers 
  [ifelse exppsw > exppfw 
   [ifelse exppsw > exppcan and exppbar > exppfp 
    [SWpackage1] 
    [ifelse exppsw > exppcan and exppbar < exppfp 
     [SWpackage2] 
     [ifelse exppsw < exppcan and exppbar > exppfp 
      [SWpackage3] 
      [SWpackage4]]]] 
   [ifelse exppsw > exppcan and exppbar > exppfp 
    [FWpackage1] 
    [ifelse exppsw > exppcan and exppbar < exppfp 
     [FWpackage2] 
     [ifelse exppsw < exppcan and exppbar > exppfp 
      [FWpackage3] 
      [FWpackage4]]]]]] 
 
[ask farmers 
  [ifelse exppsw > exppcan and exppbar > exppfp 
   [SWpackage1] 
   [ifelse exppsw > exppcan and exppbar < exppfp 
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    [SWpackage2] 
    [ifelse exppsw < exppcan and exppbar > exppfp 
     [SWpackage3] 
     [SWpackage4]]]]] 
  
end   
 
to SWpackage1 
set swr [mwmbw] of patch-here 
set canr [mwmbc] of patch-here 
set barr [mwmbb] of patch-here 
set fpr [mwmbf] of patch-here 
set fwr 0 
end 
to SWpackage2 
set swr [mwmfw] of patch-here 
set canr [mwmfc] of patch-here 
set barr [mwmfb] of patch-here 
set fpr [mwmff] of patch-here 
set fwr 0 
end 
to SWpackage3 
set swr [mcmbw] of patch-here 
set canr [mcmbc] of patch-here 
set barr [mcmbb] of patch-here 
set fpr [mcmbf] of patch-here 
set fwr 0 
end 
to SWpackage4 
set swr [mcmfw] of patch-here 
set canr [mcmfc] of patch-here 
set barr [mcmfb] of patch-here 
set fpr [mcmff] of patch-here 
set fwr 0 
end 
 
 
to FWpackage1 
set fwr [mwmbw] of patch-here 
set canr [mwmbc] of patch-here 
set barr [mwmbb] of patch-here 
set fpr [mwmbf] of patch-here 
set swr 0 
end 
to FWpackage2 
set fwr [mwmfw] of patch-here 
set canr [mwmfc] of patch-here 
set barr [mwmfb] of patch-here 
set fpr [mwmff] of patch-here 
set swr 0 
end 
to FWpackage3 
set fwr [mcmbw] of patch-here 
set canr [mcmbc] of patch-here 
set barr [mcmbb] of patch-here 
set fpr [mcmbf] of patch-here 
set swr 0 
end 
to FWpackage4 
set Fwr [mcmfw] of patch-here 
set canr [mcmfc] of patch-here 
set barr [mcmfb] of patch-here 
set fpr [mcmff] of patch-here 
set swr 0 
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end 
 
 
 
    
to plant 
  ask farmers[ 
    set swa swr * land    
    set cana canr * land 
    set fwa fwr * land 
    set fpa fpr * land 
    set bara barr * land 
  ] 
end 
   
 to store 
   ask farmers[ 
     set fstorsw round(swy * swa) 
     set fstorcan round(cany * cana)  
     set fstorfw round(fwy * fwa)  
     set fstorfp round(fpy * fpa ) 
     set fstorbar round(bary * bara) 
   ] 
  
  
 set fwithsw (farmers with [fstorsw > 0]) 
 set fwithbar (farmers with [fstorbar > 0]) 
 set fwithfp (farmers with [fstorfp > 0]) 
 set fwithcan (farmers with [fstorcan > 0]) 
 set fwithfw (farmers with [fstorfw > 0])  
  
 set fw/osw (farmers with [fstorsw = 0]) 
 set fw/obar (farmers with [fstorbar = 0]) 
 set fw/ofp (farmers with [fstorfp = 0]) 
 set fw/ocan (farmers with [fstorcan = 0]) 
 set fw/ofw (farmers with [fstorfw = 0])  
  
  
 set total-sw-production sum([fstorsw] of farmers)   
 set total-can-production sum([fstorcan] of farmers) 
 set total-fw-production sum([fstorfw] of farmers) 
 set total-fp-production sum([fstorfp] of farmers) 
 set total-bar-production sum([fstorbar] of farmers)    
 end 
  
 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; Compute COP ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
to cmpt-cop 
ifelse ticks = 0 
[ask farmers[ 
  set ucopsw ([swTVC]of patch-here )             
  set ucopcan ([canTVC]of patch-here) 
  set ucopbar ([barTVC]of patch-here) 
  set ucopfp ([fpTVC]of patch-here) 
  set ucopfw ([fwTVC]of patch-here) 
   
  set copsw ucopsw * swa                 
  set copcan ucopcan * cana  
  set copbar ucopbar * bara 
  set copfp ucopfp * fpa 
  set copfw ucopfw * fwa]] 
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[ask farmers[ 
  set ucopsw ucopsw + (([swfuel]of patch-here * (0.75 * (doil-price / 100))) 
+ ([swfert]of patch-here * (0.33 * (doil-price / 100))))                 
  set ucopcan ucopcan + (([canfuel]of patch-here *  (0.75 * (doil-price / 
100))) + ([canfert]of patch-here * (0.33 * (doil-price / 100)))) 
  set ucopbar ucopbar + (([barfuel]of patch-here * (0.75 * (doil-price / 
100))) + ([barfert]of patch-here * (0.33 * (doil-price / 100)))) 
  set ucopfp ucopfp + (([fpfuel]of patch-here * (0.75 * (doil-price / 100))) 
+ ([fpfert]of patch-here * (0.33 * (doil-price / 100)))) 
  set ucopfw ucopfw + (([fwfuel]of patch-here * (0.75 * (doil-price / 100))) 
+ ([fwfert]of patch-here * (0.33 * (doil-price / 100)))) 
 
  set copsw ucopsw * swa                 
  set copcan ucopcan * cana  
  set copbar ucopbar * bara 
  set copfp ucopfp * fpa 
  set copfw ucopfw * fwa]] 
; Fuel Elasticity Chacra 2002, Fertilizer Elasticity Baffes 2007 
      
end  
 
 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; Farmers Ship Grain ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;  
  
 to srchntruck 
   cmpt-gebasis 
   gesearch 
   truck 
   calc-truck-cost 
;   show "Trucking Complete" 
 end 
  
to cmpt-gebasis ;grain elevators set their prices 
; Have GEs set dockage and storage fees as some random function of the 
maximum tariffs set by the elevator co. & the number of GEs in close 
proximity 
  ifelse year = 2010 
  [ask cargills[ 
  set nclosege (count (all-ges in-radius (close / yfactor) ) - 1)  
  ifelse nclosege = 0 
  [set basissw CAmaxtariffsw 
   set basisbar CAmaxtariffbar 
   set basisfp CAmaxtariffp 
   set basiscan CAmaxtariffcan] 
      
   [set basissw CAmaxtariffsw - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basisbar CAmaxtariffbar - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basisfp CAmaxtariffp - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basiscan CAmaxtariffcan - ( 1 + random nclosege)]] 
   
  ask louisds[ 
  set nclosege (count (all-ges in-radius (close / yfactor) ) - 1)  
  ifelse nclosege = 0 
  [set basissw LDmaxtariffsw 
   set basisbar LDmaxtariffbar 
   set basisfp LDmaxtariffp 
   set basiscan LDmaxtariffcan] 
      
   [set basissw LDmaxtariffsw - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basisbar LDmaxtariffbar - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basisfp LDmaxtariffp - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basiscan LDmaxtariffcan - ( 1 + random nclosege)]] 
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  ask pattersons[ 
  set nclosege (count (all-ges in-radius (close / yfactor) ) - 1)  
  ifelse nclosege = 0 
  [set basissw PAmaxtariffsw 
   set basisbar PAmaxtariffbar 
   set basisfp PAmaxtariffp 
   set basiscan PAmaxtariffcan] 
      
   [set basissw PAmaxtariffsw - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basisbar PAmaxtariffbar - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basisfp PAmaxtariffp - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basiscan PAmaxtariffcan - ( 1 + random nclosege)]] 
       
  ask pnhs[ 
  set nclosege (count (all-ges in-radius (close / yfactor) ) - 1)  
  ifelse nclosege = 0 
  [set basissw PHmaxtariffsw 
   set basisbar PHmaxtariffbar 
   set basisfp PHmaxtariffp 
   set basiscan PHmaxtariffcan] 
      
   [set basissw PHmaxtariffsw - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basisbar PHmaxtariffbar - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basisfp PHmaxtariffp - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basiscan PHmaxtariffcan - ( 1 + random nclosege)]] 
         
   ask richardsons[ 
  set nclosege (count (all-ges in-radius (close / yfactor) ) - 1)  
  ifelse nclosege = 0 
  [set basissw RDmaxtariffsw 
   set basisbar RDmaxtariffbar 
   set basisfp RDmaxtariffp 
   set basiscan RDmaxtariffcan] 
      
   [set basissw RDmaxtariffsw - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basisbar RDmaxtariffbar - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basisfp RDmaxtariffp - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basiscan RDmaxtariffcan - ( 1 + random nclosege)]] 
           
  ask viterras[ 
  set nclosege (count (all-ges in-radius (close / yfactor) ) - 1)  
  ifelse nclosege = 0 
  [set basissw VImaxtariffsw 
   set basisbar VImaxtariffbar 
   set basisfp VImaxtariffp 
   set basiscan VImaxtariffcan] 
      
   [set basissw VImaxtariffsw - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basisbar VImaxtariffbar - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basisfp VImaxtariffp - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basiscan VImaxtariffcan - ( 1 + random nclosege)]] 
             
  ask otherges[ 
  set nclosege (count (all-ges in-radius (close / yfactor) ) - 1)  
  ifelse nclosege = 0 
  [set basissw OTmaxtariffsw 
   set basisbar OTmaxtariffbar 
   set basisfp OTmaxtariffp 
   set basiscan OTmaxtariffcan] 
      
   [set basissw OTmaxtariffsw - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basisbar OTmaxtariffbar - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basisfp OTmaxtariffp - ( 1 + random nclosege) 
    set basiscan OTmaxtariffcan - ( 1 + random nclosege)] 
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   ask cplants[ 
     set basiscan sum([basiscan] of all-ges)/ count all-ges + 10 ]]]             
; Crushing Plant basisis cost is the average of elevators' canola handling 
fee plus a crushing margin of $10 per M.T. 
 
 
 ; GE dies if the elevator basis price for all crops falls to zero  
   [ask all-ges 
    [ifelse (basissw <= 0 and basisbar <= 0 and basisfp = 0)  
      [die] 
      [; if the amt of ge crop storage is greater than average crop storage 
of other elevators in close proximity: increase basis by random function of 
number of elevators in close proximity, if less decrease, if equal remain the 
same 
       ifelse basissw = 0 
        [set basissw 0] 
        [ifelse gestorsw = 0  
         [set basissw basissw - min(list random close basissw)]  
         [ifelse gestorsw <  sum([gestorsw] of all-ges in-radius (close / 
yfactor) )/ count(all-ges in-radius (close / yfactor))                
          [set basissw basissw - min(list random close basissw)] 
         [ifelse gestorsw  >  sum([gestorsw] of all-ges in-radius (close / 
yfactor) )/ count(all-ges in-radius (close / yfactor)) 
          [set basissw basissw + random close] 
          [set basissw basissw]]]] 
        
        
       ifelse basisfp = 0 
        [set basisfp 0] 
        [ifelse gestorfp = 0 
         [set basisfp basisfp - min(list random close basisfp)] 
         [ifelse gestorfp <  sum([gestorfp] of all-ges in-radius (close / 
yfactor) )/ count(all-ges in-radius (close / yfactor)) 
          [set basisfp basisfp - min(list random close basisfp)] 
         [ifelse gestorfp >  sum([gestorfp] of all-ges in-radius (close / 
yfactor) )/ count(all-ges in-radius (close / yfactor)) 
          [set basisfp basisfp + random close] 
          [set basisfp basisfp]]]] 
        
        
        
       ifelse basisbar = 0 
        [set basisbar 0] 
        [ifelse gestorbar = 0  
         [set basisbar basisbar - min(list random close basisbar)] 
         [ifelse  gestorbar  <  sum([gestorbar] of all-ges in-radius (close / 
yfactor) )/ count(all-ges in-radius (close / yfactor)) 
          [set basisbar basisbar - min(list random close basisbar)] 
         [ifelse gestorbar  >  sum([gestorbar] of all-ges in-radius (close / 
yfactor) )/ count(all-ges in-radius (close / yfactor)) 
          [set basisbar basisbar + random close] 
          [set basisbar basisbar]]]] 
         
 
       ifelse basiscan = 0 
        [set basiscan 0] 
        [ifelse storcan = 0  
         [set basiscan basiscan - min(list random close basiscan)] 
         [ifelse  storcan  <  sum([storcan] of all-ges in-radius (close / 
yfactor) )/ count(all-ges in-radius (close / yfactor)) 
          [set basiscan basiscan - min(list random close basiscan)] 
         [ifelse storcan  >  sum([storcan] of all-ges in-radius (close / 
yfactor) )/ count(all-ges in-radius (close / yfactor)) 
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          [set basiscan basiscan + random close] 
          [set basiscan basiscan]]]]] 
       
     ask cplants[ 
     set basiscan sum([basiscan] of all-ges)/ count all-ges] 
     
    ]] 
 
 end 
 
 
  
to gesearch ;farmers look for grain elevators the lowest trucking cost and 
the lowest Storage and handling fees (tarrifs) 
 
;SW 
Ask farmers[ 
    set fgec-sw 0 
    set var1 [who] of all-ges with [distance myself < (trucking-threshold / 
yfactor)] 
    ] 
ask farmers[ 
  ifelse (count(all-ges with [distance myself < (trucking-threshold / 
yfactor)]) <= 1 ) 
   [set fgec-sw min-one-of all-ges [distance myself]] 
    
   [set fgec-sw min-one-of all-ges with [distance myself < (trucking-
threshold / yfactor)][basissw]] 
] 
 
 
;BARLEY 
Ask farmers[ 
    set fgec-bar 0 
    set var1 [who] of all-ges with [distance myself < (trucking-threshold / 
yfactor)]] 
ask farmers[ 
  ifelse (count(all-ges with [distance myself < (trucking-threshold / 
yfactor)]) <= 1 ) 
   [set fgec-bar min-one-of all-ges [distance myself]] 
    
   [set fgec-bar min-one-of all-ges with [distance myself < (trucking-
threshold / yfactor)][basisbar]] 
] 
 
;FIELD PEAS 
Ask farmers[ 
    set fgec-fp 0 
    set var1 [who] of all-ges with [distance myself < (trucking-threshold / 
yfactor)] 
    ] 
ask farmers[ 
  ifelse (count(all-ges with [distance myself < (trucking-threshold / 
yfactor)]) <= 1 ) 
   [set fgec-fp min-one-of all-ges [distance myself]] 
    
   [set fgec-fp min-one-of all-ges with [distance myself < (trucking-
threshold / yfactor)][basisfp]] 
] 
 
 
;INDUSTRIAL WHEAT 
  ask farmers[ 
    set fepc-fw min-one-of eps [distance myself]] 
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;CANOLA 
  ask farmers[ 
    set fghc-can min-one-of grainhandlers [distance myself]] 
end    
 
 
to truck 
 reset-vars  
  ask farmers[ 
   ask fgec-sw[set gestorsw gestorsw + [fstorsw] of myself] 
   ask fgec-bar[set gestorbar gestorbar + [fstorbar] of myself] 
   ask fgec-fp[set gestorfp gestorfp + [fstorfp] of myself] 
   ask fepc-fw[set epstorfw epstorfw + [fstorfw] of myself] 
   ask fghc-can[set storcan storcan + [fstorcan] of myself] 
    
   set basiscostsw [basissw] of fgec-sw * fstorsw 
   set basiscostcan [basiscan] of fghc-can * fstorcan 
   set basiscostbar [basisbar] of fgec-bar * fstorbar 
   set basiscostfp [basisfp] of fgec-fp * fstorfp] 
       
 
 set gewithsw (all-ges with [gestorsw > 0]) 
 set gewithbar (all-ges with [gestorbar > 0]) 
 set gewithfp (all-ges with [gestorfp > 0]) 
 set cpwithcan (cplants with [storcan > 0]) 
 set ghwithcan (grainhandlers with [storcan > 0]) 
 set epwithfw (eps with [epstorfw > 0])  
  
 set gew/osw (all-ges with [gestorsw = 0]) 
 set gew/obar (all-ges with [gestorbar = 0]) 
 set gew/ofp (all-ges with [gestorfp = 0]) 
 set cpw/ocan (cplants with [storcan = 0]) 
 set ghw/ocan (grainhandlers with [storcan = 0]) 
 set epw/ofw (eps with [epstorfw = 0])  
  
; show sum([gestorsw] of gewithsw) 
; show sum([gestorsw] of all-ges) 
; show sum([gestorbar] of all-ges) 
; show sum([gestorfp] of all-ges) 
; show sum([epstorfw] of eps) 
; show sum([storcan] of grainhandlers) 
  
end         
 
to calc-truck-cost ; calculate trucking cost as a function of the Euclidean 
Disitance from farmer to the grain elevator 
 
if ticks = 0 [set truck-surcharge 10] 
set truck-surcharge  truck-surcharge * (1 + ((doil-price / 100) * 1.04))              
; 1.04 represents the LR elasticity from the VEC 
   
  
  
  
 ask fwithsw[ 
 set edsw sqrt(([xcor] of self - [xcor] of fgec-sw) ^ 2 + ([ycor] of self - 
[ycor] of fgec-sw) ^ 2)  
 set trkdistsw sqrt((yfactor * ([ycor] of self - [ycor] of fgec-sw)) ^ 2 + 
((xfactor) ^ 2) * (((edsw) ^ 2)-(([ycor] of self - [ycor] of fgec-sw) ^ 2))) 
 set truckcostsw  (7.99592636077614 + trkdistsw * (0.061872896)) * [fstorsw] 
of self 
 set tottruckcsw truckcostsw * (1 + (truck-surcharge / 100))] 
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 ask fwithcan[   
 set edcan sqrt(([xcor] of self - [xcor] of fghc-can) ^ 2 + ([ycor] of self - 
[ycor] of fghc-can) ^ 2) 
 set trkdistcan sqrt((yfactor * ([ycor] of self - [ycor] of fghc-can)) ^ 2 + 
((xfactor) ^ 2) * (((edcan) ^ 2)-(([ycor] of self - [ycor] of fghc-can) ^ 
2))) 
 set truckcostcan  (6.66333846100087 + trkdistcan * (0.0515612610048975)) * 
[fstorcan] of self 
 set tottruckccan truckcostcan * (1 + (truck-surcharge / 100))] 
   
 ask fwithfw[   
 set edfw sqrt(([xcor] of self - [xcor] of fepc-fw) ^ 2 + ([ycor] of self - 
[ycor] of fepc-fw) ^ 2) 
 set trkdistfw sqrt((yfactor * ([ycor] of self - [ycor] of fepc-fw)) ^ 2 + 
((xfactor) ^ 2) * (((edfw) ^ 2)-(([ycor] of self - [ycor] of fepc-fw) ^ 2))) 
 set truckcostfw  (7.99592636077614 + trkdistfw * (0.061872896)) * [fstorfw] 
of self 
 set tottruckcfw truckcostfw * (1 + (truck-surcharge / 100))] 
  
 ask fwithfp[  
 set edfp sqrt(([xcor] of self - [xcor] of fgec-fp) ^ 2 + ([ycor] of self - 
[ycor] of fgec-fp) ^ 2) 
 set trkdistfp sqrt((yfactor * ([ycor] of self - [ycor] of fgec-fp)) ^ 2 + 
((xfactor) ^ 2) * (((edfp) ^ 2)-(([ycor] of self - [ycor] of fgec-fp) ^ 2))) 
 set truckcostfp  (7.99592636077614 + trkdistfp * (0.061872896)) * [fstorfp] 
of self 
 set tottruckcfp truckcostfp * (1 + (truck-surcharge / 100))] 
  
 ask fwithbar[  
 set edbar sqrt(([xcor] of self - [xcor] of fgec-bar) ^ 2 + ([ycor] of self - 
[ycor] of fgec-bar) ^ 2)   
 set trkdistbar sqrt((yfactor * ([ycor] of self - [ycor] of fgec-bar)) ^ 2 + 
((xfactor) ^ 2) * (((edbar) ^ 2)-(([ycor] of self - [ycor] of fgec-bar) ^ 
2))) 
 set truckcostbar  (6.39668886179948 + trkdistbar * (0.049497912480469)) * 
[fstorbar] of self 
 set tottruckcbar truckcostbar * (1 + (truck-surcharge / 100))]  
  
 
end 
 
 
 
to move-to-ports 
 
 
ask all-ges 
  [set VCswqty gestorsw * 0.429 
   set TBswqty gestorsw * 0.224 
   set domswqty gestorsw * 0.347 
    
    
   set VCbarqty gestorbar * 0.185                       
   set TBbarqty gestorbar * 0.025 
   set dombarqty gestorbar * 0.79 
    
    
   set VCfpqty gestorfp * 0.739                         
   set TBfpqty gestorfp * 0.06 
   set domfpqty gestorfp * 0.201 
   ] 
   
  ask all-ges 
  [set VCcanqty storcan * 0.892531876                        
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   set TBcanqty storcan * 0.107468124 
      ] 
   
  ask cplants 
  [set VCcanqty storcan * 0.49 
   set TBcanqty storcan * 0.059 
   set bdcanqty storcan * 0.451] 
   
      
 
 
    
set SWVCsupply sum([VCswqty] of all-ges) 
set SWTBsupply sum([TBswqty] of all-ges) 
set swdomsupply sum([domswqty] of all-ges) 
 
set BARVCsupply sum([VCbarqty] of all-ges) 
set BARTBsupply sum([TBbarqty] of all-ges) 
set bardomsupply sum([dombarqty] of all-ges) 
 
set fpVCsupply sum([VCfpqty] of all-ges) 
set fpTBsupply sum([TBfpqty] of all-ges) 
set fpdomsupply sum([domfpqty] of all-ges) 
 
set CANVCsupply sum([VCcanqty] of grainhandlers) 
set CANTBsupply sum([TBcanqty] of grainhandlers) 
set CANBDsupply sum([BDcanqty] of cplants) 
 
 
;;; Ask Ethanol Plants to process Grain and Move Excess Supply to Port ;;; 
 
set tot-exp-ethsupply 0 
 
if total-fw-production != 0[ 
ifelse year = 2010  
[set gasoline-demand 2560526000]                                       ; 2010 
Sales of Sask. Gasoline in Litres   
[set gasoline-demand (-7.83E+07 + (40050.67143 * year)) * 1000]        ; 
Saskatchewan Trend Regression of future gasoline demand 
 
set ethanol_demand (ethanol_mandate / 100) * gasoline-demand 
 
ask eps 
[set ethproduct (epstorfw * 371.7472119)]                              ; 
Wheat Grain Conversion Factor Derived from Dept. of food and Agriculture 
Govt. Western Australia May 2006 
 
set ethsupply sum([ethproduct] of eps) 
 
 
 
set total-dom-ethdemand ethanol_demand                                 ; Set 
domestic demand that will be supplied by the ethanol plants 
set nsgreatd (count(eps with[ethproduct > meanethdemand])) 
 
;Allocating Supply to domestic demand and/or Export Supply 
set meanethdemand (ethanol_demand / count(eps with [epstorfw > 0])) 
ifelse ethsupply >= ethanol_demand 
[ask eps with [ethproduct <= (meanethdemand)] 
    [set dom-ethsupply ethproduct 
     set exp-ethsupply 0 
     set total-dom-ethdemand total-dom-ethdemand - ethproduct] 
 ask eps with [ethproduct > (meanethdemand)] 
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    [set dom-ethsupply total-dom-ethdemand / (count(eps with[ethproduct > 
meanethdemand]))] 
  
 ask eps with [ethproduct > (meanethdemand)]    
    [set total-dom-ethdemand total-dom-ethdemand - dom-ethsupply 
     set exp-ethsupply ethproduct - dom-ethsupply]] 
 
[ifelse total-fw-production = 0 
  [ask eps 
    [set dom-ethsupply 0 
     set exp-ethsupply 0]] 
  [Ask eps 
    [set dom-ethsupply ethproduct 
     set exp-ethsupply 0 ]]]  
   
 set tot-exp-ethsupply sum([exp-ethsupply] of eps)] 
  
 
;; Ask Biodiesel Plant to process Canola and Move Excess Supply to Port ;;  
 
ifelse year = 2010  
; 2010 Sales of Sask. Gasoline in Litres  
[set diesel-demand 2447498000] 
; Trend Regression of future gasoline demand 
[set diesel-demand (-113470246.18  + (57558.72987 * year)) * 1000]     
 
set biodiesel_demand (biodiesel_mandate / 100) * diesel-demand 
 
ask bds 
[set bdproduct (canbdsupply * 1083.818759)] 
; Canola coversion factor of 1083.82 computed from data collected from FAPRI 
Missouri 
 
set Biodsupply sum([bdproduct] of bds) 
 
 
;Allocating Supply to domestic demand and/or Export Supply 
ifelse Biodsupply >= biodiesel_demand 
[ask bds 
   [set dom-Biodsupply biodiesel_demand 
    set exp-Biodsupply Biodsupply - biodiesel_demand 
    ]] 
 
[ifelse total-can-production = 0 
  [ask bds 
    [set dom-Biodsupply 0 
     set exp-Biodsupply 0]] 
  [Ask Bds 
    [set dom-Biodsupply bdproduct 
     set exp-Biodsupply 0 ]]]  
   
 set tot-exp-Biodsupply sum([exp-Biodsupply] of bds)  
end  
  
  
  
to calc-railcost 
set rail-surcharge truck-surcharge 
 
Ask all-ges 
[set swrailcVC round((VCswqty) * (railcost * 0.02097) * distvc / 1.609344) * 
(1 + (rail-surcharge / 100)) 
 set swrailcTB round((TBswqty) * (railcost * 0.02097)  * distTB / 1.609344) * 
(1 + (rail-surcharge / 100)) 
178 
 
 
  
 set barrailcVC round((VCbarqty) * (railcost * 0.02097) * distvc / 1.609344) 
* (1 + (rail-surcharge / 100)) 
 set barrailcTB round((TBbarqty) * (railcost * 0.02097) * distTB / 1.609344) 
* (1 + (rail-surcharge / 100)) 
 
  
 set fprailcVC round((VCfpqty) * (railcost * 0.02097) * distvc / 1.609344) * 
(1 + (rail-surcharge / 100))  
 set fprailcTB round((TBfpqty) * (railcost * 0.02097) * distTB / 1.609344) * 
(1 + (rail-surcharge / 100)) 
 
 
 set swtotrcost swrailcVC + swrailcTB  
 set bartotrcost barrailcVC + barrailcTB 
 set fptotrcost fprailcVC + fprailcTB 
 
]   
ask grainhandlers 
[set canrailcVC round((VCcanqty) * (railcost * 0.02097) * distvc / 1.609344) 
* (1 + (rail-surcharge / 100)) 
 set canrailcTB round((TBcanqty) * (railcost * 0.02097) * distTB / 1.609344) 
* (1 + (rail-surcharge / 100)) 
 set cantotrcost canrailcVC + canrailcTB]  
 
 
ask cplants 
 [set canrailcBD round((BDcanqty) * (railcost * 0.02097) * distBD / 1.609344) 
* (1 + (rail-surcharge / 100)) 
  set cantotrcost  cantotrcost + canrailcBD] 
  
ask bds 
 [set canrailcVC round(((exp-biodsupply * 0.000885)) * (railcost * 0.02097) * 
distVC / 1.609344) * (1 + (rail-surcharge / 100)) ; Biodiesel litres is 
converted back to MT to calculate rail cost to VC 
  set cantotrcost  canrailcVC]  
  
ifelse total-fw-production = 0 
[ask eps 
 [set ethrailc 0 
  set ethtotrcost  ethrailc]]  
[ask eps 
 [ifelse ethproduct = 0 
 [set ethrailc 0 
  set ethtotrcost  ethrailc] 
 [set ethrailc round(((exp-ethsupply * 0.0007892)) * (railcost * 0.02097) * 
distVC / 1.609344) * (1 + (rail-surcharge / 100))       ; ethanol litres is 
converted back to MT to calculate rail cost to VC 
  set ethtotrcost  ethrailc]]] 
 
 
 ask fwithsw[set railcostsw (fstorsw / [gestorsw] of fgec-sw) * [swtotrcost] 
of fgec-sw] 
 ask fwithbar[set railcostbar (fstorbar / [gestorbar] of fgec-bar) * 
[bartotrcost] of fgec-bar] 
 ask fwithfp[set railcostfp (fstorfp / [gestorfp] of fgec-fp) * [fptotrcost] 
of fgec-fp] 
 ask fwithcan[ 
   ifelse [breed] of fghc-can !=  cplants  
   [set railcostcan (fstorcan / [storcan] of fghc-can) * [cantotrcost] of 
fghc-can] 
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   [set railcostcan (fstorcan / [storcan] of fghc-can) * ([cantotrcost] of 
fghc-can + ([bdcanqty] of fghc-can / canbdsupply) * [cantotrcost] of bd 
37139)]] 
  
  
 ask fwithfw[set railcostfw (fstorfw / [epstorfw] of fepc-fw) * [ethtotrcost] 
of fepc-fw] 
 
;show "Computation of Rail Cost Complete" 
  
end 
 
 
 
to ocean-freight 
Ask farmers[ 
  set OFCsw 0 
  set OFCbar 0 
  set OFCfp 0 
  set OFCfw 0 
  set OFCcan 0] 
Ask all-ges[ 
  set ofcostsw 0 
  set ofcostbar 0 
  set ofcostfp 0 
  set ofcostcan 0] 
Ask cplants[ 
  set ofcostcan 0] 
Ask bds[ 
  set ofcostcan 0] 
ask eps[ 
  set ofcostfw 0] 
 
 
if OceanFreight[ 
 ifelse ticks = 0[ 
   set OFReast  19.67 
   set OFRwest  26.38 
   ask all-ges[ 
     set ofcostsw OFRwest * vcswqty + OFReast * tbswqty 
     set ofcostbar OFRwest * vcbarqty + OFReast * tbbarqty 
     set ofcostcan OFRwest * vccanqty + OFReast * tbcanqty 
     set ofcostfp OFRwest * vcfpqty + OFReast * tbfpqty] 
    
   ask bds[ 
     set ofcostcan exp-biodsupply * 0.000885 * OFRwest] 
   ask cplants[ 
     set ofcostcan (([ofcostcan] of bd 37139) * [bdcanqty] of self / 
canbdsupply) + vccanqty * OFRwest + tbcanqty * OFReast] 
   ask eps[ 
     set ofcostfw exp-ethsupply * 0.0007892 * OFRwest] 
    
   ask fwithsw[ 
     set OFCsw fstorsw / [gestorsw] of fgec-sw * [ofcostsw] of fgec-sw] 
   ask fwithbar[ 
     set OFCbar fstorbar / [gestorbar] of fgec-bar * [ofcostbar] of fgec-bar] 
   ask fwithfp[ 
     set OFCfp fstorfp / [gestorfp] of fgec-fp * [ofcostfp] of fgec-fp] 
   ask fwithfw[ 
     set OFCfw fstorfw / [epstorfw] of fepc-fw * [ofcostfw] of fepc-fw] 
   ask fwithcan[ 
     set OFCcan fstorcan / [storcan] of fghc-can * [ofcostcan] of fghc-can]] 
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[ 
   set OFReast  OFReast *( 1 + (0.337 * (doil-price / 100)))   ;Growth 
elasticity obtained from Hummels (2007), Initital values obtained as estimate 
Canadian Grain Exports 2010/11 
   set OFRwest  OFRwest *( 1 + (0.337 * (doil-price / 100))) 
   ask all-ges[ 
     set ofcostsw OFRwest * vcswqty + OFReast * tbswqty 
     set ofcostbar OFRwest * vcbarqty + OFReast * tbbarqty 
     set ofcostcan OFRwest * vccanqty + OFReast * tbcanqty 
     set ofcostfp OFRwest * vcfpqty + OFReast * tbfpqty] 
    
   ask bds[ 
     set ofcostcan exp-biodsupply * 0.000885 * OFRwest] 
   ask cplants[ 
     set ofcostcan (([ofcostcan] of bd 37139) * [bdcanqty] of self / 
canbdsupply) + vccanqty * OFRwest + tbcanqty * OFReast] 
   ask eps[ 
     set ofcostfw exp-ethsupply * 0.0007892 * OFRwest] 
    
   ask fwithsw[ 
     set OFCsw fstorsw / [gestorsw] of fgec-sw * [ofcostsw] of fgec-sw] 
   ask fwithbar[ 
     set OFCbar fstorbar / [gestorbar] of fgec-bar * [ofcostbar] of fgec-bar] 
   ask fwithfp[ 
     set OFCfp fstorfp / [gestorfp] of fgec-fp * [ofcostfp] of fgec-fp] 
   ask fwithfw[ 
     set OFCfw fstorfw / [epstorfw] of fepc-fw * [ofcostfw] of fepc-fw] 
   ask fwithcan[ 
     set OFCcan fstorcan / [storcan] of fghc-can * [ofcostcan] of fghc-can]] 
] 
end   
 
 
 
 
to price-react 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; Price Reaction For Bioethanol Crops;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
 
set pgast (42.23218 + 0.562963 * crude-price)/ 100                             
; Gas price per litre method extracted from Tyner & Taheripour 2007. Used VEC 
and Regina Gas and Cdn Oilprice per barrel for estimation 
set petht ((0.625  * pgast) + (eth-subsidy / 100)) * (1 - (ethprofit / 100))   
; Ethanol Price is 70% but use 62.5% (pimentel(2003) of the Gas price (Tyner 
& Taheripour 2007) and calibrated to obtain reasonable ethanol price stimates  
 
 
ifelse ticks = 0 
[set epmargin 0.30]                                                            
; Rilett 2003= 0.60-0.70+ (assumed $0.75)grown at PPI rate of 9.5% (2002-
2010)= ($0.82125) with assumed 36% accrued to Non feedstock costs= approx. 
$0.30/L  
[set epmargin epmargin + (0.2 *(0.75 * (doil-price / 100)))] 
set fethp (petht - epmargin) 
set pfwt fethp * 371.7472119 
 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; Price Reaction For Biodiesel Crops ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
      
 
set pdt (33.14212 + 0.51646 * crude-price)/ 100                                 
;  
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set pbdt ((0.9 * pdt) + (Bd-subsidy / 100)) * (1 - (ethprofit / 100))           
;BioDiesel Price is 90% of the Diesel price Dept. of food and Agriculture 
Govt. Western Australia May 2006 
 
 
ifelse ticks = 0 
[set bdmargin 0.66] 
[set bdmargin bdmargin + (0.14 * (0.75 * (doil-price / 100)))] 
set fbdp (pbdt - bdmargin) 
set pbdcant fbdp * 1083.818759 
 
set pcanenergy (pbdcant * sum([bdcanqty] of cplants) + wpcan * 
(sum([vccanqty] of cplants) + sum([tbcanqty] of cplants))) / sum([storcan] of 
cplants) 
set pcanfood wpcan 
end 
 
to set-tax-exemptions 
ifelse scenset = 1 or scenset = 2 
 [ifelse year = 2010 
  [set eth-subsidy 25 
   set bd-subsidy 39] 
  [ifelse year = 2011 
   [set eth-subsidy 24 
    set bd-subsidy 35] 
   [ifelse year = 2012 
    [set eth-subsidy 23 
     set bd-subsidy 33] 
    [ifelse year = 2013 
     [set eth-subsidy 22 
      set bd-subsidy 29] 
     [ifelse year = 2014 
      [set eth-subsidy 21 
       set bd-subsidy 25] 
      [ifelse year = 2015 
       [set eth-subsidy 20 
        set bd-subsidy 23] 
       [ifelse year = 2016 
        [set eth-subsidy 19 
         set bd-subsidy 21] 
        [ifelse year = 2017 
         [set eth-subsidy 18 
          set bd-subsidy 19] 
         [set eth-subsidy 18 
          set bd-subsidy 21]]]]]]]]] 
  [set eth-subsidy 25 
   set bd-subsidy 39] 
end 
 
 
to calc-margin 
   
   
  ask farmers 
  [set fgpsw  0 
   set fgpcan  0 
   set fgpbar  0 
   set fgpfp 0 
   set fgpfw  0] 
   
   
  ifelse ticks = 0 
  [ask farmers 
   [set fwcmemory (tottruckcsw + copsw) / (fstorsw) 
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    set swcmemory (tottruckcsw + basiscostsw + railcostsw + copsw + OFCsw) / 
(fstorsw)]] 
  [ask farmers 
    [if fstorsw > 0 
      [set swcmemory (tottruckcsw + basiscostsw + railcostsw + copsw + OFCsw) 
/ (fstorsw)] 
     if fstorfw > 0 
      [set fwcmemory (tottruckcfw + railcostfw + copfw + OFCfw) / 
(fstorfw)]]] 
      
   
  ask farmers 
  [ifelse fstorsw = 0 
   [set fgpsw wpsw - swcmemory 
    set vcsw swcmemory] 
   [set fgpsw ((wpsw * fstorsw) - tottruckcsw - basiscostsw - railcostsw - 
copsw - OFCsw) / (fstorsw) 
    set vcsw (tottruckcsw + basiscostsw + railcostsw + copsw + OFCsw) / 
fstorsw] 
    
    
   set fgpbar ((wpbar * fstorbar) - tottruckcbar - basiscostbar - railcostbar 
- copbar - OFCbar) / (fstorbar) 
   set vcbar (tottruckcbar + basiscostbar + railcostbar + copbar + OFCbar) / 
(fstorbar) 
    
 
   set fgpfp ((wpfp * fstorfp) - tottruckcfp - basiscostfp - railcostfp - 
copfp - OFCfp) / (fstorfp) 
   set vcfp (tottruckcfp + basiscostfp + railcostfp + copfp + OFCfp) / 
(fstorfp) 
 
   ifelse fstorfw = 0 
   [set fgpfw pfwt - fwcmemory 
    set vcfw fwcmemory] 
   [set fgpfw ((pfwt * fstorfw) - tottruckcfw - copfw - railcostfw - OFCfw) / 
(fstorfw) 
    set vcfw  (tottruckcfw + copfw + railcostfw + OFCfw) / (fstorfw)] 
    
 
   ifelse [breed] of fghc-can =  cplants 
     [set fgpcan ((pcanenergy * fstorcan) - tottruckccan - railcostcan - 
copcan - basiscostcan - OFCcan) / (fstorcan) 
      set vccan (tottruckccan - railcostcan - copcan - basiscostcan - OFCcan) 
/ (fstorcan)] 
     [set fgpcan ((pcanfood * fstorcan) - tottruckccan - railcostcan - copcan 
- basiscostcan - OFCcan) / (fstorcan) 
      set vccan (tottruckccan - railcostcan - copcan - basiscostcan - OFCcan) 
/ (fstorcan)] 
] 
set Biod-fgpcan sum([fgpcan] of farmers with[[breed] of fghc-can = cplants]) 
/ count(farmers with[[breed] of fghc-can = cplants])   
 
;Show "Computation of Margin Complete"   
 end 
  
  
 
to calc-means 
 
ifelse total-sw-production = 0 
[set meanrailcostSW 0 
 set meantruckcostsw 0 
 set meangmsw 0 
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 set meancopsw 0 
 set meanofcsw 0] 
[set meanrailcostSW sum([railcostsw] of farmers)/ total-sw-production 
 set meantruckcostsw sum([tottruckcsw] of farmers)/ total-sw-production 
 set meangmsw sum([fgpsw] of fwithsw) / count(fwithsw) 
 set meancopsw (sum([copsw] of fwithsw) )/ total-sw-production 
 set meanofcsw (sum([ofcsw] of fwithsw) )/ total-sw-production] 
 
ifelse total-bar-production = 0 
[set meanrailcostBAR 0 
 set meantruckcostBAR 0 
 set meangmbar 0 
 set meancopbar 0 
 set meanofcbar 0] 
[set meanrailcostBAR sum([railcostbar] of farmers)/ total-bar-production 
 set meantruckcostBAR sum([tottruckcBAR] of farmers)/ total-BAR-production 
 set meangmbar sum([fgpbar] of fwithbar) / count(fwithbar) 
 set meancopbar (sum([copbar] of fwithbar) )/ total-bar-production 
 set meanofcbar (sum([ofcbar] of fwithbar) )/ total-bar-production] 
 
ifelse total-can-production = 0 
[set meanrailcostCAN 0 
 set meantruckcostCAN 0 
 set meangmcan 0 
 set meancopcan 0 
 set meanofccan 0] 
[set meanrailcostCAN sum([railcostcan] of farmers)/ total-can-production 
 set meantruckcostCAN sum([tottruckcCAN] of farmers)/ total-can-production 
 set meangmcan sum([fgpcan] of fwithcan) / count(fwithcan) 
 set meancopcan (sum([copcan] of fwithcan) )/ total-can-production 
 set meanofccan (sum([ofccan] of fwithcan) )/ total-can-production] 
 
ifelse total-fp-production = 0 
[set meanrailcostFP 0 
 set meantruckcostFP 0 
 set meangmfp 0 
 set meancopfp 0 
 set meanofcfp 0] 
[set meanrailcostFP sum([railcostfp] of farmers)/ total-fp-production 
 set meantruckcostFP sum([truckcostFP] of farmers)/ total-fp-production 
 set meangmfp sum([fgpfp] of fwithfp) / count(fwithfp) 
 set meancopfp (sum([copfp] of fwithfp) )/ total-fp-production 
 set meanofcfp (sum([ofcfp] of fwithfp) )/ total-fp-production] 
 
 
ifelse total-fw-production = 0 
[set meanrailcostfw 0 
 set meantruckcostfw 0 
 set meangmfw 0 
 set meancopfw 0 
 set meanofcfw 0] 
[set meanrailcostfw sum([railcostfw] of farmers)/ total-fp-production 
 set meantruckcostfw sum([tottruckcfw] of farmers)/ total-fw-production 
 set meangmfw sum([fgpfw] of fwithfw) / count(fwithfw) 
 set meancopfw (sum([copfw] of fwithfw) )/ total-fw-production 
 set meanofcfw (sum([ofcfw] of fwithfw) )/ total-fw-production] 
 
 set meangebasissw (sum([basissw] of All-ges) )/ count(all-ges) 
 set meangebasisfp (sum([basisfp] of All-ges) )/ count(all-ges) 
 set meangebasisbar (sum([basisbar] of All-ges) )/ count(all-ges) 
 set meangebasiscan (sum([basiscan] of All-ges) )/ count(all-ges) 
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end 
  
to do-plots 
 
  set-current-plot "Crop Production" 
  set-current-plot-pen "SW" 
  plot total-sw-production 
  set-current-plot-pen "CAN" 
  plot total-can-production 
  set-current-plot-pen "FW" 
  plot total-fw-production 
  set-current-plot-pen "FP" 
  plot total-fp-production 
  set-current-plot-pen "BAR" 
  plot total-bar-production 
 
   
  set-current-plot "Average Gross Margins of Farmers" 
  set-current-plot-pen "PSW" 
  plot meangmsw 
  set-current-plot-pen "PCAN" 
  plot meangmcan 
  set-current-plot-pen "PFW" 
  plot meangmfw 
  set-current-plot-pen "PFP" 
  plot meangmfp 
  set-current-plot-pen "PBAR" 
  plot meangmbar 
 
   
  set-current-plot "Average Rail Costs $/M.T." 
  set-current-plot-pen "SW" 
  plot meanrailcostSW 
  set-current-plot-pen "CAN" 
  plot meanrailcostcan 
  set-current-plot-pen "FP" 
  plot meanrailcostfp 
  set-current-plot-pen "BAR" 
  plot meanrailcostbar 
  set-current-plot-pen "FW" 
  plot meanrailcostfw 
 
  set-current-plot "Average Trucking Costs $/M.T." 
  set-current-plot-pen "SW" 
  plot meantruckcostsw 
  set-current-plot-pen "CAN" 
  plot meantruckcostcan 
  set-current-plot-pen "FP" 
  plot meantruckcostfp 
  set-current-plot-pen "BAR" 
  plot meantruckcostbar 
  set-current-plot-pen "FW" 
  plot meantruckcostfw 
   
  set-current-plot "Average Transpotation Costs $/M.T." 
  set-current-plot-pen "SW" 
  plot meantruckcostsw + meanrailcostSW + meanofcsw 
  set-current-plot-pen "CAN" 
  plot meantruckcostcan + meanrailcostcan + meanofccan 
  set-current-plot-pen "FP" 
  plot meantruckcostfp + meanrailcostfp + meanofcfp 
  set-current-plot-pen "BAR" 
  plot meantruckcostbar + meanrailcostbar + meanofcbar 
  set-current-plot-pen "FW" 
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  plot meantruckcostfw + meanrailcostfw + meanofcfw 
   
  set-current-plot "Average Basis Cost $/M.T." 
  set-current-plot-pen "SW" 
  plot meangebasissw 
  set-current-plot-pen "FP" 
  plot meangebasisfp 
  set-current-plot-pen "BAR" 
  plot meangebasisbar 
  set-current-plot-pen "CAN" 
  plot meangebasiscan 
  
  
  
  set-current-plot "Average Production Cost $/M.T." 
  set-current-plot-pen "SW" 
  plot meancopsw 
  set-current-plot-pen "FP" 
  plot meancopfp 
  set-current-plot-pen "BAR" 
  plot meancopbar 
  set-current-plot-pen "CAN" 
  plot meancopcan 
   set-current-plot-pen "FW" 
  plot meancopfw 
   
end 
 
 
 
 
 
to output-vars 
 
ifelse ticks = 0 
[set gebswlist (list meangebasissw) 
 set gebfplist (list meangebasisfp) 
 set gebbarlist (list meangebasisbar) 
 set gebcanlist (list meangebasiscan) 
 set ngelist (list count(all-ges))] 
[set gebswlist lput meangebasissw gebswlist 
 set gebfplist lput meangebasisfp gebfplist 
 set gebbarlist lput meangebasisbar gebbarlist 
 set gebcanlist lput meangebasiscan gebcanlist 
 set ngelist (lput count(all-ges) ngelist)] 
 
 
if ticks = (20 - 1) 
[set avgebasissw sum(gebswlist) / length(gebswlist) 
 set avgebasisfp sum(gebfplist) / length(gebfplist) 
 set avgebasisbar sum(gebbarlist) / length(gebbarlist) 
 set avgebasiscan sum(gebcanlist) / length(gebcanlist) 
] 
 
 
 
 
 
ifelse ticks = 0  
[set swpricelist (list wpsw)] 
[set swpricelist lput wpsw swpricelist] 
 
ifelse ticks = 0  
[set fwpricelist (list pfwt)] 
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[set fwpricelist lput pfwt fwpricelist] 
 
ifelse ticks = 0  
[set cppricelist (list crude-price)] 
[set cppricelist lput crude-price cppricelist] 
 
ifelse ticks = 0  
[set swprodlist (list total-sw-production)] 
[set swprodlist lput total-sw-production swprodlist] 
 
ifelse ticks = 0  
[set fwprodlist (list total-fw-production)] 
[set fwprodlist lput total-fw-production fwprodlist] 
 
if ticks = (15 - 1)[ 
  Output-show "Scenario:" Output-show (word "Timepath:" timepath ",seed:" 
rand-seed ",Oil:"Doil-price",Esub:"eth-subsidy) 
  Output-show "swprodlist:"Output-show swprodlist 
  Output-show "fwprodlist:"Output-show fwprodlist   
  Output-show "swpricelist:"Output-show swpricelist 
  Output-show "fwpricelist:"Output-show fwpricelist 
  Output-show "cppricelist:"Output-show cppricelist 
  Output-show "gebswlist:"Output-show gebswlist 
  Output-show "gebcanlist:"Output-show gebcanlist 
  Output-show "gebbarlist:"Output-show gebbarlist 
  Output-show "gebfplist:"Output-show gebfplist 
  Output-show "ngelist:"Output-show ngelist    
  Output-show "" 
  Output-show ""] 
 
end  
  
  
  
 
to reset-vars 
reset-farmers-vars   
reset-ge-vars 
reset-ep-vars 
reset-cp-vars 
end 
 
to reset-farmers-vars 
 ask farmers 
 [ set railcostsw 0 
   set railcostbar 0 
   set railcostcan 0 
   set railcostfp 0 
   set railcostfw 0 
    
   set truckcostsw 0 
   set truckcostbar 0 
   set truckcostcan 0 
   set truckcostfp 0 
   set truckcostfw 0 
    
   set tottruckcsw 0 
   set tottruckcbar 0 
   set tottruckccan 0 
   set tottruckcfp 0 
   set tottruckcfw 0 
   ] 
 
 end 
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to reset-ge-vars 
ask all-ges 
 [set gestorsw 0 
  set gestorbar 0 
  set gestorfp 0] 
end 
to reset-cp-vars  
ask grainhandlers 
 [set storcan 0] 
end 
 
to reset-ep-vars 
ask eps 
 [set epstorfw 0] 
end 
 
 
 
 
to setup-var-next-period  
 
  
  
  
  
  
end    
 
 
 
 
to go 
  if ticks = 0 
  [scenario1]  
   
  if ticks = 15 
  [stop 
   scenario1] 
  if ticks = 4 
  [scenarioset] 
  set-world-prices 
  set-tax-exemptions 
  produce  
  srchntruck 
  move-to-ports 
  calc-railcost 
  ocean-freight 
  price-react 
  calc-margin 
  calc-means 
  do-plots 
  setup-var-next-period 
  output-vars 
   tick 
   go 
end 
   
to get-fwfarmers 
  ask farmers with [fstorfw > 0] [set color orange] 
end 
 
to get-biodfarmers 
  ask farmers with[[breed] of fghc-can = cplants][set color green] 
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  ask farmers with [fstorcan = 0][set color blue] 
end 
 
to reset-farmers 
  ask farmers[set color blue] 
  ask patches[ set pcolor white] 
end   
 
to show-ge-close-buffer 
  ask all-ges[ask patches in-radius close[set pcolor yellow]] 
end 
   
 
to seedtime1 
set rand-seed 100 
set timepath 1 
set Doil-price 0 
set scenset 1 
setup 
end 
 
to seedtime2-4 
set rand-seed 100 
set timepath 1 
set Doil-price 0 
setup 
end 
 
 
to scenarioset 
ifelse scenset = 1 
[scenario1] 
[ifelse scenset = 2 
 [scenario2] 
 [ifelse scenset = 3 
  [scenario1] 
  [scenario2]]] 
end   
 
 
 
to scenario1 
set Doil-price 0 
end 
 
to scenario2 
set Doil-price 10    
end 
 
 
to replicate 
 go 
 set timepath timepath + 1 
 ifelse timepath = 51  
   [set timepath 1 
    exportout 
    set scenset scenset + 1] 
   [reset 
    replicate] 
 
end 
 
to doruns 
 seedtime1 
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 replicate   
 seedtime2-4 
 replicate 
 seedtime2-4 
 replicate 
 seedtime2-4 
 replicate 
end 
 
to exportout 
  export-output (word "data/Output/Setting_P10_S100/seed_" rand-seed 
"_oil_"Doil-price"_esub_"eth-subsidy".csv") 
end 
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APPENDIX D: FARMCHAIN MODEL TABLE OF INITIAL VALUES AND 
PARAMETERS 
Table D1 is lists the values of structural parameters and initial values used in the FARMCHAIN 
model. 
Table D1. Structural Parameter and Initial Values in the FARMCHAIN Model 
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Table D1. Structural Parameter and Initial Values in the FARMCHAIN Model
 
Source: Created by author with data from the FARMCHAIN model. 
 
